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I. INTRODUCTION
In Part I of this Article, we described the Riot Commission model
of the criminal process as one of "business as usual" with a few excep-
tions. Neither the goals nor procedures of the criminal process
in an emergency differ substantially from the administration of justice in
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THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCaDIma (1974) [hereinafter cited as URCP];
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STAND-
ARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE (1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS
RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE];
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
(Proposed Official Draft 1975) [hereinafter cited as ALl PRE-ARRAIGNmENT CODE];
W. DOBROVIR, JUSTICE IN TIME OF CRISIS (1969) [hereinafter cited as DOBROvIR];
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, A
NATIONAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE CRIME (1972) [hereinafter cited as NAC STANDARDS];
REPORT OF THE COMMIrrEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE UNDER EMER-
GENCY CONDITIONS, The Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit (1973)
[hereinafter cited as 1973 D.C. REPORT];
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968)
[hereinafter cited as CIVIL DISORDERs REPORT] (the Commission will be referred to as
the Riot Commission);
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non-emergency conditions.' We noted that police, counsel, and courts
did not receive high marks when judged by such a standard,2 and sug-
gested the need for a different conception of the purposes of the criminal
process during serious civil disorders and the adoption of special pro-
cedures and practices to accomplish those purposes.3
In this Part, we shall discuss (1) the special powers which we
think should be entrusted to civilian authorities during serious civil
disorders; (2) the constitutional justification for such powers; and (3)
F. WIENER, A PAcncAL MANauAL oF M~AR'I. LAw (1940) [hereinafter cited as
WIENER];
Colista & Domonkos, Bail and Civil Disorder, 45 J. URBAn L. 815 (1968) [herein-
after cited as Bail and Civil Disorder];
Pye & Lowell, The Criminal Process During Civil Disorders, 1975 DU L.J. 581
[hereinafter cited as Part I];
Criminal Justice in Extremis: Administration of Justice During the April 1968
Chicago Disorder, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 455 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Justice
in Extremis];
Developments in the Law-The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85
HAuv. L. REV. 1130 (1972) [hereinafter cited as National Security Interest and Civil
Liberties];
Survey, The Long, Hot Summer: A Legal View, 43 NOTRE DAm.E LAw. 913 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Long, Hot Summer];
Comment, Riot Control Legislation: A Necessary Evil, 46 DENVER LJ. 152 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Riot Control Legislation];
Note, Bail and Preventive Detention During Riots: A Proposal, 35 BRooKLYN L.
REv. 417 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bail and Preventive Detention];
Note, Riot Control: The Constitutional Limits of Search, Arrest and Fair Trial
Procedure, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 85 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Limits on Riot Control];
Note, Riot Control and the Fourth Amendment, 81 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Riots and the Fourth Amendment].
1. See Part I 589-94.
2. See Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 'U.S. 880
(1973); CIVIL DISORDERS REPORT ch. 13; 1973 D.C. REPORT. See also DoBRoVm; T.
HAYDEN, REBELLIONS nr Naw -u: OFFICIAL VIOLENCE AND GHsrro RESPONSE (1967);
Botein & Stem, Civil Liberties and Civil Disorders: Are They Reconcilable, 14 N.Y.L.F.
763 (1968); Crockett, Recorders Court and the 1967 Civil Disturbance, 45 J. URBAN L.
841 (1968); Dodds & Dempsey, Civil Disorders: The Impact of Mass Arrests on the
Criminal Justice System, 35 BRoOKLYN L. REv. 355 (1969); Ginsberg & Starkman, Civil
Disturbances, Mass Processing and Mlisdemeanants: Rights, Remedies and Realities, 61
J. CmrM. L.C. & P.S. 39 (1970); Kaufman, Kunstler, Carter & Dodds, Lawyers Look at
Civil Disturbances, 25 BAR BULL. N.Y. Crry LAWYERS' Ass'N 118 (1967-68); Locke,
Riot Response: The Police and the Courts, 45 J. URBAN L. 805 (1968); Sengstock, Riots
and Mass Criminal Justice: The Collapse of the Bill of Rights, 26 LEGAL Am BRIEFCASE
201 (1968); Criminal Justice in Extremis; Symposium, Proper Handling of Mass Arrests:
The Experience of Two Cities, 46 DENVER LJ. 26 (1969); The Long, Hot Summer;
Comment, The Administration of Justice in the Wake of the Detroit Civil Disorder of
July 1967, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1544- (1968); Comment, Contingency Profile on the
Administration of Justice Under Emergency Conditions in Kansas City, Missouri, 39 U.
Mo. K.C.L. REV. 408 (1971).
3. See Part 1 595-603.
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the protection that should be provided to ensure that the powers are not
utilized except on occasions justifying departure from the normal crimi-
nal process. We shall confine our attention primarily to the subjects of
arrest, detention, search and seizure, and prosecutorial discretion.
There are obviously other areas that appropriately could be con-
sidered, and some will doubtlessly disagree with our selection. The
purpose here is not to provide a blueprint for codification. Rather, it is
to stimulate a reconsideration of the purposes of the criminal process in
serious emergencies, and to provide examples of the types of authority
that a legislature might choose to confer upon its executive and judicial
authorities if our concept of the different nature of the criminal process
in serious disorders is accepted. Initially, it is appropriate to examine
briefly some of the state legislation in the area that has been enacted in
the wake of the disorders of the last decade.
II. STATE EMERGENCY POWER LEGISLATION
Following the civil disorders of the sixties, several states enacted
special legislation setting forth powers that may be utilized to quell a
civil disorder. The catalyst for these legislative actions was apparently
the report of the Riot Commission. After reviewing the laws that were in
permanent force in most states, the Commission observed that "[e]ffec-
tive control of a civil disorder may require special laws in addition to the
normal complement of penal statutes and ordinances."4 Although it did
not specify what powers should be established by such legislation,,; it did
suggest that the statutory provisions be drawn to "provide for a specific,
limited response to a particular problem, rather than wide-ranging
emergency powers." 6
The emergency power statutes that have been enacted are designed
to provide specific powers during the period of an emergency. 7 Normal-
4. Cviir DisouREs REPoRaT 290.
5. The Commission, however, suggested two possible powers: the power to seal
off areas and the power to impose curfews. Id.
6. Id. Although not referred to by the Commission, a 1965 study had indicated that
in only four states were there emergency power statutes, and that each was couched in
broad, general language. See Comment, Constitutional and Statutory Bases of Governors'
Emergency Powers, 64 MicH. L. Rav. 290, 299 (1965). See also Crum, The National
Guard and Riot Control: The Need for Revision, 45 J. Ui"N L. 863, 874 (1968).
7. Several of the statutes specifically recite the legislative findings that underlie the
provisions enacted. The Maryland statute, for example, provides that
[i]t is hereby declared to be the legislative intent to recognize the Governor's
broad power of action in the exercise of the police power of the State to pro-
vide adequate control over persons and conditions during such periods of im-
pending or actual public crisis or disaster. The provisions of this section shall
be broadly construed to effectuate this purpose. MD. ANr. CODE art. 41, §
15B(a) (Supp. 1971).
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ly, they provide that the governor, or another designated official," may
proclaim a state of emergency in the area affected by a disturbance.
Once the state of emergency has been proclaimed, the official is then
provided with a range of powers that may be utilized for the purpose of.
restoring order.9 These commonly include the establishment of a curfew,
and the prohibition of such activities as ingress or egress from specified
buildings or areas, possession or sale of Molotov cocktails or other
incendiary devices, possession of firearms and ammunition, sale or
dispensation of alcoholic beverages or other commodities, and such
other activities as the official may reasonably believe necessary to help
protect persons, property, and the public peace.10 In addition to these
See also MICH. Cown. LAws § 10.32 (1967); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 5890e, § 1 (Supp.
1974).
It should be noted that the statutory provisions considered here are obviously
intended to deal with civil disturbances, but they are worded in a broad manner to include
any type of disaster or emergency that may endanger the well-being of the community.
Indeed, at least two of the statutes have recently been amended to include specific
provisions to deal with emergencies that may be caused by the continuing energy crisis.
See ME. R v. STAT. ANN. tit. 37-A, § 57(2) (Supp. 1975); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §
15B(c-1) (Supp. 1974).
8. Several statutes designate officials other than the governor who may proclaim a
state of emergency. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 870.042 (Supp. 1975) (sheriff or other
designated city official); KYN. STAmr ANN. § 48-1803 (Supp. 1974) (mayor); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-288.12 to .13 (1969) (power of municipalities and counties to enact
ordinances); TEx. RaV. Cm. STAT. tit. 94, art. 5890e, § 6 (Supp. 1974) (power of cities
or towns to enact ordinances).
9. Although the statutes are normally phrased in terms of providing discretionary
power, Florida has adopted both automatic and discretionary measures. The measures
which become operative upon the declaration of an emergency include the prohibition of
sale, display, or possession (in a public place) of firearms or ammunition, except by
authorized law enforcement or military personnel. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 870.044 (Supp.
1975). The discretionary measures are similar to those noted in the text. Id. § 870.045.
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3125-26 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 870.043-.045
(Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-1801 (Supp. 1974); LA. REv. SrAT. ANN. tit. 14, §
329.6(A) (1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 37-A, § 57(1) (Supp. 1975); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 41, § 15B(c) (1971); MICr. CoM. LAWS § 10.31 (1967); Miss. CODE ANN. §
45-17-7 (1973); NnB. REV. STAT. § 28-827 (Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-20-4.3
(1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.12 (1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1321.4 (Supp.
1975); TENN. CODE § 7-607, -610 to -615 (1973); llx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 5890e, § 3
(Supp. 1975); WASH. REv. CODE AiqN. § 43.06.220 (1970); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-5-
6 to -7 (Supp. 1974). In the few cases which have been required to determine the
constitutionality of these types of provisions, they have been upheld. See, e.g., United
States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971).
In other jurisdictions, legislation has expanded the definition of "riot." Thus, the
District of Columbia statute defines riot as a "public disturbance involving an assemblage
of five or more persons which by tumultuous and violent conduct or the threat thereof
create grave danger of damage or injury to property or persons." D.C. CoDE § 22-1122
(1973). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 232(1), 2102(a) (1970). The District of Columbia
statute was sustained in United States v. Matthews, 419 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (a
strong dissent was filed by Judge Wright, id. at 1186); United States v. Jeffries, 45
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provisions, which are essentially identical in all of the jurisdictions not-
ed,11 two states have added other powers. In North Carolina, authority is
provided to stop and frisk persons and search their belongings in the
vicinity of the riot 12 and to obtain warrants for searching automobiles in
or approaching the area of the disturbance.' In West Virginia, law
enforcement personnel are authorized to enter private dwellings or other
buildings when in hot pursuit of a rioter, when in search of a sniper, or
when in search of weapons if there is reason to believe that they will be
removed before a search warrant can be obtained.' 4 The powers provid-
ed in all- of these statutory schemes are available only during the period
of the proclaimed emergency, and end when it is terminated. 5 Some
jurisdictions have placed specific time limits on the duration of emergen-
cy measures, which may be extended only by new proclamations.' 6
The state emergency power statutes are broadly reflective of the
spirit of the Riot Commission recommendations in their identification of
F.R.D. 110 (D.D.C. 1968). Although we confess some difficulty in determining whether
all of the extraordinarily broad language of these statutes can meet the tests set forth in
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518
(1972); and Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), we note that the
courts have interpreted the federal riot statutes in such a manner as to uphold their
constitutionality. See United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 354-64 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973); United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972). See notes 21-25 infra and accompanying text. It
is interesting to compare the broad definition of "riot" in the District of Columbia
statute with that in the standard reinsurance contract issued by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development. See Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Lynn, 492 F.2d 979
(1st Cir. 1974). Some of the problems -that may be involved in the prosecution of
persons for aiding and abetting in the instigation of a riot are considered in United States
v. Rodgers, 419 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir. 1969).
See generally Bassiouni, The Development of Anti-Riot Legislation, in THE LAW OF
DIssENT AND RIOTS 357 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1971); Riot Control Legislation 156-60;
Comment, Riot and Disorderly Conduct: A Tour Through the Middle Ground, 51 ORE.
L. REV. 613 (1972); Comment, Criminal Lmv-West Virginia Riot Law, 72 W. VA. L.
Rav. 99 (1970); Note, Public Disorder Statutes in Iowa: An Evaluation of Existing
Statutes and the Proposed Revisions, 57 IowA L. REv. 862 (1972); Note, California's
Urging to Riot Law, 4 SAN DMGo L. REv. 118 (1967); Note, Virginia's Legislative
Response to Riots and Their Underlying Causes, 54 VA. L. REv. 1031 (1968).
11. See note 10 supra.
12. N.C. GFN. STAT. § 14-288.10 (1969). See notes 59-73 infra and accompanying
text.
13. Id. § 14-288.11 (1969).
14. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-6-1a(d) (Supp. 1975). See notes 99-120 infra and
accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Mi. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 15B(c) (1971); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
43.06.210 (1970).
16. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 870.047 (Supp. 1975) (seventy-two hours); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:329.6(B) (1974) (five days); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-20-4.4 (1953)
(three days); TEx. REV.. Cv. STAT.. art. 5890e, § 3 (Supp. 1974) (seventy-two hours).
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specific measures that may be taken during a civil disorder.' 7 The
statutes are, however, both more restrictive and permissive than the
recommendations of the Commission. They are more restrictive to the
extent that they enact as emergency powers many of the measures that
the Commission felt should be enacted only as general laws.' 8 They are
more permissive in that they do not limit the discretion of the executive
who is responsible for restoring order. The statutes almost invariably
state that the enumerated powers are illustrative of the type of measures
that may be utilized,' 9 or provide specifically that the executive may
prohibit other activities that are reasonably believed to be necessary for
the restoration of order.20
The civil disorder conditions that produced the state emergency
power statutes also provided the impetus for Congress to expand the
federal riot laws.2" Although these provisions do not provide the federal
executive with additional powers to quell disorders,22 they do parallel
the state provisions to the extent that they punish some of the same
conduct that state executives are given the power to ban during an
emergency. Thus, in the Civil Obedience Act of 1968,2 criminal penal-
ties are imposed upon a person who, during a civil disorder, teaches or
demonstrates the use of, or transports or manufactures, any firearm,
explosive, or incendiary device,24 or who acts to interfere with public
officers who are lawfully engaged in the restoration of order.28
17. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
18. The Commission, for example, recommended that prohibitions against the
possession of incendiary devices (such as Molotov cocktails), interference with emergen-
cy personnel, and the sale of firearms be enacted as laws that would be in permanent
force. CiviL DisoRDERs REPORT 289. The emergency power statutes, as noted at note 10
supra and accompanying text, include these powers only during the period of an
emergency.
19. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-1801 (Supp. 1974); MICH. COMn. LAws § 10.31
(1967).
20. The Oklahoma statute, for example, provides that the governor may prohibit
"such other activities as he reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and
maintain life, health, property or the public peace." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
1321.4(9) (Supp. 1975). The provisions in other jurisdictions are virtually identical. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3126a(9) (1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-1801 (Supp. 1974);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 15B(c) (1971); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.06.220(9)
(1970).
21. See Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 104(a), 1002(a), 82 Stat. 75-77, 90-92 (Apr. 11,
1968), codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 231-33, 2101-02 (1970).
22. These powers are considered in Part 1 610-36.
23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 231-33 (1970).
24. Id. § 231(a)(l)-(2).
25. Id. § 231(a)(3). The provisions of section 231 have withstood constitutional
challenge on several occasions. See United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119 (5th
cert. 4enied, 409 U.S, 991 (1972); United States v, Mqechanic, 454 F.2d 849 (8th
1026 W¢ol. 1975:1021
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In our opinion, these statutory schemes represent a desirable trend
towards codification of powers that should be possessed by an executive
during times of civil emergency.26 They are, however, only a beginning.
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 929 (1972); National Mobilization Comm. to End the
War in Vietnam v. Foran, 411 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Banks, 368 F.
Supp. 1245 (D.S.D. 1973); United States v. Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1971).
An additional provision of the 1968 enactment made it unlawful to travel in, or use,
interstate commerce with intent to incite, organize, or participate in a riot. 18 U.S.C. §
2101 (1970). It has also been held to be constitutional. See United States v. Dellinger,
472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973). Doubts about its constitu-
tionality had been raised in early commentary. See Note, The Federal Riot Act and the
First Amendment, 5 H~Av. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REV. 393 (1970).
Proposals now pending before the Congress would make substantial changes in the
present federal law governing riots and civil disorders. S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§
1831-34 (1975). See REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY to accompany S. 1,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE CODIFICATION REVISIoN AND REFORM ACT OF 1974, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., vol. I, at 818-28 (1974). The proposals have been criticized. See Schwartz, The
Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 17 CRim. L. REP. 3203, 3209 (1975).
26. It is significant that codification of the powers which may be exercised in times
of civil emergency is a common pattern in other parts of the free world. The labels that
have traditionally been placed upon the emergency powers of the government have
differed between the common and civil law countries, though the powers and procedures
have been quite similar. In the common law countries, the basic institution has been
martial rule or martial law, based on a flexible concept of necessity, see Part I 605 n.66,
and, historically, not based upon statutory provision. In France, on the other hand, the
basic emergency institution has been the state of siege, which differs from the strict
common law model to the extent that it attempts to define by statutory provision the
legally permissible emergency action. See Friedrich & Sutherland, Defense of the
Constitutional Order, in STumEs IN FEDERALIsM 676, 678-79 (Bowie & Friedrich eds.
1954).
The emergency power institutions in the common law countries are best illustrated
by England. As already noted, it has generally been assumed that martial law or rule
was, and is, the normal method of responding to civil emergencies. While it is true that
that model was frequently utilized, it was also common for the Parliament to make
statutory provision for dealing with emergencies. Thus, it has been observed that the
theory and practice of emergency government throughout most of English his-
tory were: a minimum of statutory provision for situations of national danger;
action by Parliament itself. . . to meet any serious crisis that had arisen; and,
where Parliament was unable to function, independent executive action based
upon the royal prerogative or the common law. Such executive action usually
took the form of martial law, the basic English institution of constitutional dic-
tatorship. C. RossrrE, CONSTIoONAL DICrAToRsHIP 136 (1948).
See also J. EAvEs, EMERGENCY PowERs AND THE PARLIAMENTARY WATCHDOG: PAnLIA-
MENT AND THE EXECUTIVE IN GREAT BRITAIN 1939-1951 (1957). The pattern was signifi-
cantly altered in 1920, however, when the Emergency Powers Act of 1920 was adopted.
10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 55, as amended by the Emergency Powers Act 1964, c. 38; see 38
HALsBuY's STATUTFS OF ENGLAND 289-91 (3d ed. 1972). The Emergency Powers Act
provides the Crown with considerable authority during a civil disturbance and is quite
similar to the state emergency power statutes that are considered in the text. Thus, it
provides that a state of emergency may be declared when it appears that events will, in
essence, deprive the community of the essentials of life. Emergency Powers Act of 1920,
10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 55, § 1(1). Such a declaration may not continue for more than one
month, and if Parliament is not in session when it is declared, and if it shall not
1027
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otherwise convene within five days, it must be ordered to convene within a five day
period. Id. § 1(2). During the emergency, the Crown may promulgate regulations and
confer upon subordinate officers "such powers and duties as His Majesty may deem
necessary for the preservation of the peace, for securing and regulating the supply and
distribution of food, water, fuel, light, and other necessities, for maintaining the means of
transit or locomotion, and for any other purposes essential to the public safety and the
life of the community." Id. § 2(1). Although it is clear that the Emergency Powers Act
of 1920 was designed to protect against labor strife, see RossrrER, supra, at 173-74, it is
a statutory scheme that is available for much broader use, and, as noted, quite similar to
the schemes that presently prevail in many of our states. It need not, however, be the
only statutory authority that will be available to deal with civil emergency in the realm.
Thus, when the disorders in Northern Ireland reached a point where control was
difficult, Parliament passed the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, c.
53, 43 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGr.AND 1235 (Supp. 1973), which, inter alia, provided
law enforcement personnel with broad powers of arrest, detention, and search and seizure
which were not otherwise authorized. Finally, it might be observed that the English Act
of 1920 was, at the time of its adoption, roughly similar to laws then (and now) in force
in many civil law countries-a fact that was not specifically considered by Parliament,
which was then more concerned with resolving a bitter strike in the coal mines.
RossrraR, supra, at 173.
The powers of the executive to deal with civil emergencies in the other common law
countries are similar, though in some the powers entrusted to the executive greatly
exceed those of the English Act. In Canada, for example, the War Measures Act, CAN.
REV. STAT. c. W-2 (1970), authorizes the issuance of a proclamation in the event of
"war, invasion or insurrection," id. § 2, and gives the Governor in Council the power to
issue such orders and regulations "as he may . . . deem necessary or advisable for the
security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada . . . ," id. § 3(1). This power
enables the Governor in Council to suspend the Bill of Rights entirely, id. § 6(5), and
when it is kept in mind that Canada has been subject to the War Measures Act for some
forty percent of its history, see Marx, The Emergency Power and Civil Liberties in
Canada, 16 McGILL LJ. 39, 40 (1970), it is apparent that the statute confers a rather
broad range of power upon the executive. The use of the War Measures Act in 1970 to
deal with terrorists is described in McGonagle, Emergency Detention Acts: Peacetime
Suspension of Civil Rights-with a Postscript on the Recent Canadian Crisis, 20 CATm.
U.L. REV. 203, 233-36 (1970). See generally Friedrich & Guttman, The Federal
Executive, in STUDIES IN FEDERALISM, supra, at 63, 88-93. In India, the Defence of India
Act of 1962 contains a quite similar basic statutory scheme, see generally H. DoAnIA &
T. DoABIA, THE LAW OF PREVENTIvE DETENTION IN INDIA AND THE DEFENCE OF INDIA
ACT 1962 (1963); B. Dtrrr & B. BEOTRA, THE DEFENCE OF INDIA ACT, 1962, AND RU nzs
(1966); B. SINGH, ANNOTATED THE DEFENCE OF INDIA ACT, 1962 (2d ed. 1966), as does
the South African Public Safety Act of 1953. See generally E. BROOKES & J. MACAULAY,
Ctr. LmEmRT IN SoUrH AFRmcA (1958); McGonagle, supra, at 215-27; Mathews &
Albino, The Permanence of the Temporary-An Examination of the 90- and 180-day
Detention Laws, 83 S. AFR. L.. 16 (1966). The Australian system is discussed in
Friedrich & Sutherland, supra, at 694-97.
In France, the emergency powers of the government are specified by the so-called
Stat de sige (state of siege), which is a product both of legislative activity and the
general history of France. See RossiTmE, supra, at 79. As it is presently used, 9tat de
siege may be traced to the birth of the Second Republic, and the enactment of the law of
August 9, 1849, which gave the legislature power to declare 9tat de siege in case of an
imminent threat to the internal or external security of the nation. In the constitution of
1852, which established the Empire, the power was entrusted to the Emperor, with the
Senate as an advisor. In the years that followed, the institution was used indiscriminate-
ly. In order to conform the institution to other changes in the constitutional laws adopted
1028 lVol. 1975:1021
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We believe that civil law enforcement authorities and the courts should
be granted additional powers not normally permitted in the criminal
in 1875, a new law on the subject was enacted on April 3, 1878 (the Third Republic),
which provided that the 6tat de siege "can only be declared in the event of imminent
danger resulting from a foreign war or an armed insurrection." RossrrR, supra, at 82.
The declaration may be made only by a "law"-that is, by legislative action-unless the
legislature is not convened, in which event it must be convened within two days. In
addition, the declaration must be limited in duration and designate the areas to which it
is to apply. Id. at 88. The effect of the declaration, however, continued to be governed by
the law of 1849, which provided that the powers of the police would pass to the military,
that military courts could take jurisdiction "over crimes and offenses against the safety of
the Republic," and authorized broad search, deportation, censorship, and confiscation
powers. Id. at 83. The emergency power provisions in other continental countries are
reviewed in Friedrich & Sutherland, supra, at 699-707 (Germany and Switzerland). The
distinguishing characteristics of the civil law 6tat de sige, then, are that it is thoroughly
regulated by statute, utilizes a system of parliamentary supremacy, and involves only a
transfer of power from the civil to the military establishment, as opposed to a more
general expansion of power. Since it is a legislative creature, moreover, complaints about
its use are determined by legislative action, not judicial action, as is the familiar means
of review in common law countries.
Since 1958, authority has been granted for itat d'urgence. In May of that year,
before enactment of the new Constitution, the Parliament declared an 6tat d'urgence
for the entire territory of metropolitan France. Decree of May 17, 1958 [1958] J.O.
4734, [1958] D.L. 213. It was followed by the enforcement decree adopted on the same
day by the Council of Ministers. The Minister of Interior was charged with the execution
of the law. A separate decree of the same day extended the jurisdiction of courts-martial
over all crimes against the internal security of the state, armed rebellion, or participation
in a conspiracy to commit crimes, interference with road traffic, homicide, designated
offenses against persons and property, and all offenses against national defense. The
Ministers of Justice and National Defense were charged with the execution of the
decree. A Tribunal de Cassation des Force Armees was established to review appeals
from courts-martial. [1958] Recueil Sirey 174. The 9tat d'urgence militaire apparently
differs from itat de sigge in that the control of the armed forces and review of military
proceedings is retained by civilian authorities under the Council of Ministers and the
President of the Republic.
The 9tat de siege is compared and contrasted with martial law-type powers in
Friedrich & Sutherland, supra; Kelly & Pelletier, Theories of Emergency Government, 11
&D.L. REv. 42, 55-58 (1966); Radin, Martial Law and the State of Siege, 30 CAJJF. L.
Rnv. 634 (1942).
The institutions of emergency power in much of the free world are similar, at least
to the extent of providing a basic statutory framework within which the powers are
utilized under emergency conditions. We do not suggest, however, that they should be
used, either generally or specifically, as a model upon which to build statutory schemes
in this country for several reasons. The first is that the legal systems of other countries
are not based upon constitutional principles identical to our own, with the result that the
various statutory emergency schemes would not be reflective of the values and principles
of the United States Constitution that must guide any statutory scheme in this country.
In addition, the emergency institutions in each country are a product of both legislative
judgments and its own idiosyncratic history. Finally, the relationship between emergency
power and the more general requirements of each country's legal system is not sufficient-
ly well understood on a broad comparative basis to facilitate the distillation of normative
principles that could be utilized for the construction of a model system of emergency
power in western political democracies, even if the Constitution permitted it.
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process under non-emergency conditions. Once a decision is made con-
cerning which powers are appropriate and permissible, and which are
not, the statutory provisions should then be made equally applicable to
military and civilian authorities.
M. ARRESTS, CURFEWS, STOPS, FRISKS, SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES, AND DOCUMENTATION
A. Arrests
The law of arrest in many jurisdictions is inadequate to deal with
the problems presented by civil disorders. Although the Constitution
apparently permits a peace officer to arrest without a warrant whenever
lie has probable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed
an offense,27 state law is frequently more restrictive. It commonly limits
the power to arrest without a warrant for misdemeanors to breaches of
the peace or offenses committed in the presence of an arresting officer,"
and some states place additional limitations upon the authority of an
officer to arrest without a warrant for a felony.29 Several jurisdictions
also deny police officers the authority to refrain from arresting persons
who commit an offense in their presence30 or to release any person who
27. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975); Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959); LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further
Ventures Into the 'Quagmire,' 8 CraM. L. BULL. 9, 20 (1972).
28. The statutes are analyzed in ALI PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE Appendix X. See
generally 1 C. WRIHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 77 (1969);
Long, Hot Summer 969-72; Note, Probable Cause at the Initial Appearance in lWarrant-
less Arrests, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1128 (1972).
29. In Georgia, for example, it is provided that
faln arrest for a crime may be made by an officer . . . without a warrant
if the offense is committed in his presence, or the offender is endeavoring to
escape, or for other cause if there is likely to be a failure of justice for want
of an officer to issue a warrant. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-207 (1972).
The law in North Carolina governing felony arrests was substantially the same, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15-41 (1953), until recently changed to permit felony arrests upon
probable cause. Id. § 15A-401(b) (1975).
30. See ARx. STAT. ANN. § 19-1705 (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 125, § 82 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1975); IND. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-11-7 (1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 743.4
(Supp. 1975); Nnn. REV. SrAT. § 29.401 (1964); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 62.09(13) (Supp.
1975). In the District of Columbia, failure to make an arrest for an offense committed in
the police officer's presence is a criminal offense. D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-143 (1973). See
also State v. Lombardi, 8 Wis. 2d 421, 99 N.W.2d 829 (1959). A provision requiring
that officers arrest anyone committing an offense in their presence can be particularly
troublesome in dealing with minor disputes where an arrest may have racial overtones
and in dealing with street gatherings. See U.S. PRES. COMM. ONe LAw ENFORCEMENT &
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocmTY 104-06
(1967); CIVIL DISORDERS REPORT 164-65. The problem is discussed in ABA PROJECT ON
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN
POLICE FUNCTION 117-21 (1972).
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has been arrested, 1 while notice of authority and purpose is commonly
required in statutory authorizations for forcible entry to make arrests. 2
In addition, it has recently been proposed that nighttime arrests on
private premises should be permitted only in special circumstances. 33
The arrest powers of law enforcement personnel should be clari-
fied, and expanded where necessary, during serious civil disorders, and
the discretion that is conferred should be the subject of explicit depart-
mental rules and guidelines. In considering the power and latitude that
should be entrusted to the police during a civil disorder, it is essential to
keep in mind the nature of the situation the officers will confront. In any
mass disturbance there will be numerous occasions where a person is
apprehended for a curfew violation though the arresting officer knows
that the person is not involved in the disturbance or any other criminal
activity. Similarly, offenders will be brought to the stationhouse, where
31. See W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECiSiON TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 172-
74 (1965); STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE 31-38.
32. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1970), which provides that an "officer may break
open any outer or inner door or window of a house. . . to execute a search warrant, if,
after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance . . . ." The state
statutes are collected in ALI PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE Appendix XI. All but three of the
statutes follow the wording of section 3109 closely. Id. at 312. Some jurisdictions provide
authority for omission of the warning in specified types of emergencies by statute, see,
e.g., N.Y. ClUm. PRoc. LAW § 120.80(4) (1971), or court decision, see People v.
Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956); People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d
855 (1955); People v. Baca, 197 Cal. App. 2d 362, 17 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1961); People v.
Ker, 195 Cal. App. 2d 246, 15 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1961), aff'd 374 U.S. 23 (1963); People
v. Macias, 39 Ill. 2d 208, 234 N.E.2d 783 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1066 (1969);
People v. Floyd, 26 N.Y.2d 558, 260 N.E.2d 815 (1970); State v. Young, 176 Wash. 2d
212, 455 P.2d 595 (1969). Even in jurisdictions which follow the emergency rule,
however, courts have been reluctant to dispense with knock and announce requirements.
See, e.g., People v. De Santiago, 71 Cal. 2d 18, 453 P.2d 353, 76 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1969);
People v. Gualindi, 21 Ill. App. 3d 992, 316 N.E.2d 195 (1974); State v. Beason, 534
P.2d 44 (Wash. 1975). But in other jurisdictions, the necessity that will justify omission
of notice of authority and purpose is very narrow, for example, where "there is
reasonable cause to believe that giving of such notice would present a clear danger to
human life." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(e) (1) (c) (1975). But cf. State v. Watson, 19
N.C. App. 160, 198 S.E.2d 185 (1973). Congress has recently repealed the broad
authority previously given to dispense with notice of authority and purpose in the
District of Columbia. Pub. L. No. 93-481, 88 Stat. 1455 (October 26, 1974). See
generally Note, No-Knock and the Constitution: The District of Columbia Court
Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 (A Critique and Proposed Alterations), 55
MINN. L. REv. 871 (1971); Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139
(1970).
33. See AU PRE-ARRAiGNMENT CODE § 120.6(3), quoted at note 40 infra. See also
United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1973) (warrantless nighttime entry
and arrest justified by exigent circumstances); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385,
391-94 (D.C. Cir. 1970); cf. URCP 222 (citations); Fm. R. CRm. P. 4(b)(1)
(warrants).
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their demeanor, background, and absence of a criminal record will
make it clear to a precinct officer or prosecutor that it is unlikely that
any criminal conduct would have occurred in the absence of the oppor-
tunity provided by the disorder, and that no future criminal activity is
likely to occur. If processed, such a case will probably be nolle
prossed at a later time, and if not dropped, the defendant will prob-
ably be acquitted, or placed on probation if convicted. Existing
requirements that police officers arrest everyone committing an offense
in their presence, and prohibitions against the release of arrested persons
without a judicial imprimatur, even where new evidence has established
that probable cause does not exist, reflect an understandable concern
that broadened discretion might encourage harassment, discriminatory
enforcement, or corruption which would be invisible to the courts.34
However, in a civil disorder, the spontaneity, limited duration, and
number of people involved, when combined with the probability that
police will be functioning in groups, rather than individually, greatly
reduce the danger of harassment or corruption. The need for discretion
is much greater because of the number of people involved, the finite
capacity of jails even when backup confinement facilities are used, and
the fact that many, if not most, people arrested have not in the past and
will not in the future violate the criminal law. Finally, there may be no
need to take persons into custody or hold them to answer a criminal
charge if there is no likelihood that prosecution will occur.35
Under these circumstances, we believe that an officer should not be
required to arrest if he thinks that an admonishment will accomplish the
law's objectives, and that no useful purpose will be served by taking the
person into custody.36 He should also be authorized to issue a citation in
34. See generally K. DAvIs, POLICE DIsCRETION 143-64 (1975); Goldstein, Police
Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Adminis-
tration of Justice, 69 YALE L.. 543 (1969); Goldstein, Police Discretion: The Ideal
Versus the Real, 23 PUB. AD. REv. 140 (1963); LaFave, The Police and Nonenforce-
ment of the Law (pts. 1-2), 1962 Wis. L. REv. 104, 179; Remington & Rosenblum, The
Criminal Law and the Legislative Process, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 481; Tieger, Police
Discretion and Discriminatory Enforcement, 1971 DUKE L.. 717. In recent years the
existence and need for police discretion has more generally been accepted, and much of
the present debate centers upon how it may be controlled. See N. MoRnis & G. HAwIs,
THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRRIE CONTROL ch. IV (1970); J. SKOLNICK,
JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); J. WILSON, VARmTIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR (1968);
Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies, 36 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRon. 500 (1971); McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MIcH. L. REV. 659
(1972); Milner, Supreme Court Effectiveness and the Police Organization, 36 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROD. 467 (1971).
35. See notes 232-40 infra and accompanying text.
36. As Professor LaFave has pointed out in a more general context, "[tlhe law
which defines when a police officer can make an arrest has developed with almost no
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lieu of arrest, thus permitting the offender to remain at liberty, but still
accomplishing the required documentation, and avoiding the necessity.
of leaving the streets where his presence may be needed.3 7 After initial
arrest, an officer should also be authorized to release the arrestee by the
issuance of a citation if he believes that continued custody is unneces-
sary, and to make the release unconditional if he determines that there is
no longer reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested committed
the offense.3 8 The arrestee should be permitted to forfeit collateral for
those offenses for which no useful purpose will be served by court
appearance. In addition, prosecutors should screen those detained by the
police and release those who pose no danger of committing further
offenses during the disorder.3 9 In short, the only offenders who should
be brought before a judge are those who have not been released by the
exercise of police or prosecutorial discretion. Control over the exer-
cise of this discretion should be accomplished by promulgation of rules
and regulations to guide its exercise.
The arrest powers of the police during civil disorders should also
include the authority to arrest without a warrant for any offense when
concern with whether the taking of immediate custody is necessary." W. LAFAVE, supra
note 31, at 168. This has certainly been true in serious disorders where not only may
there be no good reason for taking a person into custody, but there may also be cogent
reasons why he should not be detained.
37. Few existing statutes have the desired flexibility. Those which authorize release
on citation frequently exclude all felonies. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 853.6 (West
Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-302 (1975). Some reform proposals would require
issuance of a citation for certain minor offenses, which would also be undesirable in a
serious civil disorder. See STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE §§ 2.1, 2.2, 2.3(a);
NAC STANDARDS, CORRECTIONS § 4.3. See also NAC STANDARDS, COURTS § 4.2; NAC
SuANARns, PoLIcE §§ 1.3, 4.3; URCP 221a. A highly desirable degree of flexibility
would be provided under section 120.2 of the ALl Pre-Arraignment Code, which would
permit the issuance of a citation in lieu of arrest or after arrest subject to regulations.
The Riot Commission recommended an expanded use of citations and summons. CrvM
DisoRDERs REPORT 189.
38. The ALl Pre-Arraignment Code, for example, provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
An officer shall promptly release from his custody any person who has been
arrested without a warrant, if at any time prior to the appearance of such per-
son at a police station the officer determines that he no longer has reasonable
cause to believe that the arrested person has confmitted a crime for which
such arrest is authorized. Id. § 120.9(2).
It also provides that
If the station officer concludes that there is no reasonable cause to believe that
the arrested person has committed a crime, and no indictment, information or
complaint charging such person with a crime has been returned or issued, the
station officer shall order the arrested person released forthwith. Id. § 130.2
(1) (a).
See also CALIF. PENAL CODE § 849(b) (West Supp. 1975); Feeney, Citation in Lieu of
Arrest: The New California Law, 25 VAND. L. Rav. 367 (1972).
39. See notes 232-40 infra and accompanying text.
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probable cause exists. Strong reasons may also be present, where proba-
ble cause for arrest exists, for permitting an officer to enter a private
dwelling at night without a warrant, and for dispensing with the normal
requirement of notice of authority and purpose in a broader range of
cases than would be justifiable under normal conditions. 40
More serious problems are presented if serious consideration is
given to enlarging the powers of police to arrest when they have no
probable cause to believe that any offense has been committed, but have
ample reason to believe that one or more persons are about to commit
an offense. Should an officer have the power to arrest a person during a
civil disorder when there is reasonable cause to believe that an offense
will soon be committed? Obviously, such power does not normally exist
40. Some latitude in this regard would be permitted if the proposals of section 120.6
of the ALI Pre-Arraignment Code were enacted:
(2) Entry Without Prior Demand. The demand to be admitted required by
subsection (1) [notice of authority and purpose], need not be made, if
the officer has reasonable cause to believe that a person whom he is au-
thorized to arrest for a felony or a misdemeanor is present on such
premises, and that if such demand were made,
(a) the person to be arrested would escape; or
(b) the officer would be subject to harm in effecting the arrest; or
(c) any person would be harmed, or evidence destroyed, or property dam-
aged or lost.
(3) Special Restrictions on Arrests at Night. No law enforcement officer
shall seek to enter any private premises in order to make an arrest between
10 p.m. and 7 a.m. unless
(a) he is acting under a warrant of arrest and the warrant authorizes its
execution during such hours, or
(b) he has reasonable cause to believe that such action is necessary to pre-
vent
(i) the escape of a person to be arrested for a crime involving seri-
ous bodily harm or the threat or danger thereof, or
(ii) harm to any person, destruction of evidence, or damage to or
loss of property.
The problem with this proposal in the context of a serious disorder is the necessity that
the officer have "reasonable cause to believe," defined elsewhere as "a basis for belief in
the existence of facts which, in view of the circumstances under and the purpose for
which the standard is applied, is substantial, objective, and sufficient to satisfy applicable
constitutional requirements." Id. § 120.1(2). Unless "reasonable cause to believe" is
watered down to the point where it is less restrictive than the traditional meaning of
"probable cause," see Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307 (1959), there will be frequent cases where there is probable cause to arrest and
probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested is within a particular building,
but less than probable cause to believe that entry at night is necessary to prevent escape,
or that entry with notice would subject the officer to harm. In the fluid conditions of a
serious disorder, it seems more appropriate that the necessity of probable cause be
reserved for the issues of whether the person to be arrested has committed a crime and is
within the premises, and the more lenient standard of "reasonable suspicion" be utilized
for the qualifying circumstances that will permit entry at night or without notice. See,
e.g., ALI PRE-ARRmGNMENT CODE § 110.2; ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL
RELEASE § 2.2; NAC STANDARDS, CoRRECTIONS § 4.3; NAC STANDARDS, COURTS § 4.2;
URCP 211 (a).
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for good reasons. The law usually does not punish intent alone; conduct
must at least reach the level of an attempt, endeavor, solicitation, or
conspiracy before the criminal law is violated. The police should not
have authority to arrest for conduct which, if not innocent, is at least not
criminal. If such authority did exist, presumably the arrested person
would be entitled to immediate release, because the police would have
an obligation to bring him before a magistrate who would in turn be
required to release him in the absence of a charge of violation of law.4'
Despite the policeman's duty to prevent crime, his constitutional power
to restrict liberty in advance of criminal conduct is limited to the power
to stop and frisk, and then only in certain circumstances.42 These
theoretical objections seem equally valid during emergency conditions.
There are also practical objections to restricting liberty in advance
of criminal conduct. The risk of arresting the innocent is always present,
but the degree of risk is small when the officer has observed the
defendant in flagrante delicto, considerable when he arrests without a
warrant upon probable cause, and extreme when he must estimate the
likelihood, not that an offense has been committed and that the arrestee
committed it, but that he is about to do so. Too many innocent persons
would undoubtedly be drawn into a net of these dimensions. It is even
less defensible to arrest persons where there is no probable cause to
believe that they have committed or are about to commit acts prohib-
ited by law.4"
It could, however, be argued that an exception should be made for
civil disorders. Certainly the problem is greater in magnitude when large
groups of people are milling around and there is a common design to
obstruct the operation of the government. In such a situation, there may
be only a brief and ambiguous interval between a demonstration protect-
ed by the first amendment and an unlawful disturbance which exceeds
the suppression capability of the local police.44 There will also be
41. See Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 950 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
880 (1973). The "prompt presentment" statutes are catalogued in ALI PRE-ARRAGN-
MENT CODE Appendix I.
42. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968);
LaFave, Street Encounters and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67
MICH. L. REv. 39 (1968). See notes 60-79 infra and accompanying text.
43. This is the evil that was apparently present in the arrests during the 1971
Washington May Day demonstrations. See Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973).
44. The sophistication of the problem is suggested by the language of the 1972
Uniform Public Assembly Act:
§ 16. [Management of Public Assembly]
Vol. 1975:1021] 1035
DUKE LAW JOURNAL Mol. 1975:1021
occasions where law enforcement officers may have a good faith belief
that it is necessary to take persons into custody and detain them in order
to restore order in a strife-tom city, but have no probable cause to
believe that an offense has been committed.
Nevertheless, we think it unnecessary, unwise, and unconstitutional
to provide such broad powers to the police. The practical problems
faced by police in a civil disturbance can be dealt with more effectively,
and with less danger to civil liberties, by expanding the range of conduct
which is unlawful during such an emergency. Through such a process,
arrest powers will be expanded automatically as the range of conduct
declared unlawful is itself expanded. In substance, a decision to broaden
the coverage of the criminal law in civil disorders means that many of
the decisions concerning whether persons should be taken into custody
for conduct not ordinarily punishable are shared by the legislature rather
than depending entirely upon the discretion of the officer on the street.
Recent statutes and proposals-for example, prohibiting possession of
incendiary devices, 5 and making it a crime to refuse to vacate certain
premises46 or to disperse when ordered to do so-reflect this approach.
(a) Consistent with terms of the permit, a person granted a permit to hold
a public assembly is entitled to determine the order of events of the public as-
sembly.
(b) The political subdivision shall take all necessary steps -by the provision of
necessary personnel, equipment, materials, and facilities to assure freedom to
exercise rights of free speech and peaceable assembly and prevent persons from
interfering with or disrupting the conduct of a public assembly for which a per-
mit has been issued.
(c) If the highest ranking law enforcement officer in charge determines that
a public assembly for which a permit has been granted is not proceeding as
authorized and that there is a substantial impairment of normal use of a public
place not authorized by the permit or that there is imminent or existing danger
that substantial harm to the public health or safety will occur, he shall marshal
available resources to obtain compliance with the permit. He shall take appro-
priate steps to control any interference with or disruption of the conduct of
the public assembly. He shall communicate with representatives of the person
holding the public assembly to obtain their assistance. If, after taking these
measures, the highest ranking law enforcement officer in charge determines
that the public assembly cannot continue as authorized because of an imminent
or existing danger that substantial harm to the public health or safety will oc-
cur, he shall limit the public assembly or otherwise impose conditions upon its
conduct to the extent reasonably necessary to remove the danger. If the emer-
gency measures taken and those that may reasonably be taken do or would not
remove the imminent or existhig danger, the highest ranking law enforcement
officer in charge may postpone or cancel the public assembly and, if necessary,
disperse the participants and bystanders.
(d) If a public assembly is held for which no permit has been granted and
which substantially harms public health or safety or substantially impairs nor-
mal use of a public place, law enforcement and health officers shall take only
those steps reasonably necessary to remove the substantial harm or impairment.
However, if necessary to remove an imminent or existing danger of substan-
tial harm to the public health or safety, the highest ranking law enforcement
officer in charge may cancel the public assembly and disperse the participants
and bystanders. 13 U.L.A. 481, 494-95.
45. See note 10 supra.
46. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 328(c) (1974) (prohibiting failure to leave
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The general law of conspiracy, rarely invoked in civil disorders, pro-
vides an additional basis for criminal charges. 4 7
B. Curfews
Of particular importance is authority to impose curfews-pro-
hibitions against mere presence on the streets in designated areas
during certain hours for everyone not falling within limited exceptions.48
Recent state statutes have uniformly granted such authority.49 The
imposition of a curfew may be ineffective as a technique to dissuade
rioters from pursuing their unlawful objectives, but it may encourage
citizens not involved in a disturbance to remain at home. If innocent
bystanders are on the streets, they may be indistinguishable from poten-
tial rioters looking for others with whom to band together for unlawful
purposes, and thus contribute to the problems faced by the police in
their attempts to restore order. In addition, a curfew provides an instant
basis for arrest of persons who are in the proscribed area either afoot or
in vehicles, 50 an easily provable offense in the event of trial, and should
property of an educational institution when ordered to do so); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-288.19 (1969) (authorizing the Governor in an emergency to issue an order of
evacuation directing all persons within a building to leave).
47. Some disorders do not arise out of agreements to commit unlawful acts, but
others suggest the possibility that the law of conspiracy may have been violated either
before or during the disorder.
48. See generally DoBRovm 5-11; Frese, The Riot Curfew, in THE LAW OF DIssENr
AND RioTs (M. Bassiouni ed. 1971) (reprinted from 57 CALiF. L. REv. 450 (1969))
(describing the varied uses of the curfew in the disorders of the past decade); National
Security Interest and Civil Liberties 1304-07; Comment, Martial Law, 42 S. CAr. L.
REv. 546, 556-59 (1969); Note, Judicial Control of the Curfew, 77 YALE L. 1560
(1968) (detailing the criticisms that may be leveled against the use of a curfew as a riot
control measure). The tactical use of the curfew is described in R. APPLEGATE, RIOT
CoNTRoL-MAITmI AND TEcHNiQuEs 43, 64-65 (1969); R. MoMoissE, RoTs,
REvOLTs Am INsuRRTONs 406-07 (1967).
49. A typical statute, for example, provides for
ft]he establishment of curfews, including, but not limited to, the prohibition
of or restrictions on pedestrian and vehicular movement, standing, and parking,
except for the provision of designated essential services such as fire, police, and
hospital services. . . . FLA. STAT. ANN. § 870.045(1) (Supp. 1975).
It is also required that any curfew order that is promulgated must be filed with a local
court clerk, delivered to radio and television stations for broadcast, and where practicable
be published by posting and loudspeakers. Id. § 870.046. See also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
14.329.6(A)(1) (1974); MI. ANN. CODE art. 41.15(B)(c) (1971); MICH. Colo. LAWS
§ 10.31 (1967); Miss. CODE ANN. § 45-17-3 (1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40a-20-
4.3(A)(1), (B) (Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.12(b) (1) (1969); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1321.4(a)(1) (Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7-112(1)(a), (2)
(1973); W. VA. CODE § 61-6-la(c) (Supp. 1975). The adoption of such provisions had
been recommended by the Riot Commission. Civm Disoiwans REPOPT 290. See also Riot
Control Legislation 160.
50. The arrest would, of course, be based upon the violation of the curfew, which is
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justify a search incident to an arrest.51
Curfew orders, as well as curfew enabling statutes and ordinances,
have been challenged on the grounds of inadequate notice,52 interfer-
ence with the constitutionally protected right to travel,"3 and infringe-
ment of first amendment rights.54 The courts, however, have generally
generally denominated a misdemeanor. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 870.048 (Supp.
1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 15(B)(g) (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-20-4.5
(1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1321.6 (Supp. 1974). See Limits on Riot Control 99.
The strict enforcement of curfew laws has also been criticized. Thus, it has been
observed that police in the Washington, D.C. riot of April, 1968, "made use of the
curfew as a mass arrest device for controlling the civil disorder and charged defendants
with curfew [violations on a] wholesale [basis] because this was a convenient way of
clearing the streets." DOBROvm 6. See also Note, supra note 48.
51. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414
U.S. 260 (1973); State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C. 484, 178 S.E.2d 449 (1971); Ervin v. State,
41 Wis. 2d 194, 163 N.W.2d 207 (1968). But cf. People v. McKelvy, 23 Cal. App. 3d
1027, 100 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972); Leven v. United States, 260 A.2d 681 (D.C. App.
1970) (invalidated search that took place following a curfew arrest, but which was
conducted after defendant had been escorted to precinct station); ALI PRE-ARR IGN-
MENT CODE § 230.2, at 522 (prohibiting searches incident to an arrest for offenses not
justifying the imposition of confinement, traffic offenses, or other misdemeanors, "the
elements and circumstances of which involve no unlawful possession or intentionally or
recklessly dangerous conduct"). Prior to Robinson and Gustafson, the authorities were
divided, but the majority probably would have precluded a full search following arrest for
a traffic, petty, non-violent, or non-possessory misdemeanor offense. Id. at 523; People v.
Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1967). Since Robinson and
Gustafson, state courts have split on whether, under state law, such a search should be
permitted. See, e.g., People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr.
315 (1975); State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 367, 520 P.2d 51, 57 (1974) (refusing to
follow Robinson); State v. Florance, 527 P.2d 1202, 1209-10 (Ore. 1974) (collecting
authorities following Robinson). See also Hughes v. State, 530 P.2d 1052 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1975). A Colorado court has suppressed as evidence hashish found in the clothing
of a minor arrested for a curfew violation under non-emergency conditions. In re People,
32 Colo. App. 79, 506 P.2d 409 (1973).
In a state which under normal conditions precludes a search incident to an arrest for
minor offenses where "exceptional circumstances" are absent, there is a special need for
broader authority during some kinds of serious civil disorders. In riots such as those that
occurred in 1967 and 1968, it may be virtually impossible to determine which curfew
violators are armed and dangerous. See Part 1 582-85.
52. See, e.g., State v. Boles, 5 Conn. Cir. 22, 240 A.2d 920 (1967) (where it was
held that notice by radio, wireservice, and newspaper was sufficient). Most statutes
providing for curfew imposition require adequate notice. See note 49 supra.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1283 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 943 (1971); Glover v. District of Columbia, 250 A.2d 556 (D.C. App. 1969).
Such attacks have generally been based upon Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500 (1964). The fact that these attacks have failed is not surprising when it is considered
that in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), the Supreme Court observed that the right to
travel may be infringed in times of necessitous emergency. Id. at 15.
54. See Commonwealth v. Stolland, 214 Pa. Super. 35, 251 A.2d 701 (1969), appeal
dismissed, 398 U.S. 916 (1971) (Spaulding, J., concurring).
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upheld the public authority to impose such restraints during a civil
disorder.55
C. Protective Zones
A variation of the curfew concept is reflected in proposals which
would authorize an executive official to establish protective or "public
safety zones" into which entrance would be prohibited. These proposals
are designed to ameliorate some of the problems posed by the inability
to control large crowds-which may include members who contemplate
violence or "peaceful" violations of law such as blocking traffic on
streets and bridges or ingress and egress to buildings-and particularly
the difficulty distinguishing the potential law breaker from the casual ob-
server. Some jurisdictions have sought to deal with these problems by
statutes which authorize law enforcement officers to order a crowd to
disperse, 56 but the technique both threatens the right of citizens to as-
semble peacefully and is difficult to enforce effectively.
55. The approach that has been taken by the courts to curfews imposed during a
civil disorder is reflected in Ervin v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 194, 163 N.W.2d 207 (1968),
where the court stated that
[t]he purpose and result of the mayor's curfew proclamation was not to destroy
freedom of movement, but to restore it .... The temporary imposition of
a curfew, limited in time and reasonably made necessary by conditions prevail-
ing, is a legitimate and proper exercise of the police power of public authority.
To argue contrariwise is to give to a mob a power to oppress that under our
Constitution is not given to the state itself. The Constitution protects against
anarchy as well as tyranny. Id. at 201-02, 163 N.W.2d at 211.
See United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971);
State v. Boles, 5 Conn. Cir. 22, 240 A.2d 920 (1967); Glover v. District of Columbia,
250 A.2d 556 (D.C. App. 1969); State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C. 484, 178 S.E.2d 449
(1971). See also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (curfew during
martial law in Hawaii in World War II, see Part I 644 n.191); Commonwealth v.
Stotland, 214 Pa. Super. 35, 251 A.2d 701 (1969), appeal dismissed, 398 U.S. 916
(1971) (Spaulding, J., concurring) (upholding emergency power statutory scheme,
including curfew power). The use of curfews in such situations has been invalidated
when the official declaring the curfew did not have authority to do so. See Municipal
Court, City of Fort Lauderdale v. Patrick, 254 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1971); Walsh v. City of
River Rouge, 385 Mich. 623, 189 N.W.2d 318 (1971) (state law was preemptive where
legislative history showed intent not to grant such power to local officials). A curfew has
also been invalidated where it contained no exceptions. People v. Kearse, 56 Misc. 2d
586, 289 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Syracuse City Ct.), appeal dismissed, 58 Misc. 2d 277, 295
N.Y.S.2d 192 (Onondaga County Ct. 1968). See generally Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 321,
330-36 (1974). It has also been held that a riot curfew does not constitute an
interruption of business for purposes of insurance procured for that purpose. Two
Caesars Corp. v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 280 A.2d 305 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
56. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 870.04 (Supp. 1975) (authorizing an order to
disperse "any number of persons ... unlawfully, riotously or tumultuously assembled");
W. VA. CoDn ANN. § 61-6-1 (Supp. 1975) (imposing the duty upon mayors, police, and
sheriffs "to go among, or as near as may be with safety, to persons riotously, tumultuous-
ly, or unlawfully assembled, and in the name of the law command them to disperse").
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The concept of a "protective zone" is designed to alleviate these
difficulties. Under one such proposal, police and fire officials would be
authorized to establish and maintain temporary public safety zones with
reasonably identifiable boundaries whenever it appeared that a need
existed to provide access for fire, police, ambulance, utility repair, or
other emergency vehicles; to ensure adequate space and freedom of
movement for the prompt performance of official duties at the scene of
any crime, fire, explosion, wreck, or other emergency situation; or to
facilitate the movement of pedestrian or vehicular traffic. Officials could
close a zone to vehicular or pedestrian traffic, permit access only to
authorized persons or vehicles, order persons and vehicles to leave pub-
lic areas within the zone within a reasonable time, or prohibit three or
more persons from congregating within a zone, in any manner reason-
ably calculated to communicate the boundaries of the zone and the
conditions imposed. Presence within a zone in violation of any condition
imposed would be a minor offense, and the act of entering the prohibit-
ed area would constitute an offense authorizing arrest without a warrant.
Any motor vehicle found within the zone could be impounded, and any
vehicle abandoned within a zone would be subject to forfeiture.T This
concept of an executive authority to limit freedom of movement, even if
pursuant to statutory authorization, obviously raises first amendment
questions, but the curfew decisions would seem to be ample precedent
for sustaining such an approach to crowd control during serious disor-
ders.58
See the discussion of the English Riot Act of 1714, Part I 663-64. A more modem
approach authorizes a law enforcement official in an emergency to issue a command to
disperse "if he reasonably believes that a riot, or disorderly conduct by an assemblage of
three or more persons, is occurring," with failure to obey the command constituting a
misdemeanor, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.5 (1969). See State v. Orange, 22 N.C. App.
220, 206 S.E.2d 377, appeal dismissed, 285 N.C. 762, 208 S.E.2d 380 (1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 996 (1975); State v. Clark, 22 N.C. App. 81, 206 S.E.2d 252, appeal
dismissed, 285 N.C. 760, 208 S.E.2d 380 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 977 (1975).
57. A bill incorporating these provisions to authorize the temporary establishment of
protective zones in the District of Columbia was drafted in 1971 within the Department
of Justice, but was apparently never introduced in Congress. See also KAN. STAT. ANN. §
48-1801 (Supp. 1974) (authorizing the "designation of specific zones within the area in
which occupancy and use of buildings and ingress and egress of persons and vehicles may
be prohibited or regulated"); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 15B(c) (1971); TFx. Ruv. Civ.
STAT. art. 5890e, § 3 (Supp. 1974) (authorizing the "designation of specific zones within
the area in which, under necessitous circumstances, the occupancy and use of buildings
and vehicles may be controlled" and the "control of the movement of persons or vehicles
into, within, or from those designated areas"); Riot Control Legislation 160-61. See note
10 supra and accompanying text. Any such provision must contain sufficient guidelines
and standards to ensure that it cannot be used to interfere with the exercise of first
amendment rights. Washington Mobilization Comm. v. Cullinane, 400 F. Supp. 186
(D.D.C. 1975).
58. See notes 48-55 supra and accompanying text.
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D. Stops and Frisks
During a civil disorder, one of the most important tasks of law
enforcement personnel will be to prevent armed persons in the area of
the disorder from joining with others to engage in unlawful conduct.
Thus, there may be on occasion a legitimate need for an expanded
power to stop and frisk in the area of the riot.59 The opinions of the
Supreme Court in the stop-and-frisk area provide a substantial basis for
such authority.
In Terry v. Ohio,60 the Court sustained the admission into evidence
of a pistol revealed as the result of the stopping and the patting down of
the outer garments of a suspect who had been surreptitiously "casing" a
jewelry store. On its facts, the decision is limited to a stop and frisk
where the officer had reason to believe that he was dealing with an
armed and dangerous individual and had a reasonable ground to suspect
that "criminal activity was afoot."' 61 In Adams v. Williams,62 a stop and
frisk of a person suspected of possessing narcotics was sustained where
police had acted on the basis of a tip from an informant-whose
reliability had not been established-that the suspect was armed. Adams
suggests that the quality of evidence needed to justify a stop and frisk of
someone who is suspected of being about to commit an offense will not
be subjected to rigorous judicial scrutiny. 63 The language of both Ad-
ams and Terry is broad enough to permit a stop and frisk of someone
who is reasonably suspected of being armed and dangerous and of
having committed an offense at some earlier time, and perhaps the
stopping of a person who is reasonably suspected of having been present
at the time of an offense. 4 It probably does not justify the stopping of a
person who is not reasonably suspected of having committed, being
about to commit, or having been present at the commission of an
offense, nor the frisk of a person when there is no reason to believe that
he may be armed.65
59. See generally Limits on Riot Control 100-03; Riot Control Legislation 166.
60. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
61. Id. at 22-23, 30.
62. 407 U.S. 143 (1972), noted in 50 DENVER L.J. 243 (1973); 50 J. URBAN L. 790
(1973); 24 SYRACUSE L.J. 839 (1973).
63. See United States v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 65, 66-67 (D.S.D. 1974). See also
Nakell, Proposed Revisions of North Carolina's Search and Seizure Law, 52 N.C.L. REv.
277, 317-37 (1973).
64. See ALI PRE-AR AIGNmENT CODE § SS 110.2.
65. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63-64 (1968); cf. United States v.
Williams, 372 F. Supp. 65 (D.S.D. 1974) (discussed at notes 66-73 infra and accompa-
nying text).
Vol. 1975:1021] 1041
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
The use of a stop and frisk type power during a civil emergency
was adjudged in United States v. Williams,0 a district court case which
arose during the Wounded Knee disturbance in 1973. The stopping
occurred as the defendant approached a roadblock outside the village
of Wounded Knee. Williams was detained and informed that his car
would be searched, although he refused to give his consent and was
not free to leave the scene without submitting to the search. FBI
agents removed the contents of his car and spread them upon the
highway, discovering in the process a small amount of marijuana. The
defendant moved to suppress the marijuana in the prosecution which
followed. The district court held that a stop and frisk was a reasonable
procedure under the emergency conditions present at Wounded Knee
but that the scope of the search of this defendant's belongings was too
broad. The roadblock was justified by the occupation of the village and
the violence that had been associated with it, and the need to protect the
officers and others in the general area from the threat of physical
danger.17 The danger posed by efforts to resupply the insurgents also
gave the officers authority to conduct "limited searches for the purpose
of denying the occupants of Wounded Knee those supplies that were
vital to the continuance of the insurrection"; 68 however, it did not justify
the extensive search of the defendant's car. When the FBI agents at
Wounded Knee produced no evidence to justify probable cause to arrest
the defendant, "he should have been allowed to leave the roadblock
without the total search he experienced." 9
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon the airport search
cases which have indicated that a suspect may avoid a stop and frisk
procedure by withdrawing from his attempt to board an aircraft.7 0 The
analogy is not, however, altogether persuasive. In the airport search
cases, the object is to prevent weapons or explosives from being taken
aboard airplanes; when a suspect turns away that object is achieved. In
the Wounded Knee type situation, on the other hand, the object is to
prevent ammunition and supplies from reaching the insurgents, which
66. 372 F. Supp. 65 (D.S.D. 1974). Although Williams did not as such involve a
stop and frisk, the court analyzed the roadblock search on a stop-and-frisk basis.
67. Id. at 66. Specifically, the court observed that
[t]he existence of a general insurrection or mass riot has an effect upon the
reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment. A riot is a situation
that presents a clear danger to the populace and the police themselves and re-
quires the unusual exercise of police power which courts should not easily or
lightly interfere with. Id.
68. Id. at 67.
69. Id.
70. United States v. Miner, 484 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Davis,
482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). See note 89 infra.
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the court held to be permissible as a basis for the roadblock and limited
stop and frisks. 1 The court itself noted, however, that the roadblocks
had not been successful in stemming the flow of these items.72 If the
permissible object of the procedure was to intercept ammunition and
weapons, then it would be difficult to accomplish without searching
automobiles stopped at the roadblock. One would hardly anticipate that
the driver would emerge with those items on his person. The court's own
logic would seem to support the proposition that the permissible purpose
of the search should have justified a search of the car,73 though not
necessarily as broad as the one actually conducted.
In a civil disorder where a curfew is in force, there may be little
need for any stop and frisk, inasmuch as the mere presence of the person
on the street constitutes the offense that justifies the arrest and the
search.74 When a curfew is not in force, however, the luxury of the
lengthy surveillance which characterized Terry, or even the uncorrobo-
rated tip of an informer as in Adams, will rarely be possible, and,
depending upon the conditions, there may be a need to stop anyone
found on the street in a riot area and perform a limited search of his
outer garments. 75 On occasion there may also be a reasonable suspicion
that the person frisked is armed and dangerous, and has committed or is
about to commit a crime. In other circumstances, there may not be such
a factual predicate, except to the extent that the officer suspects every-
one on the public streets in the area of the riot of possible criminal
conduct. One recent statute faced these problems directly and au-
thorized an officer to stop and frisk any person in an area contiguous
to a riot when he has reasonable grounds to believe that the person
is, or may become, unlawfully involved in the riot.76 While the lan-
guage of the statute is inescapably broad, it seems nevertheless to be
within the bounds of the Constitution, inasmuch as the rationale of
Terry suggests that the limited intrusion by the stop and frisk may be
71. See notes 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
72. 372 F. Supp. at 66.
73. A similar situation was present in United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971), where an auto was stopped during a curfew.
When the driver stepped out of the auto, an officer saw the butt end of a shotgun, and
then proceeded to pull the stock and trigger mechanism of a twelve-gauge shotgun from
the floor behind the front seat. The search was upheld, as was a subsequent search that
uncovered other, similar items. 441 F.2d at 1279-80. The facts in Chalk are, of
course, distinguishable from those in Williams, since in the latter case the officers did
not observe weapons or ammunition in the auto as the defendant alighted.
74. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
75. See Limits on Riot Control 100, 102-03.
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.10(a) (1969).
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justified by the significant government interest sought to be vindi-
cated. 77
In the context of the civil disorder, the indignity of the stop and
frisk seems minor compared to the importance of assuring that armed
persons are not on the streets. 78 In a sense, it is a lesser restriction than a
curfew, which subjects an unarmed person on the streets to arrest, a
potentially broader search, and imprisonment. The intrusion is certainly
far less than the more lengthy detention of persons suspected of contrib-
uting to the disorders permitted by Moyer and Sterling.7 9
E. Searches and Seizures
The fourth amendment's provisions, which prohibit unreasonable
searches and seizures, declare that warrants shall not issue except upon
probable cause, and require particularity in the description of the prem-
ises to be searched and objects to be seized,80 have resulted in something
less than an unambiguous line of Supreme Court interpretations.8' The
77. 392 U.S. at 20-24. That the North Carolina statute does not simply codify
Terry is plain, inasmuch as it allows the officer to make a search of any belongings in
the possession of the individual even though he may not be endangered himself, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-288.10(a) (1969), a procedure that would seem to contravene the
holding in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64-66 (1968). Although it may be argued
that the North Carolina scheme is thus too broad and is, therefore, unconstitutional, the
language of the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Chalk, upholding the constitutionality
of the other aspects of the North Carolina legislation, suggests that it is a permissible
exercise of legislative authority, 441 F.2d at 1280, at least where it can be shown that it
was necessary to achieve the purpose of the stop. See notes 66-73 supra and accompany-
ing text.
78. Thus, it has been suggested that the police should be able to "stop and question
people in the riot area fairly freely." Limits on Riot Control 100-03. See note 55 supra.
79. See Part 1 636-55. See notes 241-60 infra and accompanying text.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
81. Thus, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Court observed
that "[t]he decisions of the Court over the years point in differing directions and differ
in emphasis. No trick of logic will make them all perfectly consistent." Id. at 483. Much
of the confusion is the result of a failure to determine authoritatively and consistently
whether the warrant clause and the reasonable search clause are dependent or independ-
ent of each other. Player, Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 5 GA. L. Rav. 269 (1971).
As Professor Bacigal has pointed out,
[o]ne theory views the clauses as dependent and complementary; thus making
warrantless searches unreasonable except in emergency situations when resort
to a magistrate is impossible. The second theory views the warrant and rea-
sonableness clauses as independent and severable; thus searches without a war-
rant are judged solely by the standard of reasonableness, and the failure to ob-
tain a warrant is not relevant. Bacigal, The Emergency Exception to the
Fourth Amendment, 9 U. RcsMsoND L. REV. 249, 257 (1975).
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exact relationship between the warrant clause and the clause assuring
security from unreasonable searches and seizures is only one area in
which definitive decisions have not yet been rendered. 2 Certain princi-
ples do, however, seem to be reasonably clear. Although a search
warrant supported by probable cause should, in theory, be the normal
method of proceeding, 3 a search without a warrant may be reasonable
where valid consent has been procured,84 where it is incident to a valid
arrest, 5 where a search for an offender or weapons was performed while
in "hot pursuit,"8 6 where there is probable cause for believing that a
moving automobile or one which is likely to be moved contains matter
subject to seizure,87 where what are often called "inventory searches"
are undertaken, 8 and in certain other unusual situations.8" The the-
82. See Irons, The Burger Court: Discord in Search and Seizure, 8 U. RicmoND L.
REv. 433 (1974); LaFave, supra note 27.
83. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); United States v. United States Dist.
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968); United
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-07 (1965).
84. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 165-66 (1974); Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). See Wefing & Miles, Consent Searches and the Fourth
Amendment: Voluntariness and Third Party Problems, 5 SEToN HALL L. REv. 211
(1974).
85. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224-26 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida,
414 U.S. 260, 263-64 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969);
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950). See also Cook, Warrantless
Searches Incident to Arrest, 24 ALA. L. Rnv. 607 (1972); Nakell, Search of the Person
Incident to a Traffic Arrest: A Comment on Robinson and Gustafson, 10 CalM. L.
BULL. 827 (1974); Comment, Searches Incident to Arrest: The Expanding Exception to
the Warrant Requirement, 63 Gno. L.J. 223 (1974).
86. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967).
87. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,
47-49 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925); see Miles & Wefing,
The Automobile Search and the Fourth Amendment: A Troubled Relationship, 4 SuToN
HALL L. REv. 105 (1972); Murray & Aitken, Constitutional Limitations on Automobile
Searches, 3 LoYoLA U.L.A.L. REv. 95 (1970); Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures
of Automobiles, 87 Hnv. L. REV. 835 (1974); Note, Confusing the Confusion:
Automobile Search and Seizure Takes a New Turn, 12 HousToN L. Rav. 460 (1975);
Note, Mobility Reconsidered: Extending the Carroll Doctrine to Movable Items, 58
IowA L. Rlv. 1134 (1973).
88. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg.
Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); see Stroud, The Inventory Search and the Fourth
Amendment, 4 IN. LEGAL F. 471 (1971).
89. These situations include border searches, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 95 S.
Ct. 2574 (1975); United States v. Ortiz, 95 S. Ct. 2585 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); regulatory searches of licensed premises, United
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); welfare inspections, Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309 (1971); scientific tests and intrusion into the body, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291
(1973); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); custodial searches, ALI PRE-
ARRArGNMENT CoDE § SS 230.6; United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974); plain
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view seizures, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); open field searches,
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967); and activities not directed toward criminal investigation, United States v.
Dunavan, 464 F.2d 1166 (6th Cir. 1972). See generally Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, MODERN Ca1rimiA. PROCEDURE, 338-39 (4th ed. 1974).
The most prominent contemporary example of an exigent situation which has given
rise to a limited type of search that need not comply with the usual warrant requirements
involves so-called "airport searches" conducted in an effort to preclude the hijacking of
commercial aircraft. The need for such security measures has been described as follows:
Airplane hijacking, the unlawful seizure and diversion of aircraft to un-
scheduled destinations, is a contemporary phenomenon with potentially cat-
astrophic consequences. The high incidence of air piracy-jeopardizing pas-
sengers' lives, threatening commercial airlines' personnel and property, wreak-
ing substantial economic loss upon both, and inhibiting citizens' exercise of the
constitutional right to travel-has demonstrated civil aviation's need for se-
curity measures. United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 511 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 902 (1974).
In response to this need, security measures have been adopted for all commercial flights,
which are designed to preclude a would-be hijacker from taking weapons or explosives
aboard an aircraft.
The constitutionality of the measures has produced considerable decisional au-
thority. The basic issue has been whether the search and seizure rules of the
fourth amendment will permit a warrantless search for air security purposes. As a
very broad proposition, the courts have clearly concluded that the normal airport search
need not comply with the warrant requirements. This view is most aptly illustrated by
United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), which was the first of the
so-called "airport search" cases, where two passengers had been identified as meeting the
"profile" of a potential hijacker, had activated an electronic magnetometer metal detec-
tion device, and had failed to produce adequate identification upon request. When
requested by two United States Marshals, the two again activated the magnetometer, and
one disclosed that an erroneous nane appeared on his ticket. The passengers were then
escorted to a private area, where a pat down revealed "a hard object about 4 inches wide,
6 inches long, and three-quarters of an inch deep" under one man's clothing, which
turned out to be narcotics instead of a weapon. When the two sought to suppress the
narcotics so discovered in a subsequent prosecution, the court held that the procedures
utilized met all fourth amendment requirements. It specifically approved use of the
magnetometer, id. at 1085-86, and concluded that the pat down ("frisk") was within the
requirements of Terry v. Ohio. The court referred to the language in Terry indicating
that the frisk could be made for the purpose of protecting the officer making the search
and "others" from possible danger, id. at 1097, and observed that
tw]e know that the frisk is conducted in private with as much courtesy as the
circumstances permit and that those who are frisked and allowed to go on their
way generally welcome the protective measures taken in their behalf rather
than resent them. The substantial interest in preserving the integrity and
safety of air travel by preventing hijacking is obvious. In light of the circum-
stances, a 6% danger of arms suffices to justify a frisk. Id.
Terry has been followed with similar results in many other cases. United States v. Clark,
498 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Dalpiaz, 494 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Crain, 485 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Skipwith, 482
F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Doran, 482 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973);
United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840 (1973);
United States v. Riggs, 474 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973);
United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d
667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d
769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 US, 947 (1972); UniteO States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d
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ories underlying these various exceptions to the warrant requirement
lack symmetry.90  In several factual situations where warrantless
searches have been sustained, "reasonableness"' has been predicated
upon the theory that the exigencies of the situation make the course
of action imperativel -a rationale which has also been utilized to dis-
701 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972); United States v. Mitchell, 352 F.
Supp. 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), affd without opinion, 486 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1973). Other
cases have reached the same conclusion relying upon the administrative search rationale
of Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See United States v. Davis, 482
F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). Although the courts have for the most part clearly indicated
that the narrow limits in Terry must be carefully followed, some have written opinions
that are very broad in doctrinal base and do not tie the result to the narrow limits of
Terry. Thus, in United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974), Judge Friendly
referred to his earlier concurring opinion in United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d at 674-75, in
which he said that the airport searches were justified by the danger of hijacking alone, so
long as conducted in good faith and with reasonable procedures.
Notwithstanding this broad approval of airport search procedures without warrants,
the courts have been sensitive to the limited purposes of the airport search, and where
those needs have been exceeded, courts have required the searches to meet ordinary
fourth amendment standards. See United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir.
1974) (pat down occurred too soon in procedure); United States v. Moore, 483 F.2d
1361 (9th Cir. 1973) (could not search luggage after denial of boarding); United States
v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973) (continued search after it was known that the
accused had neither explosives nor weapons); United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d
723 (2d Cir. 1973) (no circumstances to justify pat down); United States v. Meulener,
351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (could not search baggage).
See generally Abramovsky, The Constitutionality of the Anti-Hijacking Security
System, 22 BuirpA.o L. Rnv. 123 (1972); Andrews, Screening Travelers at the Airport to
Prevent Hijacking: A New Challenge for the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 16
AR1z. L. REv. 657 (1974); Brodsky, Terry and the Pirates: Constitutionality of Airport
Searches and Seizures, 62 KY. L.J. 623 (1974); Gora, Fourth Amendment at the
Airport: Arriving, Departing, or Cancelled?, 18 VILL. L. REV. 1036 (1973); McGinley &
Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable Approach, 41 FoRDHAM L. Rlv.
293 (1972); Wright, Hijacking Risks and Airport Frisks: Reconciling Airport Security
with the Fourth Amendment, 9 CraM. L. BULL. 491 (1973).
90. Thus, the search incident to an arrest has been traditionally justified on the
grounds of protecting the officer from the possibility that the arrestee is armed,
preventing the destruction of evidence, or furnishing appropriate custodial care. ALI
PRE-ARMUGNMENT CODE § SS 230.1. But cf. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973),
(permitting full search following an arrest for a traffic offense apparently without regard
to the purpose of the search). The conceptual basis for consent searches has been unclear
since Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), in which the Court apparently
rejected the theory that consent searches are based on "waiver" of the constitutional
rights to be free from warrantless searches. In addition, the rationale for custodial
searches of arrested persons and "inventory" searches of vehicles is less clear than ever
after United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), and Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433 (1973).
91. This seems true of the hot pursuit, airport, and border search cases, and is the
stated explanation of the vehicle search cases. But see Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42 (1970). It has been stated that these jealously and carefully drawn exceptions exist
only where the exigencies of the situation make the course imperative-that is, when
"the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the [legitimate] governmental
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pense with normal requirements of notice of authority and purpose in
the execution of a warrant, 92 in the installation of a device for electronic
survellance pursuant to a warrant,93 and the dspensation, from the
necessity of probable cause for permissible stops and frisks."s
In the emergencies characteristic of some kinds of civil disorders,
there is good reason for state laws relating to searches, like those
authorizing arrests, to be as broad as the Constitution will permit. Rules
which greatly limit permissible consent searches,9 or impose additional
requirements for nighttime searches, 96 should not apply in serious civil
disorders. Provisions should also be made to dispense with the necessity
of notice of authority and purpose where there is reasonable cause to
believe that the normal notice would endanger successful accomplish-
ment of the search or endanger the officer or some other person, 97 if
such exceptions are not already authorized by statute or decisional law.
The more serious search and seizure issues during an emergency
caused by a civil disorder are whether it is constitutional, and if so,
whether it is desirable to (1) further expand the circumstances when,
assuming the existence of probable cause, a search of premises may be
conducted without a warrant; (2) modify normal requirements of par-
purpose behind the search." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967). But
cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800
(1974); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
433 (1973). See also Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
92. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Blakey, The Rule of Announcement
and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L. REv.
499 (1964).
93. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-54 (1967); Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323, 329-31 (1966). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1970).
94. SeeTerryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
95. See, e.g., State v. Hall, 264 N.C. 559, 142 S.E.2d 177 (1965) (prohibiting search
of residence of suspected husband upon consent of the wife).
96. State statutes requiring daytime searches as a rule are collected in ALI PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT CODE 512-13. A broad exception such as that contained in § SS 220.2(3)
of the Code would probably be an adequate, but more unwieldly, substitute for permitting
searches with a warrant at anytime during a serious civil disorder:
Upon a finding by the issuing authority of reasonable cause to believe that the
place to be searched is difficult of speedy access, or that the objects to be seized
are in danger of imminent removal, or that the warrant can only be safely or
successfully executed at nighttime, or under circumstances the occurrence of
which is difficult to predict with accuracy, the issuing authority may, by appro-
priate provision in the warrant, authorize its execution at times other than
those specified ....
97. See ALI PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE § SS 220.3, at 513-15 (notice not necessary
where it would endanger execution of the warrant). Present law in some states provides
no exception for the execution of a search warrant even where exceptions are permitted
for entries to arrest without a warrant. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-249, -401(e) (1) (c)
(1973).
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ticularity in designating premises to be searched or objects to be seized
in order to permit limited area searches; and (3) broaden the authority
to establish roadblocks and search vehicles. A more fundamental ques-
tion is whether probable cause should be a prerequisite to a lawful
search in serious civil disorders when there are reasonable grounds to
suspect that objects subject to seizure are present in a dwelling or
vehicle.
1. Emergency Searches Without a Warrant for Weapons and Simi-
lar Devices. Initially, it is important to determine when, if ever, a search
of premises without a warrant should be justified in a serious civil
disorder. Officers in "hot pursuit" clearly have authority to enter prem-
ises to search for an offender or weaponsY8 A recent West Virginia
statute has gone so far as to authorize the authorities charged with
suppressing a riot to enter premises without a warrant when in fresh
pursuit of a rioter, in search of a sniper who has fired therefrom, or in
search of armaments stored therein, where there is "reason to believe"
that those persons or things would be gone before a search warrant
could be obtained. 91
The authority of a law enforcement officer who is not in hot
pursuit to search premises without a warrant during a serious urban dis-
order is less than clear. The state's interest in such searches is obvious
-to assist in the restoration of order and the protection of persons and
property. But Camara v. Municipal Court'00 suggests that justification
in terms of reasonableness may not be enough unless the state can also
establish that the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the
governmental purpose, 10 ' and the Supreme Court has imposed a much
stricter requirement for search of premises,"' even where there is argua-
bly an emergency, than it has for searches of persons'0 3 or vehicles.' 0 4 In
some cases, the state will not be able to make such a showing, even
assuming the immediate unavailability of a magistrate, because the na-
ture of the objects sought to be seized may be such that they are un-
likely to be moved, or there may be no urgency to act until the disorder
has subsided. In other cases, however, the state may be able to make a
compelling case, as when the objects sought are weapons or other things
98. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
99. W. VA. CODE § 61-6-la(d) (Supp. 1974).
100. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
101. Id. at 533.
102. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20
(1925).
103. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
104. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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likely to be used to injure persons or to damage or destroy property, and
where there is reason to believe that the delay required to obtain a
warrant will result in their removal or use.' 05 In the fluid conditions of a
riot, weapons and incendiary devices are more likely to be used than
hoarded, and magistrates are not readily accessible to police on the
streets who are faced with the decision of whether to take preventive
action or risk additional damage, injury, and death. In such circum-
stances, prompt action is required and should be permitted. Statutes
should, therefore, expressly authorize a search without a warrant for
any objects that are capable of injuring persons or damaging or destroy-
ing property when there is probable cause to believe that they will be
found on designated premises, and that they will be used or removed
before a warrant can be procured.'
It is of interest to note that the American Law Institute has rec-
ommended a narrow emergency house search provision that is not lim-
ited to civil disorders:
An officer who has reasonable cause to believe that premises or a
vehicle contain
(1) individuals in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm;
or
(2) things imminently likely to burn, explode, or otherwise cause
death, serious bodily harm, or substantial destruction of property; or
(3) things subject to seizure . . . which will cause or be used to
cause death or serious bodily harm if their seizure is delayed,
may, without a search warrant, enter and search such premises and
vehicles, and the individuals therein, to the extent reasonably neces-
sary for the prevention of such death, bodily harm, or destruction., 07
105. See Barton v. Eichelberger, 311 F. Supp. 1132 (M.D. Pa. 1970), alf'd, 451 F.2d
263 (3d Cir. 1971); National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 1310-12; Riots and
the Fourth Amendment 626-28.
106. Such authority would be narrower than the present power to conduct car
searches in non-emergency conditions. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
107. ALI PRE-Aa RlAGNMENT CODE § SS 260.5; see Mascolo, The Emergency Doc-
trine Exception to the Warrant Requfrement Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BUFFALo
L. REv. 419 (1973). Mr. Mascolo defines the emergency doctrine exception as follows:
Law enforcement officers may enter private premises without either an ar-
rest or a search warrant to preserve life or property, to render first aid and
assistance, or to conduct a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, provided
they have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an urgent need for such
assistance and protective action, or to promptly launch a criminal investigation
involving a substantial threat of imminent danger to either life, health, or prop-
erty, and provided, further, that they do not enter with an accompanying intent
to either arrest or search. If, while on the premises, they inadvertently dis-
cover incriminating evidence in plain view, or a result of some activity on their
part that bears a material relevance to the initial purpose for their entry, they
may lawfully seize it without a warrant. Id. at 426-27.
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This proposal was designed for emergencies which occur during routine
law enforcement activities, and the limitations were expressly designed
to be narrower than the existing law authorizing vehicle searches, in
order to minimize doubts concerning the constitutionality of entering
dwellings without a warrant caused by the Agnello0 8 and Vale' °9
decisions."10
In a civil disorder, if there is reason to believe that objects capable
of endangering life or destroying property are present in a dwelling, and
there is probable cause to believe that they will be used or moved in the
near future, police should be authorized to enter, search, and seize
them."' In such cases, the danger of frustrating the seizure by the
necessity of a warrant application is always present. The danger of
frustration is increased by the need for keeping the maximum number of
officers on the street." 2 In such circumstances, the reasonableness of the
See also Note, The Emergency Doctrine, Civil Search and Seizure, and the Fourth
Amendment, 43 FOuDHAM L. REv. 571 (1975). Under such an approach, a search which
has as one of its purposes the acquisition of incriminating evidence would require a
warrant regardless of the level of the emergency. The Supreme Court of California has,
however, rejected such a doctrine in People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 497 P.2d 1121, 102
Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972), cert. denied 410 U.S. 947 (1973). The ALI proposal is intended
to permit searches or arrests if the emergency conditions justifying entry are present.
ALI PRE-ARP.AGNMENT CODE 553. Professor Bacigal distinguishes between emergencies
involving a potential loss of life (which he designates as emergency intrusions) and
emergencies involving a potential loss of evidence (emergency searches), but argues for
the same "strict standards" to be applied to each. Bacigal, supra note 81, at 249, 267-69.
108. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
109. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
110. See ALI PRE-ARRmAGNMENT CODE 553.
111. There is always the possibility that such authority might be abused and used as a
pretense for a search that would reveal other seizable items in "plain view." Cf. Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Even where bona fide grounds for an
emergency search exist, it may be appropriate to limit the seizure authority to the
dangerous substances the presence of which justified the warrantless search, prohibiting
seizure of evidence of crime or contraband of a different nature. See People v. Sibron, 18
N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E.2d 196, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting),
rev'd 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. Rnv. 349, 437 (1974) (stop and frisks); cf. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 84-4
(airport searches); N.C. GEN. STAT. 15A-279(d) (1975) (non-testimonial identifica-
tions). Prohibition of seizure of non-dangerous instrumentalities might also ban testimo-
ny of observations made possible as a result of the warrantless search.
112. In Barton v. Eichelberger, 311 F. Supp. 1132 (M.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 451 F.2d
263 (3d Cir. 1971), for example, the court upheld a search without a warrant during a
substantial disorder in York, Pennsylvania, when the police learned of a sniper in a
certain block. They obtained a warrant to search five designated dwellings for weapons.
After unsuccessfully searching the five dwellings, the police concluded that the sniper
was in an adjoining building for which they had no warrant. They entered the building,
arrested him and seized the weapons. The court upheld the action on the grounds that
"exceptional circumstances were present requiring immediate entry ... before . .. a
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searches would be supported by the theory of the hot pursuit113 and the
moving vehicle cases, 114 buttressed by the authority of the martial law
cases.
115
We are aware that others who recognize the necessity of less
stringent limitations upon searches in serious domestic disorders, never-
theless oppose any blanket authority to dispense with warrants in speci-
fied emergencies. One view prefers to consider each action "in light of
the specific emergency presented," taking into account "the urgency of
the interest asserted and, in view of that interest, the urgency of the
specific action undertaken," balancing "both against the private interest
invaded."' 6 A second view would expand the concept of probable cause
by equating it with a "showing of reasonableness under the circum-
stances. 1"7
We think that express authority to act in all cases falling within the
statutory emergency exception is more desirable than proceeding on a
case by case basis for several reasons. First, the absence of statutory
authority to enter requires that police engage in a sophisticated balanc-
ing of competing values in the context of a need for prompt action.
While the problem exists in any case where an officer determines to
proceed without a warrant, it is considerably less desirable when imme-
diate action may be required. Second, a statutory definition tends to
discourage abuses by implicitly instructing police that a warrant will be
required in cases not covered by the statute, and not permitted under
normal conditions. Third, a case by case determination by magistrates in
an emergency invites a loose interpretation of probable cause that may
survive the termination of the emergency." 8 Finally, recent decisions
warrant could have been obtained." Id. at 1152-53. See T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 47-49 (1969).
113. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
114. See authorities cited in note 87 supra.
115. See notes 241-59 infra and accompanying text.
116. Riots and the Fourth Amendment 626.
117. Limits on Riot Control 98.
118. This possibility is rather clearly indicated by the number of warrants that have
been granted in domestic wiretap cases under Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970). Thus, it has been reported
that virtually all of the applications submitted were approved between 1970 and 1973.
See ADmINsTRAIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORTS ON APPLICATIONS FOR
ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNI-
CATIONS (1968-73). See also Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of fustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1974) (total number of applications between June, 1968, and
December, 1972, was 2,751, and the total number of authorizations in the same period
was 2,744); Pulaski, Authorizing Wiretap Applications Under Title III: Another Dissent
to Giordano and Chavez, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 750, 755 n.13 (1975). This frequency of
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suggest that the Court is proceeding to categorize general circumstances
justifying dispensation with a warrant, rather than determining each
case on its specific facts.119 Such an approach invites a legislative
statement of when a warrant should not be necessary.1 20
2. Particularity Requirements. The exact meaning of the "par-
ticularity" requirement of the fourth amendment is unclear l2 but its
objective seems to be the avoidance of the pernicious features of a
general warrant by removing from the executing officer's discretion the
question of where he may search and what he may seize. 22 This is
accomplished by specifying the precise permissible scope of a search in
the language of the warrant.1 23
The requirement of particularity as to objects to be seized involves
the same general problems in both emergency and non-emergency situa-
tions. It seems necessary unless "general" searches are to be tolerated,
and, in addition to the historical evidence that the fourth amendment
was specifically designed to eliminate such searches, no strong case can
be made that their value to the state balances the infringement upon
privacy which would accompany them.'24 The public interest is protect-
ed adequately by the doctrine which permits seizure of any object not
named in the warrant which is discovered inadvertently during and
within the scope of search authorized by a warrant.1
25
approval is only one of the criticisms that has been directed toward the warrant
requirements for eavesdropping. See E. LAPmus, EAVESDROPPING ON TRIAL 72-93 (1974);
T. TAYLOR, supra note 112, at 85-91. See also United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505
(1974); United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974); United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); United States v. Gustafson, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); Cady
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
454-73 (1971).
120. See Platte, A Legislative Statement of Warrantless Search Law: Poaching on
Sacred Judicial Preserves?, 52 ORE. L. Rav. 139 (1973).
121. "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
122. See Cook, Requisite Particularity in Search Warrant Authorizations, 38 TNN,.
L. REv. 496 (1971); LaFave, Search and Seizure: The Course of True Lmv . . . Has
Not ... Run Smooth, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255, 266-68; Mascolo, Specificity Requirements
for Warrants Under the Fourth Amendment: Defining the Zone of Privacy, 73 DICK. L.
REv. 1 (1968).
123. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925) ("It is enough if the
description is such that the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort
ascertain and identify the place intended.").
124. See Cook, supra note 122, at 515-16.
125. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466-73 (1971).
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The requirement of particularity in designating the premises to be
searched raises different issues. The problem is particularly acute when
multi-dwelling or multi-office buildings are involved. Unless there is
probable cause to search the entire building, 126 it is necessary that the
warrant specifically indicate the premises to be searched.' 7 During a
civil disorder, however, the information available may not support
the belief that objects subject to seizure will be found in more than one
apartment. Instead, there may be moral certitude that a cache of weap-
ons or incendiary devices is hidden in an apartment house, but no
probable cause to believe that they will be found in all or any particular
apartments or that the occupants of the apartment house are acting in
concert. The general law of search and seizure would not permit a
search of all or any of the apartments-an area search-without a
warrant, nor would it permit a warrant to be issued in the absence of
information identifying the apartment where the cache is thought to be
secreted.' 28
During a civil disorder there may be compelling reasons for permit-
ting a search of all apartments or any individual apartments in such
circumstances because of the need to prevent use of potential instrumen-
126. Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1119 (1969); United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1955); Tynan v. United
States, 297 F. 177 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 604 (1924); People v. Estrada, 234
Cal. App. 2d 136, 44 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1965); State v. Sheppard, 46 N.J. 526, 218 A.2d
156 (1966); People v. Montanaro, 34 Misc. 2d 624, 229 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1962);
Commonwealth v. Copertino, 209 Pa. Super. 63, 224 A.2d 228 (1966).
127. United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1955); Giles v. United States,
284 F. 208 (1st Cir. 1922); Perez v. State, 249 Ark. 1111, 463 S.W.2d 394 (1971);
People v. Avery, 173 Colo. 315, 478 P.2d 310 (1970); Fance v. State, 207 So. 2d 331
(Fla. 1968); Thompson v. State, 198 Ind. 496, 154 N.E.2d 278 (1926); State v.
Ratushny, 82 N.Y. Super. 499, 198 A.2d 131 (1964); People v. De Lago, 16 N.Y.2d 289,
213 N.E.2d 659, 266 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 963 (1966); Common-
wealth v. Smyser, 205 Pa. Super. 599, 211 A.2d 59 (1965); State v. Costakos, 101 R.I.
692, 226 A.2d 695 (1967).
128. The rule was expressed concisely in United States v. Poppitt, 227 F. Supp. 73, 76
(D. Del. 1964):
When a warrant directs the search of a multiple occupancy apartment or build-
ing, without identifying the particular apartment or room to be searched, the
validity of . . . the warrant will depend upon whether probable cause for so
describing the premises is shown in the affidavit. A search warrant may
validly direct the search of an entire building if probable cause is shown for
searching each separate apartment, or for believing that the entire building is
actually being used as a single unit ....
See also Hogrefe v. United States, 30 F.2d 640, 641 (9th Cir. 1929); United States v.
Harris, 365 F. Supp. 261, 262 (N.D. Ohio 1972); United States v. Esters, 336 F. Supp.
214, 218 (E.D. Mich. 1972); United States v. Nagle, 34 F.2d 952, 957 (N.D.N.Y.
1929); People v. Sheehan, 28 Cal. App. 3d 21, 103 Cal. Rptr. 201, 203 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 229 Pa. Super. 182, 323 A.2d 26, 28 (1974); Commonwealth
v. Copertino, 209 Pa. Super. 63, 68, 224 A.2d 228, 230 (1966). See authorities cited in
notes 126-27 supra. See generally Cook, supra notW 122, at 498.
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talities of violence. Under different circumstances, there may be an
equal need to search different houses within a limited area.1 29 Such
searches would be adjudged "reasonable" under the martial law authori-
ties.13 0
There is also statutory precedent to justify such searches. In Title
I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
Congress relaxed the particularity requirement for warrants authorizing
electronic surveillance. 3' The extraordinary circumstances asserted as
justification for such warrants are clearly of a lesser order than the
emergency involved in locating and confiscating weapons during a civil
disorder.'32
A less persuasive case can be made by analogy to the relaxation of
the particularity requirement in the inspectorial searches permitted by
Camara v. Municipal Court.3 3 Like the search to ascertain the existence
129. Riots and the Fourth Amendment 626-28; Limits on Riot Control 91-98.
130. See notes 241-308 infra and accompanying text. The leading authority among
the "martial law" cases is Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), discussed in
Part I 632-34, 638 n.167. In that case, state militiamen during the Dorr Rebellion broke
into Luther's home without a warrant for the purpose of arresting him. The Court upheld
the action, stating that the presence of "reasonable grounds" would justify the search and
seizure. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 45-46. The language of the Court can be interpreted to
mean that the search itself was reasonable because the objects of the search might have
been frustrated if a warrant was required in view of the violence taking place. It may be
read more broadly to imply that during such emergency conditions, fourth amendment
standards may be less stringent than in normal periods. Luther is at best, however,
doubtful authority because (1) it involved a true insurrection, but cf. Valdez v. Black,
446 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 963 (1972), discussed
at Part I 647 n.203; (2) it arose before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment; and
(3) it was a diversity case applying state law. See Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule
and the National Emergency, 55 HIv. L. REv. 1253, 1264, 1266 (1942).
See also United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1280-81 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 943 (1971), discussed at notes 254-60 infra and accompanying text; Johnson v.
State, 8 Md. App. 28, 33-34, 257 A.2d 756, 759-60 (1969) (in which the court upheld a
warrantless automobile search during the Baltimore riot of April, 1968, relying heavily
on the riot conditions to establish reasonable cause for the search).
131. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iii) (1970); cf. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 98-
100 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974).
132. See note 118 supra.
133. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
Camara is written in terms of probable cause and particularity. To determine whether
the searches were reasonable, the Court went through the familiar process of balancing
the governmental and citizen interests. It found that the primary governmental interest
was the prevention and abatement of "conditions which are hazardous to public health
and safety." 387 U.S. at 535. To satisfy that interest, the government needed the power
to conduct area searches since any other technique would not achieve acceptable results.
Since the government thus had substantial interest in, and need for, such searches, the
ultimate question was simply whether the personal interests of citizens offset those
interests. The Court concluded that because the searches were neither personal in nature
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of conditions dangerous to health and safety in Camara, the principal
purpose of the search during a civil disorder should not be to uncover
evidence to be admitted against a lawbreaker at trial. Rather, the
principal purpose would be to prevent the use of weapons to exacerbate
the disorder and endanger persons and property. Violations of law may
also be uncovered in an inspectorial search, and evidence establishing
such violations may be seized. Unlike the inspectorial search, however,
where violations uncovered are likely to be minor offenses usually
punishable only by fine, criminal prosecution with the possibility of
substantial punishment will be likely in the riot search unless an arbi-
trary rule excluding the admission of evidence is imposed.134
nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involved a "relatively limited
invasion" of personal privacy, and were, therefore, reasonable. Id. at 537-38.
The Court then addressed the need for, and the standards for issuing, a warrant. A
warrant would issue, it said, if there were a valid public interest, based upon reasonable
standards, to justify the intrusion. Id. at 538-39. The reasonableness standard, however,
would not require specific knowledge of particular dwellings, as would be the case in
normal criminal cases, since the warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that the gov-
ernmental decision to search private property is based on a reasonable governmental
interest:
Having concluded that the area inspection is a "reasonable" search of private
property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it is obvious that
"probable cause" to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legis-
lative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satis-
fied with respect to a particular dwelling. Such standards, which will vary
with the municipal program being enforced, may be based upon passage of
time, the nature of the building (e.g., a multi-family apartment house), or the
condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon specific
knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling. Id. at 538.
See Riots and the Fourth Amendment 628-30; Limit on Riot Control 94-98.
The Court recognized that there would be no need for a warrant in emergency
situations where "compelling urgency" necessitated immediate action. 387 U.S. at 539.
The authority of Camara in the context of a serious civil disorder is doubtful in view of
the Court's observation that inspectoral searches were not "personal in nature" nor
"aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime." Id. at 537. See Denenberg, Administrative
Searches and the Right to Privacy in the United States, 23 INT. & CoMP. L.Q. 169
(1974); LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and
See Cases, 1967 Sup. CT. Rav. 1; Sonnenreich & Pinco, The Inspector Knocks:
Administrative Inspection Warrants Under an Expanded Fourth Amendment, 24
S.W.L.J. 418 (1970); Note, Administrative Search Warrants, 58 MINN. L. Rnv. 607
(1974).
134. See note 111 supra. A particularly strong argument can be made for a prohibi-
tion against seizure or for an exclusionary rule for evidence unrelated to the civil
disorder which is observed in the homes of persons uninvolved in the disorder which are
searched pursuant to these extraordinary powers. The privacy of an uninvolved citizen
has been invaded and contraband or evidence of crime in general is unrelated to the
justification for the invasion. Such an approach has been rejected in the airport search
cases. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Likewise, there
is good reason to require the return of dangerous weapons after the disorder has sub-
sided if possession of such weapons is not prohibited by law, and the municipality should
be prepared to assume liability for any damage to property that results from area
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Although the teaching of Camara does not clearly resolve the area
warrant question, it has been interpreted as an indication that legislation
authorizing such warrants would be permissible. Thus, in United States
v. United States District Court,135 the Supreme Court held that domestic
security eavesdropping must be conducted in accordance with the war-
rant requirements of Title M of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968,130 but that the warrant requirements could be
altered to ensure that the legitimate governmental interests in such
surveillance would be protected. Specifically, it noted that there were
substantial distinctions between ordinary criminal surveillance and do-
mestic security surveillance, and that "the focus of domestic surveillance
may be less precise than that directed against more conventional types of
crime." 1 7 The Court then considered the principles it had earlier identi-
fied in Camara, and concluded that
Congress may wish to consider protective standards for [domestic secu-
rity] which differ from those already prescribed for specified crimes in
Title Ill. Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth
Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate
need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights
of our citizens. For the warrant application may vary according to the
governmental interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights
deserving protection. 138
In other words, the Court reaffirmed the necessity for a warrant, but
clearly suggested that Congress could provide lesser standards for the
issuance of a warrant if the governmental interests in question differed
substantially from those in ordinary criminal circumstances. In the civil
disorder context, the Court's language would provide additional support
for the conclusion that area warrants may be properly issued, at least
where there has been a legislative specification of the showing that must
be made for their issuance.
Justification for an area search may depend upon the objects
sought to be seized. There may be no more need to search for informa-
tion concerning a criminal offense already committed, the fruits of
searches. To the extent possible, hardship should be borne by the community, not the
individual.
135. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1970).
137. 407 U.S. at 322.
138. Id. at 322-23. See also Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 626, 646, 656-59
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Note, The "National Security Wiretap": Presidential Prerogative or
Judicial Responsibility, 45 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 888, 895-97 (1972); Comment, Privacy and
Political Freedom: Application of the Fourth Amendment to "National Security" Inves-
tigations, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1205 (1970).
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crime, or things otherwise unlawfully possessed in a riot than in non-
emergency conditions. But a search for weapons or other things likely
to be used as a means of injuring persons or damaging or destroying
property is quite a different matter. Only where the objects to be
seized are of a nature that justifies emergency power should authority
be granted to dispense with the normal requirement of particularity.
Even if a limited area search can be justified, there is an obvious
problem involved in determining how wide an area may be searched. An
extensive area search will raise an issue of the existence of probable
cause as well as the problem of satisfying the requirements of particular-
ity. In some cases, the two may be separate, but a search of an extensive
area on the grounds that there is probable cause to believe that some-
thing will be found somewhere involves both issues-as in the search
during a civil disorder of every house in a black section of Plainsfield,
New Jersey, by National Guardsmen in 1967,119 and the infamous
search of more than 300 homes in a black section of Baltimore over a
period of nineteen days in an effort to find the slayers of two police-
men.
140
A search of an apartment house, three row houses, or even a city
block pursuant to a properly obtained warrant is, of course, quite
different from house to house searches of an entire section of the city
without a warrant. The interposition of a magistrate provides a judg-
ment that is more detached as compared with that of law enforcement
officers acting under severe pressure. 41 More importantly, the basis for
the extraordinary action is recorded in advance of the search, a proce-
dure which will reduce the danger of a highly fallible post hoc recon-
struction of the events known before the search if the search proves
139. CIVIL DisoRDERs REPORT 45; N.Y. Times, July 20, 1967, at 1, col. 8. A mass
search of houses without a warrant was conducted following a report that forty-six
carbines had been stolen from a nearby arms manufacturing plant and distributed to
youths who had fired at a police station.
140. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966). The searches were based
solely on informant tips and produced "a series of the most flagrant invasions of privacy
ever to come under scrutiny in a federal court." Id. at 201.
141. In making this suggestion, we do not suggest that most magistrates are likely to
deny authority to search in any but the most clear-cut cases of abuse. See note 118 supra.
We also recognize the apparent inconsistency in our advocacy that warrants be required
and that decisions be made on a case by case basis using the criterion of "reasonable-
ness" in area searches and roadblocks, while at the same time we urge that authority be
granted for searches without a warrant in specially limited emergencies. The
rationale for this difference is (1) the particular danger of frustration, which justifies
dispensation of the warrant requirement in the emergency search but not in the other
cases; and (2) area searches and roadblocks invade the privacy of uninvolved persons in
the absence of probable cause, thereby justifying the greater protection hopefully
provided by judicial intervention.
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fruitful. The magistrate's determination that there is presently an
emergency caused by a civil disorder, that the objects sought to be
seized are capable of being used to exacerbate the disturbance, and
that there is probable cause for believing that these objects are in a
limited and described geographical area, is a far cry from suspicions
by a policeman that weapons may be found in the area. Nevertheless,
there is a need to restrict the area to be searched to reasonable limits.
Presumably, most people would agree that a search of 300 houses
might be patently unreasonable, while a search of each of two adjoining
row houses would be much less offensive. It is difficult in advance
to specify whether limits of one or two blocks would be reasonable or
unreasonable without knowledge of the particular facts involved. The
appropriate limits should be determined on a case by case basis by a
magistrate applying a standard of reasonableness. Additional protec-
tion could be provided by limiting the number of judicial officials who
would be authorized to issue the warrant.1 42 In short, it is our opinion
that area searches during civil disorders, authorized by statute and sub-
ject to the limitations we have suggested, would be constitutional.
We reject the argument that warrantless area searches should be
permitted. An area search is by its nature likely to invade the privacy of
persons who are completely innocent of any wrongdoing and who
planned no such activity. It is not asking too much to require submission
of the proposed search to a judicial officer before such a step is under-
taken. Emergency searches of particular dwellings may sometimes be
justified without a warrant, but area searches should always require
one.
1 43
3. Roadblocks and Vehicle Searches. Police frequently stop ve-
hicles to inspect car registrations or operators' permits, sometimes justify-
ing the stop on the basis of statutes imposing a duty on the motorist to
display a permit upon request, sometimes upon the more general theory
that the operation of a motor vehicle on public highways is a "privilege"
rather than a "right," and sometimes under express statutory authoriza-
tion.144 Trucks are stopped for weighing and cars are routinely stopped
142. Jurisdiction to issue such a warrant might, for example, be granted to judges of
the court of general jurisdiction and denied to lower-ranking judicial officials who are
normally authorized to issue warrants.
143. The Plainfield, New Jersey, search discussed in note 139 supra is the kind of
abuse that could probably be avoided by insistence upon a warrant. See Limits on Riot
Control 98.
144. See, e.g., State v. Fish, 280 Minn. 163, 167, 159 N.W.2d 786, 789-90 (1968);
State v. Allen, 282 N.C. 503, 194 S.E.2d 9 (1973). For authorities to establish
roadblocks to check licenses, see Lipton v. United States, 348 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1965);
City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1959); Commonwealth v. Mitchell,
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for safety checks. 145 Presumably, no right to a general search of the
vehicle would ordinarily accompany the authority to stop under these
statutes, absent the presence of other factors such as an arrest and' a
valid search pursuant to it,' 46 the observation of seizable objects in plain
view,' 47 or probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains objects
subject to seizure.' 48
In addition, some jurisdictions have routinely used the roadblock to
cordon off roads in an attempt to apprehend a criminal who is believed
to be in a particular area. There is law upholding the use of cordons, at
least where a crime is known to have been committed and there is a
355 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1962). The doctrine that the police have an absolute power to
check licenses and registrations which may be used to serve general crime detection
objectives has recently come under severe criticism. Note, Automobile License Checks
and the Fourth Amendment, 60 VA. L. REv. 666 (1974). The courts of Pennsylvania and
New York have ruled that the validity of any license check practice that gives the police
discretion to select cars on the basis of observation should be measured by the standards
of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and that only systematic stopping practices such as
roadblocks are permissible in the absence of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975); Commonwealth v. Swanger,
453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973), noted in 47 TEwMLE L.Q. 640 (1974). Compare
CAL. VEmCLE CODE § 2814 (West 1971), with CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 2804, 2806 (West
1971). A middle course has been taken by the District of Columbia in permitting stops if
the purpose is to insure possession of a valid license and registration, but requiring
compliance with the Terry standards if the purpose is to investigate unrelated criminal
activity. Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573, 582-83 (D.C. Ct. App.), aff'd, 411
U.S. 389 (1973); State v. Severance, 108 N.H. 404, 237 A.2d 683 (1968) (to the same
effect). One commentator would require probable cause to justify a stop. Note, Nonar-
rest Automobile Stops, Unconstitutional Seizures of the Person, 25 STAwr. L. REv. 865
(1973). See also Note, Automobile Spot Checks and the Fourth Amendment, 6
RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 85 (1974).
145. See Comment, Interference with the Right to Free Movement: Stopping and
Search of Vehicles, 51 CALr'. L. REv. 907, 916 (1963).
146. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 365 (1964); cf. ALI CODE OF PRE-ARRAiGNmENT PROCEDURE, § SS 230.4:
Search of Vehicles
(1) Permissible Circumstances. If, at the time of the arrest, the arrested indi-
vidual is in or in the immediate vicinity of a vehicle of which he is in appar-
ent control, and if the circumstances of the arrest justify a reasonable belief
on the part of the arresting officer that the vehicle contains things which are
(a) subject to seizure. . ., and
(b) connected with the offence for which the arrest is made, the arresting
officer may search the vehicle for such things and seize any things subject to
seizure.. . discovered in the course of the search.
The Code requires that the search be contemporaneous with the arrest or as soon
thereafter as is reasonably practicable. Id. § SS 230.4(2). The limitations are less
significant in view of the broad authority for "inventory searches" apparently permitted
under Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). But see State v. Navarro, 312 So. 2d
848 (La. 1975) (striking down a vehicle search incident to a traffic arrest).
147. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971).
148. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925).
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reasonable belief that the criminal is nearby,14 9 but roadblocks to "curb
juvenile problems," to check for "anything suspicious," or to police a
certain area with a high crime rate have been struck down.' In a
famous dictum, Justice Jackson opined that the propriety of a roadblock
and a search pursuant to it depends in large part upon the gravity of
the offense.15 1 Commentators have suggested that Justice Jackson's
standard balanced the seriousness of the offense, the certitude that some
offense has been committed by someone, and the necessity of such
action not only to apprehend the violator but to protect others. It is
conceded, however, that the sole criterion of seriousness is used most
frequently by law enforcement agencies in determining whether to stop
all vehicles or use patrol cars to seal off an area for discriminate stops.15 2
149. The authorities are collected at ALI PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE 266-67. See
United States v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 65 (D.S.D. 1974); United States v. Bonanno,
180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y.) rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Bufalino v. United States,
285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960); People v. Euctice, 371 1Il. 159, 20 N.E.2d 83 (1939);
Commonwealth ex rel. Crawford v. Bollinger, 198 Ky. 646, 249 S.W. 786 (1923);
Williams v. State, 226 Md. 614, 174 A.2d 719, cert. denied, 369 U.S. 855 (1961); Freed-
man v. State, 195 Md. 275, 73 A.2d 476 (1950); State v. Hatfield, 112 W. Va. 424,
164 S.E. 518 (1932); IDAHO CODE § 19-621 (Supp. 1975); MONT. Rav. CODE ANN. § 95-
618 (Supp. 1974); N.D. CODE §§ 24-15-01 et seq. (1970); Comment, supra note 145;
Comment, Freedom of the Road. Public Safety v. Private Right, 14 DEPAuL L. REv. 381
(1965); Note, Random Roadblocks and the Law of Search and Seizure, 46 IowA L. REv.
802 (1961).
150. See People v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253, 294 P.2d 13 (1956); Wirin v. Horrall, 85
Cal. App. 2d 497, 193 P.2d 470 (1948); Mincy v. District of Columbia, 218 A.2d 507,
508 (D.C. Ct. App. 1966). See also Williams v. Alioto, 15 Crim. L. Rep. 2187 (1974)
(where San Francisco police were enjoined from stopping and interrogating more than
six hundred black males who resembled composite drawings of "zebra killers").
151. But if we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment for
these reasons, it seems to me they should depend somewhat upon the gravity of
the offense. If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnaped and the of-
ficers throw a roadblock about the neighborhood and search every outgoing
car, it would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The officers
might be unable to show probable cause for searching any particular car. How-
ever, I should candidly strive hard to sustain such an action executed fairly
and in good faith, because it might be reasonable to subject travelers to that
indignity if it was the only way to save a threatened life and detect a vicious
crime. But I should not strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal search
to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger. Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
152. See, e.g., L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE & D. RoTENBERo, DETECION OF CIMM 36-
37 (1967). An essentially similar approach has been taken in a recent proposal of the
American Law Institute that police be given express authority to stop vehicles at a
roadblock when such action is reasonably necessary to apprehend a suspected felon or
free a victim of a felony. ALI PIE-ARRAmGNmENT CODE § 110.2:
(2) Stopping of Vehicles at Roadblock: A law enforcement officer may, if
(a) he has reasonable cause to believe that a felony has been committed;
and
(b) stopping all or most automobiles, trucks, buses or other such motor
vehicles moving in a particular direction or directions is reasonably neces-
sary to permit a search for the perpetrator or victim of such felony in view
of the seriousness and special circumstances of such felony,
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In a serious civil disorder, there may be a compelling need for the
use of roadblocks or patrol cars to seal off an area. These would include,
for example, the need (1) to prevent weapons or incendiary materials
from being brought into the area; (2) to prevent the disorder from
spreading to yet unaffected areas of the city; and (3) to prevent
reinforcement of rioters by sympathizers from outside the immediate
area. Unlike the use of the roadblock in other situations, law enforce-
ment during a civil disorder should not be primarily concerned with the
apprehension of any particular suspect, the protection of any particular
victim, or the seriousness of any particular offense. Rather the disorder
creates the emergency; the primary objective is the restoration of order.
It is the need to isolate the area in which the disorder is taking place, in
order to permit the effective use of other techniques to reduce the
intensity of the disturbance, which dictates the need for a roadblock.
Law enforcement authorities should have authority to stop vehicles
within, entering, or leaving the immediate area of a riot, to search them
to determine the presence of weapons or other objects capable of being
used to cause bodily harm or injury to property, and to seize such
objects if found. Such authority should exist without the necessity of
establishing probable cause for believing that the vehicle contained
objects subject to seizure, as would normally be required for vehicle
searches. 158 The operation of a vehicle within, or an attempt to enter or
leave a riot area should be an adequate predicate to justify the search.
It seems desirable that a warrant should be required for such
authority. A magistrate should be required to find that there is a serious
civil disorder justifying the use of a roadblock for a limited period,
perhaps twenty-four hours, with the obligation placed upon the police to
return to the magistrate to seek an extension of their authority if the
conditions justifying the roadblocks have not abated. 154 In the unusual
situations where immediate action is required before a magistrate can be
reached, authority might be granted to establish the roadblock subject to
subsequent judicial approval. 5 '
We do not think our proposals are necessarily inconsistent with the
order the drivers of such vehicles to stop, and may search such vehicles to the
extent necessary to accomplish such purpose. Such action shall be accom-
plished as promptly as possible under the circumstances.
Cf. URCP 211(a); ABA Standards Relating to Pretrial Release, § 2.2; NAC STANDAims,
COUR ECIONS, § 4.3; NAC STANDARDS, CouRTs, § 4.2.
153. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970).
154. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970).
155. Cf. id. § 2518(7).
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holding in United States v. Williams,156 where, as already noted, 5 7 FBI
agents had established a roadblock across a road leading to a village
during the Wounded Knee disturbance in 1973. The defendant's car
was stopped and a search revealed marijuana, which the trial court
suppressed on the ground that the fourth amendment had been violated
by the search. It concluded that a "frisk" of the kind permitted in Terry
v. Ohio'58 would have been proper, but not the broad search that was
actually conducted. A broader search would have been authorized if any
of the usual exceptions justifying a warrantless search had been present;
as perhaps would have been the case if the defendant had been coming
from within the government's perimeter, or if the vehicle had ap-
proached the roadblock from outside the perimeter and then attempted
to avoid it. 59
One may wonder whether the result in Williams would have been
the same if the search had revealed grenades, automatic weapons, or
ammunition instead of marijuana. In any event, the officers acted with-
out legislative authority or judicial approval, and the scope of the search
was far more intensive than that required to determine whether the
vehicle was carrying weapons to the insurgents. We do not think that
Williams is authority for the proposition that a search of a vehicle at a
roadblock pursuant to a warrant authorized by statute during a civil
disorder of the kind that took place at Wounded Knee would be
unconstitutional.
Although the roadblock authority that we suggest would probably
exceed the constitutional powers of law enforcement officials under
normal circumstances, 60 the emergency caused by the serious civil
disorder is an appropriate basis for the "reasonableness" of the
search.16' A recent statute has authorized roadblocks in serious emer-
gencies.62
156. 372 F. Supp. 65 (D.S.D. 1974).
157. See notes 66-73 supra and accompanying text.
158. See notes 60-65 supra and accompanying text.
159. 372 F. Supp. at 67.
160. See notes 144-50 supra and accompanying text.
161. We recognize that there is a superficial similarity between a roadblock during a
civil disorder and the so-called "airport search," which has uniformly been upheld by the
courts. See note 89 supra. The airport search cases may be an indication of the approach
that courts might take in analyzing the use of a roadblock during a civil disorder,
imposing a requirement of reasonable suspicion before a limited search is permitted. See
United States v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 65, 67-68 (D.S.D. 1974). See notes 66-73 supra
and accompanying text.
162. The North Carolina provision, N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 14-288.11 (1969), would
permit a roadblock to be authorized by warrant for "all vehicles entering or approaching
a municipality in which a state of emergency exists," as well as for "vehicles which might
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4. Dispensation with the Requirement of Probable Cause. A final
question involves whether probable cause should be dispensed with
altogether in the civil disorder situation. As indicated earlier, the martial
law cases support the general proposition that a search in good faith
which directly relates to the restoration of order would be permissible
without the presence of probable cause. 163 The only Supreme Court case
dealing specifically with searches in the absence of a warrant stressed
that "reasonable grounds" existed for making the disputed search.' 64 It
may be doubted whether there is any real difference between the exist-
ence of "reasonable grounds" and "probable cause," though each can be
distinguished from "reasonable suspicion." ' 5
In any event, there seems to be no compelling justification for
abandoning the standard of probable cause if the police have enlarged
authority to stop and frisk; the right to search incident to an arrest for
curfew violations; authority to obtain warrants for area searches; broad-
ened authority for vehicle searches and roadblocks pursuant to a war-
rant; and authority to search premises and vehicles without a warrant
upon probable cause to believe that deadly weapons, or any other
similar devices, are present and are likely to be used or removed unless
promptly seized. The few cases where a search of a premise, person, or
vehicle will be prohibited because of the absence of probable cause-
although there is a good faith suspicion-may involve a certain degree
of danger to the community, but the nature of the danger does not
justify the abandonment of the probable cause requirement which would
in substance remove any meaningful restraint upon police action.
F. Documentation of Arrests
The documentation that may be necessary when persons are taken
into custody during a civil disorder presents additional problems for
reasonably be regarded as being within or approaching the immediate vicinity of an
existing riot." Authority to create roadblocks without a warrant may also be included
by implication in the broad grants of authority to prevent ingress and egress from desig-
nated areas. See notes 10 & 56-58 supra and accompanying text.
163. See Part I 636-55. See notes 241-260 infra and accompanying text.
164. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (discussed at note 130 supra).
165. The ALl Pre-Arraignment Code defines "reasonable cause to believe" as a "basis
for belief in the existence of facts which, in view of the circumstances under and purpose
for which the standard is applied, is substantial, objective, and sufficient to satisfy
applicable constitutional requirements." ALI PRE-ARRGNMBNT CoDn § SS 210.1(7) (a).
"Reasonable belief" is defined as a "belief based on reasonable cause to believe." Id. § SS
210.7(b). The ALI standard would not embody the requirement of a "more probable
than not" standard. Cf. LaFave, supra note 42, at 73-75 (arguing that in the
context of arrests, it must be more probable than not that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime).
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police.' 66 The basis for many of these concerns is the assumption that
there must be a bona fide intention to prosecute every person who is
arrested. Thus, it is argued that the police must perform the paper work
required for subsequent identification of each arrestee, because without
such paper work successful prosecution might not be possible.' 6 7 If this
is not done, an arrest is said to be improper.
Attempted compliance with the mandate required by this approach
may, however, drown a police force in Polaroid pictures and forms, even
when specially tailored short forms are utilized. But efforts to escape the
dilemma by abandoning the use of forms when the burden becomes so
great that the police cannot both prepare the forms for those already
arrested and deal effectively with those still on the street have produced
widespread criticism that fundamental rights are being violated.
18
Notwithstanding such criticism, we believe that there is no constitu-
tional requirement that arrest during a civil disorder must in all cases be
fully documented. The Constitution does not assure each offender the
right to be arrested, 6 9 nor does it guarantee his successful prosecution if
he is arrested. It does require that a citizen be arrested only when there
is probable cause to believe that he has committed an offense. But if
probable cause exists, and a person is taken into custody, he has no
legitimate complaint that the police did not assemble evidence that
would be sufficient for a subsequent conviction.
In taking this position, we are not unmindful of Sullivan v.
Murphy, 70 in which the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held presumptively invalid any arrest in the Wash-
ington May Day demonstration of 1971 that was not accompanied by a
contemporaneous Polaroid photograph and field arrest form executed
by the arresting officer.' 7 ' The case involved the extraordinary proce-
dure of attacking mass arrests by a class action. It was not disputed that
wide-scale arrests had taken place without probable cause, nor was there
any question that persons other than arresting officers had been per-
166. The requirements for documentation of arrest is a subject that has also produced
considerable uncertainty in "normal" circumstances. See W. LAFA E, supra note 31, at
495-97.
167. See CIVIw DrsoiRDEs REPORT 184.
168. This seems to be the thrust of 1973 D.C. REPORT 12-16.
169. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966).
170. 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973). The May Day
disturbance and the response of the various elements of the criminal justice system are
described in Wald, May Day Revisited (pts. 1-2), 10 CmM. L. BULL. 377, 516 (1974).
See also Washington Mobilization Comm. v. Cullinane, 400 F. Supp. 186 (D.D.C.
1975).
171. 478 F.2d at 967.
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mitted to execute arrest forms; some arresting officers wore neither
name tags nor badges; and the offenses for which arrests were made
did not involve the seizure of evidence, thereby making the exclusion-
ary rule irrelevant as a deterrent to unlawful arrests.:7 1
In such unique circumstances we do not quarrel with the court's
conclusion that the arrests were presumptively invalid subject to an af-
firmative showing that any particular arrest was based upon probable
cause, as a "legal principle corollary to the Fourth Amendment's pro-
tection."'173  The dictum of the Sullivan v. Murphy court, which sug-
gests that the purpose of arrest forms is the accountability of the arrest-
ing officer to the person arrested, is much less defensible. 17 4 The rec-
ommendation by the 1973 District of Columbia Judicial Conference
Committee that, as a matter of policy, field arrest forms should be sus-
pended only as a last resort "in those extreme circumstances where,
but for the suspension, loss of life or serious bodily harm would re-
sult," 75 which was cited by the court, seems particularly unwise to us.
This qualification is a standard that is more commonly used as justifica-
tion for the use of deadly force, 70 and it seems extraordinary that it
should also be employed as the test for dispensation of the documenta-
tion of arrest. The justification relied upon by the Committee for its
172. Id. Sullivan v. Murphy can be read more narrowly to mean that the evil with
which the court was concerned was not so much arrest without documentation, as it was
arrest without documentation followed by attempted prosecution. The court stated:
The action of the police in this case went beyond precautionary measures to
ensure public safety by detention, as in Korematsu; officials did not merely
stop and detain persons who had been on the streets during the May Day dem-
onstrations, they preferred criminal charges against those who had been held
in police custody. Even assuming for the sake of discussion that in May Day
emergency conditions police officials had the authority to suspend normal con-
stitutional rights against unlawful arrest and detention-a suspension defend-
ants claim not to have effected here-no legitimate overriding interest of public
safety can be served by later booking or prosecuting on criminal charges those
who were stopped and detained.
In electing to apply the sanctions of the criminal law to those arrested,
the public authorities not only subjected those whom they accused to the proc-
esses of the criminal justice system, but they also bound themselves to follow
rules that govern the conduct of criminal prosecutions. Id. at 959-60.
Although the language is not free from ambiguity, it is not necessary to embrace the
court's assumption that constitutional rights could have been suspended during the May
Day disorders to surmise that a different case might have been presented if prosecution
had not been undertaken.
173. Id. at 967. When the circumstances of arrest are questioned, the officer must be
able to demonstrate probable cause in order for the arrest to be upheld. See, e.g., Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 95-97 (1964); arroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 159-62 (1925).
174. 478 F.2d at 967.
175. 1973 D.C. REPORT 135. The court did, however, cite the Report with apparent
approval. 478 F.2d at 967 n.57.
176. See ALI PmE-ARRAINMENT CoDE § 120.7; ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07
(1962). See also ALI PRE-ARRAIGNMfENT CODE § 260.5 (emergency searches).
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recommendation was that suspension of the evidence-recording re-
quirement in mass arrests is qualitatively different from lesser re-
sponses, and may preclude "the resolution of the disorder and the cases
it produces within the framework of the judicial process." The result,
according to the Committee, would be substituting arrest and detention
for conviction and punishment.177  But this is certainly not the neces-
sary result. It is quite possible, for example, that arrests can take place
without the usual paperwork but still with scrupulous regard for the
necessity of probable cause. Even if this does not occur, the courts
can fashion remedies to provide suitable redress, as was done in Sulli-
van v. Murphy, by creating a rebuttable presumption of illegality when
normal procedures are not followed.17
We certainly do not suggest that arrest documentation should be
eliminated without good cause. In normal conditions, routine forms
should be used; in most serious disorders, recourse should be had to
special procedures such as a field arrest form executed by the arresting
officer, accompanied by a Polaroid photograph wherever possible.'17
Cases may occur, however, where the price of using the emergency
procedure will be an inability to cope with a disorder of an intensity that
may not threaten life or serious bodily harm but which does threaten
substantial damage to property and the functioning of government itself.
In such circumstances, it seems unwise to insist that priority be given to
documentation of lawful arrests of persons, most of whom will never be
tried for the offenses they have committed, rather than using available
177. 1973 D.C. REPORT 134. See also id. at 12-18.
178. 478 F.2d at 967. In subsequent proceedings upon remand no showing of probable
cause could be made. Sullivan v. Murphy, 380 F. Supp. 867 (D.D.C. 1974). If arrests are
made without documentation and the arrestees are not prosecuted for the offenses for
which they were arrested, but subsequently bring civil suits for damages alleged to have
been suffered as a result of the arrest, then the issue of probable cause would again be
raised. If probable cause were demonstrated, then relief would presumably be denied; if it
were not, then liability might result if the defendants were unable to claim protection by
the immunities that are often available to those involved in the quelling of a civil
disorder. See Part I 651 n.209. In any event, a suit for expungement of an arrest record
should be successful if no probable cause can be produced. See note 308 infra.
179. See Metropolitan Police Department, District of Columbia, General Order No.
6, Series 1968, Procedures for Handling Prisoners and Property During Civil Disturb-
ances 2-3 (Aug. 16, 1968). See also Long, Hot Summers 972-73. Depending upon local
law, other changes in normal documentation requirements may be appropriate. See
Dodds & Dempsey, supra note 2, at 378-79 (discussing two provisions adopted in New
York in 1968, which would have permitted an arresting officer to be absent from
arraignment of a defendant during an emergency upon affirming the relevant facts and
charges for the arrest in an affidavit, N.Y. Laws of 1968, ch. 1077 (June 22, 1968), and
authorized a court during an emergency to arraign and admit a defendant to bail without
the fingerprint search normally required at that time, N.Y. Laws of 1968, ch. 1078 (June
22, 1968); neither provision survived recodification).
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manpower to restore order. The police should appreciate that the failure
to document fully may result in (1) a decision that there is no basis to
detain the arrestee; (2) that no prosecution is justified; or (3) that the
record of the arrestee should be expunged in the absence of proof
establishing probable cause for the arrest. If the emergency is sufficient-
ly grave, the police may be justified in accepting these potential conse-
quences of a failure to document, providing that they continue to
observe the requirement that no one should be arrested except under
circumstances permitted by law.
A strong argument can be made for the proposition that a defend-
ant should not be held in custody for any substantial period of time to
answer for a crime if there is no evidence to warrant conviction. 180 Even
in this situation, it is doubtful if any constitutional rights have been
violated if there is enough evidence to justify a finding of probable cause
that the arrestee has committed the offense. 8' But even if the Constitu-
tion is not offended, sound policy dictates that anyone held to answer to
criminal charges should normally be released when it becomes clear that
no case against him can be proved.18 2 A temporary detention may be
justified to provide the prosecutor an opportunity to locate alternative
sources of proof, but after a reasonable interval, an accused should be
released if there are no witnesses or documents sufficient to establish
guilt.
IV. JUDICIAL RELEASE AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION
A. Prior Experience
The prompt release of a defendant held in custody in a noncapital
case on personal recognizance or bail, which is not excessive measured
by the likelihood of his presence at trial, is fundamental to the proper
functioning of our system for the administration of justice under nor-
mal conditions.8 8 It reflects the basic notions of presumption of inno-
cence, opposition to punishment without trial, recognition of the impor-
tance of pretrial freedom for effective case preparation, and concern over
the impact of pretrial incarceration on adjudication and sentencing at
trial. Recent efforts to substitute nonmonetary conditions for a surety
bond accept these postulates, as well as the policy against invidious
discrimination between the rich and the poor. 8 4
180. 1973 D.C. REPORT 30-37.
181. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
182. See notes 36-39 supra and accompanying text.
183. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); ABA STANDARDS RELmTAmN TO PRETRAL
RELEASE § 5.3.
184. See Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1970); ABA STAmnmmDs
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The Riot Commission, consistent with its approach that the basic
purposes of the criminal process remain unchanged during a riot, assert-
ed that the "purposes of bail in our system of law have always been to
prevent confinement before conviction and to insure appearance of the
accused in court" and not "to deter future crime. '185 It recognized,
however, that "some have difficulty adhering to that doctrine when it
results in releasing a dangerous offender back into a riot area," and
refrained from an outright condemnation of preventive detention in
mass disturbances, characterizing the issue as a "problem of great
perplexity."' 80
B. Preventive Detention
The courts both before and after the Commission's Report have
practiced preventive detention although rarely admitting it. They have
done so by either denying bail or setting it at an unattainably high
amount. In the 1965 Watts riots, for example, bond was routinely set at
$3,000.l7 In the 1967 Newark riots, bond was initially set at $2,500 for
those charged with breaking and entering, $500 for curfew violators,
and $250 for those charged with loitering, but lower bonds were subse-
quently set as the jails filled and the riots subsided.188 In the 1967
Detroit riots, about three quarters of the bonds were higher than
$5,000.189 The same general results followed the Report. In the April,
1968, Baltimore riots after the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
bail was routinely set at $500 for curfew violators, and $1,000 for those
charged with more serious offenses.' 90 In Chicago, normal bail rules
were suspended and bond was set in almost every case in amounts
RELATING TO PRETRAL RELEASE §§ 1.2, 5.1; D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN Ta UNrrED
STATES: 1964, at 56-92 (1964); R. GOLDFARB, RANsoM: A CRTIQuE OF THE AMEmcAN
BAIL SYSTEm 150-72 (1965); R. MOLLEUPR, BArn REFORM IN TE NATION'S CAPrrAL
(1966); Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the
Use of Pre-trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 67 (1963); Foote, The Coming Constitutional
Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L REv. 959 (1965); Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial
Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 641 (1964).
185. Crvm DisoRDERs REPORT 192.
186. Id.
187. E. YOUNGER, REPORT TO TnE Govn~oR's COMM. ON Tm Los ANrGELES lioTs
15-16 (1965).
188. Dobrovir, Preventive Detention: The Lesson of Civil Disorders, 15 Vu.i.. L.
REv. 313, 316 (1970) (collecting the authorities).
189. Hearings on S. Res. 216 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Investigations, Riots,
Civil and Criminal Disorders, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1238-40, 1345-46, 1584-87 (1967-
68); see Comment, 66 MicN. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1549-50.
190. REPORT OF Tm BAL oRB COMm. ON Tma ADmiSTAON OF JUSTICE UNDER
EMmRGENCY CONDITONS 48 (1968).
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ranging from $1,000 for disorderly conduct to $5,000 for looting, and
up to $100,000 in other cases.' 91 In the District of Columbia, most of
the judges uniformly set money bond at $1,000 for looting and $500 for
misdemeanors, unless a reliable third party would undertake to ensure
that the defendant would not again involve himself in the riot.192
It is apparent that the courts generally engaged in preventive
detention in these disorders, 93 and that the decision not to release on
conditions which the defendant could meet was in general not individ-
ualized.' 9 4 The courts seemed to have based their actions primarily
upon two grounds: (1) the numbers involved precluded individualized
disposition;' 95 and (2) it is justifiable to detain someone who is likely to
commit a serious offense or rejoin the riot if released. The first argument
191. CmHCAGO RIOT STUDY COmm., REPORT TO Ti MAYOR 92 (1968); Criminal
Justice in Extremis 503.
192. DoBRovm 60-66. In addition to claims that constitutional rights were violated,
there is good reason to believe that the statutory rights of many defendants in the
District of Columbia were violated. Dobrovir, supra note 188, at 322-26. The 1966 Bail
Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146 et seq. (1970), provided no exceptions to the mandate
for non-financial requirements if appearance at a future trial could be ensured thereby. A
different but analogous problem was posed during the May Day disturbances when
collateral requirements for certain offenses were increased, thereby subjecting to bail
defendants who would otherwise have attained release upon forfeiture of smaller sums.
1973 D.C. REPORT 221.
193. Criminal Justice in Extremis 570. The term "preventive detention" refers to the
"practice of either denying bail or setting bail at an unattainably high amount in order
to imprison a person who presents a particular danger to society if left free before trial."
R. GOLDFARB, supra note 184, at 128 (1965).
194. The American Bar Association Commission on Standards of Judicial Adminis-
tration recommends that
[i]udges should be encouraged to refrain from imposing . . . unusually high
bail requirements. Such measures strain detention facilities and may bring
pressure on innocent arrestees to plead guilty and on minor defenders to accept
heavier charges rather than remain in jail. These consequences arouse intense
bitterness in the arrestees and their communities. To the same end, there
should be an effective procedure for screening out serious offenders from minor
offenders, and good risks from bad risks prior to trial. Procedures such as the
station summons, reliance on personal recognizance, and liberal bail require-
ments should be employed. ABA CoMM'N ON Srm -a~s OF JuDicrL AD iN-
1STRATION, STANDARUS RELATiNG TO ThUAL CouRTs § 2.45 and commentary at
76 (Tent. Draft 1975).
These recommendations are predicated upon the premise that the basic objective of an
emergency plan is to maintain an atmosphere that is "as 'normal' as possible." Id. at 75.
195. The authors of Bail and Preventive Detention, for example, state that an
"individual analysis during a full-scale riot seems a pragmatic impossibility." Bail and
Preventive Detention 430. Instead, they urge automatic release for some offenses, the
establishment of mandatory bail levels for other cases categorized by the economic level
of the defendant, the charge against him, the weight of the evidence against him, and
detention without bail for certain crimes. A defendant believed to be the riot leader
would apparently be entitled to release if he had been arrested for a curfew violation. Id.
at 431-32. See also Criminal Justice in Extremis 587 ("nothing but wishful thinking
supports the belief that [magistrates] will do under conditions of civil disorder what they
fail to do in ordinary circumstances").
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seems questionable for several reasons.196 If our recommendations are
followed, the volume of cases presented to the courts should be substan-
tially reduced. Second, the available evidence indicates that a large
number of persons arrested during a riot are curfew violators or looters
who do not have previous criminal records and are unlikely to become
involved again in the riot, or with other crimes, but who will not be able
to post high monetary bail.197 The presumption should favor release of
these people. Denial of release without trial in such cases certainly
cannot be justified on the basis of punishment or general deterrence. 9"
Thirdly, judicial resources during a civil disorder should be concentrated
on determining who should be retained in custody and not upon trials.
Finally, the personnel who are potentially available to pursue this
screening function have not been totally mobilized anywhere. In some
jurisdictions, trial judges of courts of general jurisdiction and appellate
judges do not participate, leaving the entire workload for the already
overworked magistrates and misdemeanor trial judges. 199 The use of
these judges and others from neighboring jurisdictions would greatly
relieve the pressure.2 0 In addition, the concept of reserve magistrates,
appointed from the practicing bar and assigned to precincts where
decentralized decisions concerning custody can be made, has not been
adequately explored.
The second ground of defense for the judicial use of mass preven-
tive detention poses more difficult problems. In substance, it asserts that
a citizen may be held in custody because there is a reasonable likelihood
that he will commit a new offense if released, although there is no
reasonable danger that he will flee the jurisdiction before trial.
The Riot Commission recommended a number of alternatives to
preventive detention or outright release on condition of third-party
custody. These included forbidding access to certain areas or access to
196. See DOBROViR 62.
197. Thus, in Bail and Civil Disorder, it is suggested
that there appear to be a great number of arrested persons who pose little risk
of entry (or perhaps reentry) in the riot. Doubtless many of those arrested
during riots are completely innocent of crime. Many of those who in fact are
guilty of some of the crimes prevalent in riots, such as looting, are ordinarily
responsible citizens--the mere contact with authority or arrest would likely suf-
fice to shake them back into the reality of the danger of future criminal con-
duct. Id. at 824.
See also DOBROVm 52-53.
198. See Criminal Justice in Extremis 588.
199. Thus, in the District of Columbia in 1967, 1968, and 1971, the judges of the
District of Columbia Superior Court apparently received no assistance from the judges of
the United States District Court, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, or the
United States Court of Appeals.
200. Civus DisownRs REPoRT 189.
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these areas at certain times, part-time release with a requirement to
spend nights in jail, use of surety or peace bonds on a selective basis,
prompt trial, and expedition of bail review by higher courts.201 It may
be argued that the imposition of some of these conditions upon a
defendant who can post a surety bond in the amount found to be
adequate reasonably to assure his presence at trial poses the same eighth
amendment questions as does preventive detention.20° Furthermore,
while some of these alternatives would be practicable in many situations,
they would be impracticable in many more.20 3 It is clear that there will
be cases where a court will determine that the defendant would rejoin
the riot or commit additional crimes if released, regardless of conditions
imposed upon him, that there is no danger of flight, and that prompt
trial is impossible.
Assume, for example, that a rooftop sniper is captured when he
runs out of ammunition. He is charged with assault with intent to kill
and brought before a magistrate. The evidence establishes that (1) he is
a leader of the riot forces; (2) all of his ties are with the community;
(3) it is extremely unlikely that he will leave the city; and (4) if
released, he plans to return to the riot area, arm himself, and continue to
shoot at police and firemen.
In this situation, there are some who would apparently believe that
setting bail at a figure clearly in excess of the amount required to assure
his presence at trial, or detaining him until the disorder subsides, would
be unconstitutional or at least unwise.20 In their opinion the arrestee
should be released upon his own recognizance subject to conditions
201. Id. at 192. The 1973 D.C. Report urged that courts should not set any pretrial
conditions that would bar a defendant generally from "participating in an activity which
may fall within the protections of the First Amendment." 1973 D.C. REPORT 43.
202. See Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79
YALE L.J 941 (1970). But see United States v. Smith, 444 F.2d 61 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 977 (1971); Banks v. United States, 414 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Rendel v. Mummert, 106 Ariz. 233, 474 P.2d 824 (1970).
203. Thus, it has been observed that
the Kerner recommendations with respect to conditional release of dangerous
offenders (i.e. part-time release with requirements to spend nights in jail, for-
bidding access to certain areas, peace bonds and release to third persons) seem
to the authors to be unrealistic except for some possible use of the recom-
mendation that arrestees be released to custodians outside the riot area. For ex-
ample, rearrest for failure to return to jail at night would probably not be feasi-
ble due to the record keeping and follow up required of an otherwise well oc-
cupied police force. Also rearrest would be impossible in situations such as
the Detroit riot where police for a time abandoned control of whole sections
of the city. Daytime release from detention facilities perhaps 100 miles from
the city required by inadequate local jail facilities would be impracticable. Bail
and Civil Disorder 827.
See also Criminal Iustice in Extremi" 587.
204. See Dobrovir, supra note 188; Civm DisoRDmRs REPORT 192.
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which are probably unenforceable as long as his community contacts
suggest no likelihood of flight. It is respectfully submitted that any sane
society might grant such a defendant pretrial release if he promised to
flee, but would deny it to him if he is likely to remain in the riot area.
Obviously, no case is likely to arise in which the facts are so clear,
and concededly the reliability of criteria for assessing future dangerous-
ness is dubious at best.2 0 5 Judges also have no special qualifications for
making such decisions. These are cogent reasons for denying authority
to detain in normal circumstances, but a legal system can only operate
through human beings with the best techniques available at any given
time. Judges lack special qualifications for making many of the deci-
sions that society entrusts to them. To admit that they must realize both
the difficulties involved in their tasks and their limitations does not
mean that judges should refrain from acting to protect the community
when they believe they are able to reach a rational decision that a
defendant is likely to rejoin a riot or commit a serious offense if released.
Laymen are expected to be able to agree unanimously as a jury on
whether conduct was done with knowledge or a certain intent and
whether a defendant is suffering from a mental disease, although experts
may have expressed an honest difference of opinion. Similarly, judges
regularly predict future conduct in making probation decisions, and it is
doubtful that they are less qualified to make decisions concerning
whether a person is likely to rejoin a riot or commit a crime during a
disorder.2" 6
205. See Bogomolny & Sonnereich, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: Administrative Tail
Wagging and Other Legal Problems, 11 ARmz. L. REV. 201, 218 (1969); Dershowitz,
Imprisonment by Judicial Hunch, 57 A.B.A.T. 560, 562 (1971); Dershowitz, The Law of
Dangerousness: Some Fictions About Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL EDuc. 24 (1971);
Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARv. Crv. RIGHTS-Cwv. LiB. L. REv.
300, 324-33 (1971). See also Testimony of Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., in opposition to S.
2600, 116 CONG. REc. S. 7748, 7749-52 (May 25, 1970).
206. In recommending that a limited preventive detention power be available during
emergency situations, we do not overlook the principle that exists in almost all jurisdic-
tions today that, under normal circumstances, a person arrested for a non-capital case is
entitled to pretrial release regardless of whether he may present a danger to the
community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1970); United States v. Bronson, 433 F.2d 537 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); United States v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1969); In re Underwood,
9 Cal. 3d 345, 508 P.2d 721, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1973), noted in 5 U.W.L.A.L. REv. 68
(1973). This does not, however, mean that "dangerousness" must always be ignored in
determining whether detention of a citizen is permissible. Thus, dangerousness has
frequently been used as a basis for a preventive detention type power in, for example,
capital cases, civil commitment proceedings, and release pending appeal from a convic-
tion. See Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1962); Banks v.
United States, 414 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial,
79 H- v. L. REv. 1489, 1504 (1966). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1970); D.C. CoDE §
23-1322 (1970). Although the constitutionality of any preventive detention provision
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We believe that preventive detention is a procedure that should be
available to law enforcement personnel during a serious civil disorder,
but only within the bounds of narrowly drawn legislative authoriza-
tion.207 In considering this limited power, it is important to make several
preliminary observations.
Preventive detention is a subject that has spawned much rhetoric
and scholarly comment in recent years.208 We think it possible to
acknowledge the serious concerns that are expressed about preventive
detention when used as a law enforcement procedure in ordinary cir-
cumstances, and still conclude that it may be justified when used in the
narrowly defined circumstances of a civil emergency. The answer to
such concerns is not to bar the use of a procedure that may in many
cases be necessary during an emergency, but to limit its use and the
concerns that it generates to the greatest extent possible.
Preventive detention, as with all other procedures that are to be
utilized under emergency conditions, must be considered in light of the
objectives and purposes of the system. In our view, these include restora-
tion of order and protection of the persons and property of the citizen-
ry.200 Given these paramount objectives and the extraordinary danger
posed by a serious civil disorder, we think the permissibility of a limited
preventive detention power should not be viewed on the same basis as it
has been when proposed for use in non-emergency situations.
Finally, it must be noted that legal authority in the area of preven-
tive detention is notably sparse.210 However, existing constitutional doc-
trine has not been interpreted to preclude the limited power that we
must await authoritative determination, we believe that the limited provision that we en-
vision would survive challenge if sufficient procedural safeguards were built into it. See
ABA STANDAIDS 'RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE 67. See notes 212, 245-50 infra and
accompanying text.
207. See notes 245-60 infra and accompanying text.
208. In addition to the authorities cited in note 205 supra, see Borman, The Selling of
Preventive Detention, 1970, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 879 (1971); Hermann, Preventive
Detention, A Scientific View of Man, and State Power, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 673; Hickey,
Preventive Detention and the Crime of Being Dangerous, 58 GEO. L.J. 287 (1969);
Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA.
L. REv. 371 (1970); Note, Preventive Detention, 36 GEO. WASH. L. Rnv. 178 (1967);
Note, supra note 206; Note, The Costs of Preventive Detention, 79 YALE L. 926
(1970). See also ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PRE-TRIAL RELEASE 65-71, 83-88. The
development of preventive confinement in the common law is traced in Dershowitz, The
Origins of Preventive Confinement in Anglo-American Law (pts. 1-2), 43 U. CI N. L.
REv. 1, 781 (1974).
209. See Part I 636-55.
210. See Blunt v. United States, 102 Wash. L Rep. 1585 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974), sus-
taining the preventive detention provision of the 1970 D.C. Crime Act, D.C. CODE §
23-1322 (1973).
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envision. Constitutional principles have, on the contrary, been interpret-
ed to provide considerable flexibility during serious disorders."' In
addition, there is respectable authority that has upheld the use of
preventive detention, in a much broader manner than we envision, when
military force has been called in to aid the civil power in restoring
order.212
Assuming that detention for a limited period of time for certain
persons arrested during a serious disorder may be both desirable and
constitutional, serious questions remain to be answered: (1) who may
be detained; (2) the duration of detention that will be permitted; and
(3) the procedures that should be followed to prevent abuse. The
answers to these questions should again be dictated by the purposes of
the criminal process during a serious civil disorder, and the necessity of
ensuring that extraordinary powers are limited to the emergency that
provides justification for their use.
The example of the rooftop sniper who plans to return to the riot
area with the intent of committing a serious crime in furtherance of the
objective of the disorder provides a paradigm of the need for detention.
It may also be justified in other cases involving a situation less dramatic
than a serious riot-related offense by an offender who clearly plans to
repeat his conduct if released. 213 We shall consider two classes of
211. See Part 1 636-55. See notes 241-60 infra and accompanying text.
Under a long series of cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States, lower federal courts, and state courts, police and troops in emergencies
have the authority to detain individuals during the period of an emergency
without being required to bring them before a committing magistrate and filing
charges of criminal conduct against them. Situations where this rule applies
have been traditionally limited to those where violence or the threat of violence
prevents the enforcement of the law through normal judicial process, and the
doctrine which there obtains is customarily referred to as "qualified" martial
law. In that situation, the authority of the nation, state, or city, as the case
may be, to protect itself and its citizens against actual violence or a real threat
of violence is held to outweigh the normal right of any individual detained by
governmental authority to insist on specific charges of criminal conduct being
promptly made against him, with the concomitant right to bail or release pend-
ing judicial determination of those charges. Address by Assistant Attorney
General William Rehnquist, Spring Lecture Series, Appalachian State Univer-
sity, May 5, 1971.
212. See Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909); Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355
(S.D. Ind. 1935); In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57 P. 706 (1899); Ex parte McDonald, 49
Mont. 454, 143 P. 947 (1914); State ex rel. Roberts v. Swope, 38 N.M. 53, 28 P.2d 4
(1933). But cf. United States ex rel. Palmer v. Adams, 26 F.2d 141 (D. Colo. 1927),
appeal dismissed, 29 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1928) (lack of basis for action taken). See also
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See generally C. FAirMAN, THE LAW
op MARTrA. RuLE 209-18 (2d ed. 1943); WImNER 66-67.
213. In their thoughtful article, Bail and Civil Disorder, Professors Colista and
Domonkos would limit preventive detention of a defendant to situations where there was
substantial evidence that he participated in inciting a riot or rebellion; that he has a
criminal record that evidences violent or destructive antisocial behavior; or that he
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offenders arrested during serious civil disorders that pose difficult ques-
tions: (1) persons arrested for a serious offense against persons or
property unrelated to the disorder itself; and (2) persons arrested for
less serious offenses where there is probable cause to believe that they
will resume unlawful participation in the disorder if released.
Serious crimes214 such as burglary and robbery do not stop when a
civil disorder starts. The populace may have less protection than usual
against street crime as police are required to reduce force levels in
relatively quiet sections of the city in order to concentrate their efforts
committed or attempted to commit a serious crime against the life or physical safety of
others, including arson or illegal destruction of buildings or property by explosives or
other violent means. Bail and Civil Disorders 828-29. See also Criminal Justice in
Extremis 586-87; National Security Interest and Civil Liberties 1318-21. Others would
limit preventive detention to defendants charged with a crime of an aggravated nature-
for example, capital crimes, arson, sniping, aggravated assault, possession of a deadly
weapon, or inciting to riot-following a finding after a hearing that the defendant
represents a substantial danger to others or the community. Bail and Preventive Deten-
tion 431-32.
It has also been argued that the present law of bail is sufficiently flexible to justify
preventive detention in riots if statutes were amended to provide greater authority for
courts to relate probability of guilt and necessity for detention. Limits on Riot Control
104. Our proposal differs from this approach, as do the proposals of Professors Colista
and Domonkos and of Bail and Preventive Detention, in that the judiciary would be
empowered to act only after an executive or legislative proclamation of an emergency
and only during the duration thereof. Obviously, the danger of extending the concept of
preventive detention to non-riot situations exists whenever detention is permitted on the
basis of future criminal conduct, but the danger of eroding traditional bail practices in
such situations is less when the judicial power is limited by the necessity of a political act
of high visibility and broad collateral consequences. Some judges have asserted that the
courts should not deny reasonable bail in civil disorders, but should rely upon the
executive to declare martial law if the situation demands preventive detention. See
Greene, A Judge's View of the Riots, 35 D.C.BJ. 24, 30 (Aug.-Oct. 1968). This may
well be the appropriate response in the absence of legislation permitting the courts to
deal with the emergency within the law. It is suggested, however, that it is far better to
have a limited form of preventive detention administered by the regular civilian judiciary
after the executive has proclaimed an emergency than to entrust judicial decisions to the
military with much broader powers.
214. The decision concerning which offenses are "serious" obviously would require
careful consideration. Cf. S. 2600 and H.R. 12806, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); D.C.
CODE §§ 23-1321, 1331-32 (1970). See also ABA STANmD s RELATING TO PRETRIAL
RELEASp 68-69, 83-88; Borman, supra note 208; Hickey, supra note 208; National
Security Interest and Civil Liberties 1319; Riot Control Legislation 164-65. The Judicial
Council of the District of Columbia Circuit Committee to Study the Operation of the
Bail Reform Act (Hart Committee) recommended in 1968 that judges be given "addi-
tional authority to deny release entirely for persons charged with certain riot connected
offenses for the duration of an officially declared emergency." REPORT OF TIM JUDiCIAL.
CouNcIL COMM. TO STUDY THE OPERATION OF THE BAIL REFORm Acr IN Tm DISTRICT
OF COLum rA 30 (1968) (the Hart Committee Report). It could not agree on which
offenses should be subject to the measure. See Miller, The Bail Reform Act of 1966:
Need for Reform in 1969, 19 CATH. TJ.L. REV. 24, 39-40 (1969).
1076
CIVIL DISORDERS
upon the principal areas of serious disorder. 15 The checker at a con-
venience store, the proprietor of a small liquor store, and the gas station
attendant may continue to work at a substantially increased risk as
police capability for protection is reduced. In such circumstances, it does
not seem unreasonable to us that a person arrested for a serious offense
against property or persons should be detained for a longer period than
would normally be permitted. We think that detention of a person
validly arrested for a serious crime during a civil disorder for a relatively
brief period of time is not too high a price to exact from a defendant in
exchange for the greater protection provided to the public.
In practice, we doubt if many persons arrested for serious offenses
will gain pretrial release during an emergency, regardless of the dictates
of law. We think it far wiser that the law reflect what the public expects,
and what judges will do, than to pay lip service to maintaining constitu-
tional safeguards at least in theory, when it is known in advance that the
system will break down. The language of the Constitution does not
require a result that offends experience and reason.216 Attempts to apply
the "normal" procedures will, in our judgment, result in decisions
articulated in the language of "danger of flight" which will have the
inevitable effect of limiting the opportunities of pretrial release in "nor-
mal" conditions.
In some civil disturbances, the courts will also be faced with
defendants who will probably resume participation in the disorder as
soon as they are released from custody, but who are unlikely to commit
any serious offenses. Nevertheless, their release will place a burden upon
police and make restoration of order more difficult with the consequent
inconvenience to law abiding citizens, turn the judicial process into a
revolving door, and possibly threaten the ability of the government to
function, as was the case with the Washington May Day of 1971.
The legal system must be able to respond effectively to this type of
situation. No government should be powerless to deal with concerted
illegal conduct aimed at forcing it to behave in a manner contrary to
what the elected representatives of the people think is right. One possi-
ble alternative would be legislative authorization for the court to require
that a defendant enter into a recognizance agreement by which he
promises to refrain from participating in the disturbance, entering cer-
215. CIvIL DISORDERS REPoRT 173-74. Compare the statement of the District Attor-
ney of Los Angeles County after Watts: "I take the position that any crime occurring
during the riots became more serious because of that fact alone. I believe that those who
committed crimes during those terrible days of the riot are in a special class."
216. See Criminal Justice in Extremis 581.
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tain areas, or doing certain acts, with a penalty sufficiently high to deter
all but the most zealous lawbreaker. The obvious difficulty posed by this
proposal, however, is whether and how the conditions could be enforced
during the period of the emergency. 217 Rather than suggesting ap-
proaches that cannot be made to work under the conditions of an
emergency, in most cases we think it wiser to provide that the court may
refuse release in those cases where it believes that the recognizance will
be dishonored.
The power of the courts to suspend the usual bail rules, even for
these limited categories of offenders, should be subject to specific dura-
tional limitations. In our opinion, it should not extend beyond the period
of the emergency, the existence and continuation of which should be
subject to review.218 Additional safeguards might be provided by ensur-
ing access to bail within a period of seventy-two or ninety-six hours
regardless of whether the state of emergency has been formally terminat-
ed.219 By that time, or earlier if the appropriate legislative, executive, or
judicial authority determines that an emergency no longer exists, all
those who have been detained should either be released with charges
dropped, or receive immediate hearings with eligibility for pretrial re-
lease according to the usual non-emergency practice of the jurisdiction.
In addition, persons detained during the emergency for serious crimes
should be entitled to a preliminary hearing to assure that there is
probable cause to believe that they have committed the crimes with
which they are charged. A hearing during the emergency should also be
provided to those whose detention is continued on the ground that they
are likely to rejoin the disorder.220
It is argued that detention even in these limited circumstances
authorizes punishment without trial and thus offends the Constitution.
The presumption of innocence is said to be violated if a person arrested
for a serious offense is detained because of fear that he may commit
another serious offense, or if a minor law breaker is detained because
he intends to resume his participation in the disorder.221
There is obviously considerable merit to both sides of the preven-
217. See note 203 supra.
218. See notes 297-98 infra and accompanying text. See also Bail and Civil Disorder
829.
219. See CIvL DIsoRDnns REPoRtT 359-407; Miller, supra note 214, at 24, 40. Only a
few serious disorders, such as Newark and Detroit in 1967, have lasted longer than three
days.
220. See generally ABA STArimms 1RLATING TO PEETRTAL RELEASE 84-88; Limits on
Riot Control 104.
221. See 1973 D.C. REPORT 43.
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tive detention debate. If the presumption of innocence means something
more than the obligation of the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial,2 2 it may in theory be infringed by a limited detention. In
a similar sense, it is infringed under existing federal law when a suspect
is held for six hours before presentation to a magistrate,23 or for ten
days as a result of inability to post bond following a continued prelimi-
nary hearing.224
A person arrested for disorderly conduct would in fact be pun-
ished, in the sense of being deprived of his liberty, as a result of a
detention without trial if he is denied release pending trial. His punish-
ment might be considerably less than he would receive if tried in the
midst of the emergency, 225 particularly if our suggestion concerning the
desirability of dismissing most charges were followed.2 6 Nevertheless,
the symmetry of traditional legal theory is impaired unless the procedure
is examined in terms of its relationship to the purposes of the criminal
process during a serious disorder. Neither the serious offender nor the
minor offender is being detained because he is presumed to be guilty.
Each is presumed innocent, although in a lawful arrest there has been
probable cause to believe each is guilty; and each will be given an
opportunity to have a trial in which guilt will be determined as soon as it
is reasonably possible to do so-at the end of the emergency. At
their trials, each will be presumed innocent. The punishment, although
real, is incidental and not the objective of the detention. The objective
is to facilitate the restoration of order and protect the life and property
of the citizenry. The justification for accomplishing this objective, at the
expense of the deprivation of liberty without trial which may result from
the detention, is the necessity occasioned by the emergency. The defend-
ant is detained because of the likelihood that if released he will endanger
persons or property or contribute to the disorder. His detention is
justified only because there is no other reasonable alternative which will
222. Cf. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 95 S. Ct. 1881 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970).
223. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970). See also URCP 311; FED. R. Cim. P. 5; ALI Pm-
ARRAIGNMBNT CODE § 310.1 (presentation within 24 hours of arrest); ABA STANDAm1S
RI.ATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE § 4.1; NAC STANDARDS, COURTS § 4.5; NAC
STANDms, CoRmcnoNs § 4.5(1).
224. 18 U.S.C. § 3060 (1970); see Weinberg & Weinberg, The Congressional
Invitation to Avoid the Preliminary Hearing: An Analysis of Section 303 of the Federal
Magistrates Act of 1968, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1361 (1969).
225. See CVmL DisomEnns REPORT 193 ("sentencing is often best deferred until the
heat of the riot has subsided, unless it involves only a routine fine which the defendant
can afford").
226. See notes 232-40 infra and accompanying text.
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accomplish these objectives adequately, and his special status ends with
the emergency.
Legislative endorsement of these principles would end some of the
hypocrisy which inevitably results when statutes designed with a totally
different circumstance in mind require releases during a disorder which
both the judge and public deem contrary to the community interest. It
would also discourage the available alternative of military detention, 22 7
and avoid judicial decisions in riot contexts which may water down the
right to bail in non-emergency situations.
Two additional matters deserve discussion in the context of deten-
tion during emergencies. The first involves forfeiture of collateral. In
non-emergency situations, citizens are frequently allowed to post and
then forfeit collateral following arrests for minor offenses, thereby
avoiding the necessity of a court appearance or the posting of bond or of
otherwise qualifying for pretrial release. If the amount of collateral
required to be posted is increased, the penalty imposed as a price for
avoiding court appearance is obviously greater. If the practice of permit-
ting the forfeiture of collateral is suspended, more arrested persons are
subjected to court appearance, detention until hearing, and the possibili-
ty of a more severe punishment if found guilty.
Officials may be faced with a situation similar to that which
occurred during the District of Columbia May Day demonstrations in
1971, where the normal collateral required for minor offenses was
sufficiently low that some disruptors were apparently prepared to post
the collateral, forfeit it, and rejoin the disorder. The closing of this
revolving door was possible only if collateral schedules were altered, but
the effect of prohibiting forfeitures or raising the amount was to subject
police detention facilities and the courts to a deluge of defendants whom
they were ill equipped to process effectively. Additional confusion re-
sulted from a series of conflicting decisions by the police and courts.2 28
Subsequently, the Judicial Conference Committee concluded that col-
lateral schedules should not be revised on the basis of findings concern-
ing the imminence or existence of a particular emergency. 229
We disagree. The reason for permitting collateral to be posted and
forfeited in lieu of court appearance, trial, and punishment is the
assumption that the purposes of the criminal justice system can be
achieved without resort to the more formal procedures usually involved.
227. See Part I 636-55.
228. 1973 D.C. REPORT 45,221.
229. Id. at 46. See also Washington Mobilization Comm. v. Cullinane, 400 F. Supp.
186, 214-15 (D.D.C. 1975).
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The forfeiture procedures provide both the practical equivalent of an
admission of guilt2 30 and a punishment normally appropriate for the
transgression and sufficient to deter intentional repetition of the offense.
If, however, forfeiture of collateral is being used to thwart the purposes
of the system-to facilitate the continuation of the disorder-there
seems to be no reason why the criminal process should not be altered to
prevent the abuse. Likewise, the situation may justify permitting the
forfeiture of collateral in cases not normally within the purview of the
schedule, as for curfew violations. Whether more harm will result from
clogging the courts than from returning offenders to the streets is a
decision that should be made by the courts on the scene and should be
based upon the criterion of whether the system will operate more
efficiently with or without permission to forfeit. We think the existence
of an emergency is an appropriate reason for reassessing the wisdom of
permitting the forfeiture of collateral.
Finally, it should be remembered that we envision a process where
relatively few people are detained at all. Those who are detained will be
held solely on the grounds that they constitute an unacceptable risk of
danger to the community or are likely to contribute to the disorder. The
vast majority of persons arrested in serious disorders do not fall into
either category. They are the curfew violators, many of the, looters,
traffic offenders, trespassers, and people charged with disorderly con-
duct. It is the mass of these offenders who clog the courts. Enlarged
discretion not to arrest, increased use of citations, and authority to
release those validly arrested should greatly reduce the number of
persons returned to the courts.2 31 Those presented to the courts who are
not charged with serious offenses should be promptly released on recog-
nizance in the absence of probable cause that they will rejoin the
disorder. Available judicial manpower should be used primarily to
screen cases brought before the courts to determine whether detention or
release is appropriate. The result, we think, will be the release of many
who would in the past have been detained and the detention of a few,
most of whom would have been detained in the past but under circum-
stances where there was little justification in law for the detention.
230. Compare Olim v. Mayberry, 524 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1974) (statutory requirement
for forfeiture of collateral in automobile cases equivalent to a conviction), and Lamb v.
Parsons, 195 Va. 353, 78 S.E.2d 707 (1953) (revocation of driver's license equivalent to
a conviction), with Almond v. Countryside Cas. Co., 329 F. Supp. 137 (D. Ark.
1971), aff'd 455 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1972) (forfeiture of bail not equivalent to a fine or
conviction), and Dunn v. State, 513 P.2d 1404 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (same).
231. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
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V. PROSECUTORIAL DIscRETIoN
Prosecutorial discretion is tested dramatically in civil disorders at
two stages: (1) during the disorder when the arrested person is first
presented to the prosecutor, and (2) after the disorder when a decision
must be made concerning whether to proceed with or dismiss charges.
We think that the basic problem faced by the prosecutor is quite
different at each stage.
During the disorder, the prosecutor will be faced with a choice
when he first deals with an arrested defendant. The crucial question at
this stage of the proceedings, in most cases, should be neither the
charges to be asserted against the defendant ultimately, nor his guilt of
those charges. Rather, the question should be whether he may be
released without serious danger that he will resume the disorder or
commit serious crime. If the arresting officer's report indicates probable
cause that the arrestee has committed a serious crime, the prosecutor
should normally "paper" the case as a serious crime and indicate his
intention to seek detention. ]f the report indicates the commission of a
minor offense, he should seek to ascertain whether it is probable that the
defendant will join or rejoin the disorder if released. If he concludes that
the danger of future contribution to the disorder is minimal, or cannot
be proven, he should paper the case as a minor charge, issue a citation
for a hearing at a future date, and order the defendant released. Only if
the prosecutor can demonstrate probable cause to believe that the de-
fendant will participate in the continuing disorder should he seek contin-
ued detention.
The prosecutor will necessarily be concerned tangentially with the
issue of guilt and of the appropriate charge, but these should not be the
focal points of his inquiry at this point. Naturally, he should not charge
anyone where there is inadequate evidence of guilt,2 32 but his review of
the arrest information should normally be aimed at determining the
propriety of immediate release, reserving the issue of the adequacy of
evidence to justify prosecution for a later time. Under such a procedure,
many who are clearly guilty will be released as will most of those who
are not guilty, although the formal dismissal of charges may be delayed.
A few persons who are not guilty may also be sent to court with a
recommendation for detention. We think that this risk is inevitable, and
frankly doubt the capacity of any system to conduct an effective review
of arrest information during a serious disorder with the object of deter-
232. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3.9(a) (1971).
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mining the adequacy of evidence of guilt within three hours of an ar-
restee's arrival at a detention facility.2 3  It is far better that the focus
of the inquiry at this stage, assuming once again that there is probable
cause to believe that the defendant is guilty, be limited to detention,
not guilt. In addition, no attempt should be made to try cases during
a disorder. Judicial and prosecutorial manpower should be utilized to
determine the propriety of detention and the issuance of warrants.
Prosecutors should again examine the issue of the desirability of
detention when a case is first presented to the court to determine
whether detention is appropriate. The issue might be litigated then in a
number of ways: (1) upon preliminary examination of a defendant
charged with a serious offense to determine whether there is probable
cause to believe that he has committed the offense; (2) upon a hearing
to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a defendant
charged with a minor offense will participate in the disorder if released;
and (3) upon habeas corpus to determine whether the emergency
justifying the use of extraordinary powers exists. 234
The determination of what charges will be brought against whom
should normally be delayed until the disorder is over. Whether prosecu-
tors should use their "normal standards" in determining whether to
prosecute2 5 depends upon what is meant by the concept of "normal"
standards. Usually, under normal conditions, a defendant whose guilt is
clear should be prosecuted for the offense he has committed, or at least
some lesser included offense. Concededly, prosecutors sometimes drop
charges against such defendants, but a decision to do so is generally
regarded as a deviation from the norm and requires special justifica-
tion.236
233. This was the recommendation of 1973 D.C. REPORT 31-33.
234. See notes 294-95 infra and accompanying text.
235. Id. at 36.
236. See STANiDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNcrION, supra note 232, §
3.9(b):
The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence might
support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause con-
sistent with the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that evi-
dence exists which would support a conviction. Illustrative of the factors
which the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising his discretion are:
(i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty;
(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense;
(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the par-
ticular offense or the offender;
(iv) possible improper motives of a complainant;
(v) reluctance of the victim to testify;
(vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of others;
(vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction.
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In a disorder there will be hundreds of cases where no useful
purpose of the criminal law will be served by prosecution. Prosecution
will neither deter, rehabilitate, educate, nor accomplish any other pur-
pose except jamming the court docket and providing a criminal record
to a person who is unlikely to commit an offense in the future, but who
may experience substantial and undesirable collateral effects as a result
of conviction. Many curfew violators, trespassers, persons convicted of
disorderly conduct or failure to disperse, and some looters fall into this
category. In fact, many if not most of these cases are not prosecuted
unless the prosecution occurs during the height of the disorder.23 The
decision not to prosecute in such cases should not be regarded as a
breakdown of the system or the consequence of a "speedy trial" rule,238
but as a justifiable decision of public authority that no attempt should be
made to impose criminal sanctions in the absence of a belief that some
useful public purpose will be served by so doing.239 Time and resources
now spent in trying individual or "test cases"2 4 ' can be more profitably
spent in careful preparation of cases against those charged with more
serious offenses, including riot-related offenses.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR ExTRA6RDINARY POwERS
We think that our proposals concerning arrest, search, and seizure
are consistent with existing fourth amendment law. In particular, the
The problems that will be posed to a defendant who raises a selective prosecution ques-
tion are suggested by United States v. Crow Dog, 399 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Iowa 1975).
237. See CIVIL DISORDERS REPORT 193.
238. See ABA PROJECr ON MIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRMAINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIL § 4.1 (1968). See also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972); United States v. Crow Dog, 399 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Iowa 1975).
239. We think it far wiser to exercise prosecutorial discretion not to proceed in such
cases than to attempt a "formal, conceptual separation of the law as it relates to order
maintenance," and decriminalizing "situations of incipient violence." See Force, Decri-
ninalization of the Breach of the Peace Statutes: A Nonpenal Approach to Order
Maintenance, 46 TULANE L. REv. 367 (1972).
A sound prosecutorial approach was illustrated by the situation that followed the
national political conventions in Miami in 1972. During the Republican convention,
some 1,100 youthful offenders were arrested. Of these only a very few were for serious
felonies, the remainder being for misdemeanors such as "blocking traffic and failing to
disperse." Within a six month period of arrest, the felony cases were tried in the normal
manner, but all of the misdemeanor cases were dismissed. This action was apparently
justified on the following basis:
Practically all of the law enforcement officers have felt that the main purpose
of the arrests was to prevent serious problems and to insure the democratic
process. Once that was achieved there was little desire to obtain massive con-
victions. N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1972, at 21, col. 1.
240. Cf. 1973 D.C. REPORT 49-50. The Committee recommended that "the test case
be encouraged as a method of resolving cases based on similar facts." Id. at 50. See also
ABA COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO
TRAL COURTS 76 (1975).
1084 ,[Vol. 1975:1021
CIVIL DISORDERS
willingness of the Supreme Court to apply a broad standard of "reasona-
bleness" as the test for searches without a warrant provides clear justifi-
cation for our proposals concerning emergency searches, roadblocks,
searches incident to curfew arrests, and broadened stop and frisk au-
thority. The Court will apparently no longer adopt a "per se unreasona-
bleness" approach to warrantless searches not fitting within "a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." '241 In searches
incident to an arrest, it has already indicated that it will not require
litigation in each case of the "issue of whether or not there was present
one of the reasons supporting the authority for search of person. 242
Instead, any lawful arrest will subject the arrestee to a full search of his
person.2 43 Searches of his property without a warrant, of a kind not
falling within the traditional exceptions, may be permitted if "the search
is reasonable," without regard to whether it may have been reasonable to
procure a search warrant. 4
Our proposals for preventive detention stand on a less firm footing.
We are aware of the strong arguments that have been advanced to the
effect that the eighth amendment prohibits only excessive bail and does
not preclude a legislative decision to deny bail altogether in designated
types of cases,2 45 and that, at least for certain serious offenses, bail can
be denied a dangerous offender because historically such serious offen-
ses were not bailable as a matter of right at common law.240 Either of
these theories would support our recommendation that release be denied
defendants arrested for serious offenses during a disorder, and the
former would presumably justify the denial of bail to the perpetrator of
a less serious offense who is likely to contribute to the disorder upon
release. The difficulty is that both would also justify a much broader
concept of preventive detention during non-emergency conditions, a
doctrine that is quite unnecessary in order to uphold the more limited
detention power that we envision in the extraordinary conditions that
frequently accompany a serious civil disorder.
241. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Cooper v. California,
386 U.S. 58 (1967). See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 528-29 (1967). See note 89 supra.
242. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
243. Id.
244. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807 (1974).
245. See, e.g., Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 60 GEo. LJ. 1139, 1381
(1972).
246. See, e.g., Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention,
55 VA. L. Rav. 1223, 1225 (1969).
Vol. 1975:1021] 1085
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Some justification for preventive detention may be found in the
short duration of the detention which we would permit. The right to bail
has never been interpreted to require instantaneous presentation before
a magistrate and release on bail following arrest. In rural areas, and in
some cities, the delay between arrest and a bail decision may now often
exceed the seventy-two hours that we think reasonable.247 There is, of
course, a difference between not being presented before a magistrate for
a pretrial release decision and a denial of release after presentation. We
question whether the difference reaches constitutional dimensions, at
least where the detention is as limited as we suggest. Certainly, the
realistic effect of a seventy-two hour delay-followed by release gov-
erned by ordinary criteria for a few offenders, and release upon recog-
nizance or citation for most-would seem less violative of the constitu-
tional principles than requiring a minimal bond of $300 to $500 for all
offenders with full knowledge that most will be unable to post the
premium or find a bondsman who will undertake to serve as surety.248
As was indicated earlier, case precedent in the preventive detention
area is notably lacking, especially in view of the rhetoric that it has
spawned. 249 Notwithstanding this general lack of precedent, our propos-
als are supported by the martial law cases.250 Military authorities in
serious civil disorders have been permitted to exercise powers of deten-
tion that are far greater than those we think desirable, and it should be
possible under the Constitution to authorize civilian officials of the state
to exercise the powers which military officials may constitutionally
exercise over civilians.25'
247. D. FREED & P. WALD, supra note 184, at 202.
248. Such a procedure apparently meets the requirements of the Constitution. Cf.
Foote, supra note 184, at 1126-36.
249. Blunt v. United States, 102 Wash. L. Rep. 1585 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974). Nothing
in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), even remotely suggests that its holding was
intended to deal with mass civil disturbances.
250. See note 212 supra.
251. See Part I 636-55. We appreciate that there is rhetoric suggesting that the
existence of emergencies has no effect upon the power of government. See, e.g., Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971):
In times of unrest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of inter-
nal subversion, this basic law [of the fourth amendment] and the values that
it represents may appear unrealistic or extravagant to some. But the values
are those of the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts. In times
not altogether unlike our own they won-by legal and constitutional means in
England and by revolution on this continent-a right of personal security
against arbitrary intrusions by official power. If times have changed, reducing
everyone's scope to do as he pleases in an urban and industrial world, the
changes have made the values served by the Fourth Amendment more, not less,
important. Id. at 455 (footnotes omitted).
We do not think the lofty sentiment is justified by the decisions of the Court. We
recognize that our argument is on a firmer foundation when applied to mass violence
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There is authority for the proposition that, while the military may
exercise broad powers in such an emergency, similar powers cannot be
asserted by civil authorities. 252 In the absence of legislation, we have no
quarrel with the result, although it produces at least two strange and
undesirable consequences. The rights of the citizen may depend upon
whether he is arrested, searched, and detained by a soldier or by a
policeman,253 and such a doctrine creates an incentive to use troops
when sound policy should, in our opinion, dictate that troops not be
used if civilian authorities with broader powers can cope with the
situation. A sounder approach would be a recognition that the emergen-
cy that justifies the use of troops and their extraordinary empowerment
also justifies extraordinary powers in civil authorities.
Support for this proposition may be found in the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Chalk. 54
Pursuant to a state statute and city ordinance, the mayor of Asheville,
North Carolina, proclaimed a state of emergency following a battle
between blacks and police at a local high school. He also imposed a
nighttime curfew and prohibited the off-premises possession of firearms,
in addition to other restrictions upon activities which would normally
have been beyond his authority. At about 11:00 p.m., a car was stopped
by a police officer who placed Chalk, the driver, and a passenger under
arrest for violation of the curfew order. The officer noticed what ap-
peared to be the butt end of a shotgun protruding from underneath a
newspaper on the floor of the car. He pulled it out and observed the
stock and trigger mechanism of a twelve-gauge shotgun. Further search
revealed the barrel of the gun, shotgun shells, and dynamite fuses. The
car was again searched at the police station where additional incendiary
materials were discovered. These materials constituted the basis for
federal prosecution for possession of unregistered firearms.
255
such as characterized the urban riots of 1967 and 1968 than mass non-violent civil
disobedience such as exemplified in the Washington May Day disturbance of 1971. The
precedents clearly involve cases of violence. We think they should also apply to massive
civil disobedience if of a nature sufficient to threaten the orderly functioning of
government.
252. See, e.g., Ex parte Lavinder, 88 W. Va. 713, 108 S.E. 428 (1921).
253. See Valdez v. Black, 446 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 963
(1972). For a discussion of Valdez see Part I 607 n.203. The petition for a writ of
certiorari in Valdez raised the question, inter alia, of whether National Guardsmen are
subject to the fourth amendment in the absence of insurrection or a declaration of
martial law. 40 U.S.L.W. 3290 (U.S. 1971).
254. 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971).
255. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d) (1970). The firearms in this case were
materials from which an incendiary bomb could be assembled.
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Chalk asserted that the searches which produced the incendiary
materials violated his constitutional rights, in part because they were
triggered by unlawful restrictions, particularly the curfew, imposed by
the mayor. Specifically, he argued that the statutory scheme author-
izing a mayor's declaration of a state of emergency was vague and
"overbroad," and that there was an insufficient threat to public safety to
allow the mayor to impose the restrictions.2 56 The court, in an opinion
by Judge J. Braxton Craven, analogized the exercise of discretion by the
mayor to the permissible use of military force in a domestic disorder.
Relying on the martial law cases, it observed that an executive decision
that civil control has broken down to the point that emergency measures
are necessary is not conclusive nor is it free from judicial review, but
that the scope of the review must be limited.257 The application of the
martial law approach required that judicial scrutiny be limited to deter-
mining whether the action was taken in good faith and whether there
was some factual basis for the decision that the restrictions imposed
were necessary to maintain order. 5 8 If such a factual basis existed,
Judge Craven noted, it would be highly inappropriate for a court to
substitute its judgment of the degree of necessity for the judgment of the
official who was required to take immediate action.259 Although Chalk
was written in terms of the limited scope of judicial review, it not only
reaffirms the basic theory of the martial law cases, but also uses them as
a rationale for sustaining executive action by local officials, where mil-
tary forces were not involved. -' 0
VII. LIMITATIONS UPON POWERS OF MILITARY FORCES
We have suggested earlier that in serious civil disorders military
forces should be authorized by statute to utilize the same emergency
powers as civilian police.26' In some states this may increase the existing
powers of the military;262 in most it will probably limit the powers which
256. United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1280 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
943 (1971).
257. Id. at 1280-81. Predictably, the court relied upon Luther, Moyer, Sterling,
Milligan, and other cases noted at earlier parts of this Article.
258. Id. at 1281.
259. The court stated that "[w]hether the measures employed ...were absolutely
necessary in order to prevent a serious civil disorder is clearly an important question for
political debate, but not, we think, a question for judicial resolution in this case." Id. at
1282.
260. See also United States v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 65 (D.S.D. 1974).
261. See Part 1 636-55.
262. See id. at 648 n.205.
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are now dependent upon the more flexible concepts of necessity; 203 and
in others it will clarify law that is now ambiguous.264
Eminent authority has opposed the codification of permissible
military powers upon the ground that a code is "not very helpful in
dealing with situations incapable of precise delimitation in advance"
and that "[n]o legislation could envision every situation which might
arise or help in the solution of the really difficult cases."265 In our
judgment, these observations would also apply to any attempt to fashion
legislation to deal with emergencies. It is no more or less difficult to
determine what powers civilian law enforcement authorities should be
permitted to exercise during a civil disorder. In substance, the issue is
whether crucial decisions involving public safety and individual rights
will be made in periods of comparative calm by popularly elected
legislatures or in the tumult of a disorder by civilian or military execu-
tives. We think it far better that crucial decisions concerning the breadth
of extraordinary powers be made by the elected representatives of the
people than by military commanders.266
Assuming that some form of legislative authorization and restric-
tion upon the powers of the military is appropriate, the issue then
becomes one of what extraordinary powers should be conferred. The
concept of codifying the permissible powers of troops is not new.
Unfortunately, past proposals have proceeded upon the assumption that
troops should be permitted to utilize the powers of civilian authorities in
non-emergency conditions,267 or be given special powers not entrusted
to civil authorities without discussion of why such powers should be en-
trusted only to the military. 266 We see no reason why military forces
should be granted greater powers than the civilian police. To do so
would inevitably provide an even greater incentive for their use, when,
in our opinion, resort to military force should occur only if civilian
authorities, using their emergency powers, are unable to deal with a
disorder effectively.
263. Id. at 648 n.206.
264. Id.
265. WIENER 164.
266. This is, indeed, the common procedure in much of the free world. See note 26
supra.
267. See University of Colorado Law Revision Center, A Comprehensive Study of the
Use of Military Troops in Civil Disorder with Proposals for Legislative Reform, 43 U.
COLo. L. Rlv. 399 (1972). The proposed statutory scheme reflects many of the views of
Professor Engdahl, at that time director of the Center. See Part I 655-90.
268. Ballantine, Qualified Martial Law, A Legislative Proposal (pts. 1-2), 14 MicH.
L. Rnv. 102, 197 (1915).
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We also see no convincing reason why military forces should have
less authority than civilian police.269 As a matter of prudent judgment, it
may be appropriate that troops be used to replace police in normal
protective functions and as guards for vital facilities such as bridges,
power plants, and communications centers, rather than deploying them
in a disorder area. But occasions may arise where it will be necessary to
use troops to arrest, search, or man roadblocks. They should be author-
ized to perform these functions without the necessity of a platoon's being
accompanied by a police officer who in theory makes the arrests,2 70 or
of deputizing a regiment of National Guardsmen under the theory that
they will in fact be acting as special police officers under the command
of a police chief.27 1
We recognize that there may be a catastrophe of such gigantic
proportions that the executive may be required to govern temporarily
through the use of troops who exercise powers greatly in excess of those
which we would permit in the more "routine" emergencies resulting
from serious civil disorders such as race or campus riots, massive labor
violence, or localized insurrection. Such a situation could, for example,
occur as an aftermath of a nuclear attack. 2  In such circumstances,
resort to the more flexible concept of necessity might be appropriate
despite the legislative authority and restrictions which we think should
be imposed upon police and the military. Such situations are unlikely to
occur, and should not justify a failure to delineate by legislation the
appropriate powers of the military in the disorders much more likely to
be the basis for military intervention. Neither should recognition of the
need for greater powers in the most extreme situation be used to justify
their use in less serious disorders which are nevertheless beyond the
effective control capacity of civilian authorities.
At one end of a spectrum will be disorders which civilian authori-
ties can deal with under normal procedures, and at the other will be
disruptions which threaten the survival of the political community and
in which extraordinary measures will probably be taken by an executive
and tolerated by the courts regardless of the absence of articulated legal
justification. Between these poles will be circumstances where civilian
authorities can adequately deal with serious disorders through temporar-
269. But see 1973 D.C. REPORT 19-23 (opposing a grant of arrest authority to regular
military personnel).
270. CIVIL DISORDERS REPORT 291.
271. This has been the recent practice in the District of Columbia. 1973 D.C.
REPORT 21-22.
272. See Fairman, Government Under Law in Times of Crisis, in GovERNMNrr
UNDER LAWv 232-86 (A. Sutherland ed. 1956).
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ily expanded powers, and other disorders where military forces using
these same powers will be adequate to restore order. It is in this
concededly vague middle ground that we favor the legislative expansion
of civilian authority with the same powers, but no others, being granted
to the military.
VIII. PROTECTION AGAINST ABUSE
Procedures to protect against abuse should be incorporated in any
process where extraordinary powers are vested in governmental authori-
ties. Expanded powers to deal with serious civil disorders provide a
classic example of the desirability of such safeguards, because there is
both a tendency to justify excessive use of power on emergency or
national security grounds by executives seeking to accomplish ends that
would clearly be unlawful in normal circumstances, 273 and a tendency
273. The possibility of abuse on such grounds is well summarized by Friedrich and
Sutherland, as follows:
If constitutional executives or legislatures were able, on the pretext of emer-
gency, to exercise unlimited discretion in the assumption of powers normally
denied to them, self-interest would often tempt them to discover imaginary
crises, or to exaggerate the extent and severity of real ones. This situation,
which if carried far enough would make a farce of any system of constitutional
restraints, can be avoided only by subjecting the exercise of emergency powers
to the judgment of some relatively independent and disinterested authority.
Friedrich & Sutherland, supra note 26, at 688.
This type of justification has been regrettably frequent in recent years. Its most
familiar invocation in this country has been the attempted defense of several aspects of
the so-called Watergate Affair. Thus, the drafting of domestic intelligence-gathering
plans, the creation of the so-called "plumbers'" unit, the burglary of the office of Daniel
Ellsberg's psychiatrist, the wiretapping of suspected "leakers," and the attempted cover-up
itself, as well as various other projects, were justified by those responsible for them as
being in the interest of national security. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Select
Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Book 3, at 1319-45
(1973) (the so-called Huston Plan documents, which set forth a broad program of
domestic intelligence gathering); Brief on Behalf of the President of the United States, in
Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974);
Statement of Information, Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., Book 1, at 103 (1974); Testimony of Witnesses, Hearings Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Book 2, at 304 (1974); W.
DOBROVIR, J. GEBHARTIr, S. BUFFONE & A. OAKEs, THE OFFENSES OF RICHARD M.
NIXON: A GUIDE FOR THM PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 23-24, 28-33 (1974). It had
also been used as a basis for warrantless wiretapping in so-called domestic security cases,
see Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 95-99 (1972), a practice that
was subsequently invalidated by the Supreme Court notwithstanding the argument.
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (though, as noted at
notes 135-38 supra and accompanying text, the Court did indicate that warrant require-
ments could be altered if Congress concurred that legitimate interests required such
procedures); see Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
The invocation of emergency conditions or national security requirements has also
been a frequent basis for repressive action on a far broader scale in other lands. The
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by some officials acting in good faith to overreact to events that may
constitute incipient emergencies.2 74 Any process that authorizes extraor-
dinary powers in the event that certain conditions exist is subject to
abuse if the officials to whom the decision is entrusted err, with good or
bad motive, in determining the existence of the conditions that trigger
the expanded authority.2 75 A high degree of procedural protection
against the possibility of such error may mean a substantially diminished
capacity to respond when conditions justify prompt action. A low degree
of procedural protection, on the other hand, is an invitation to abuse.
The challenge is to provide a capacity for immediate response to real
emergencies while still maintaining effective safeguards to prevent abus-
es from happening, as well as adequate redress if an abuse does occur.
Reasonable people will differ on how the balance should be struck, and
the choices should be made by legislatures after full and open debate.
The comments that follow reflect our suggestions for a pattern of
procedural protection that might be adopted.
Effective procedural protection requires the utilization of different
techniques of control of executive discretion and oversight by both
most recent example was in India in 1975, when all of the fundamental constitutional
rights of the people were suspended after a court decision finding that the Prime
Minister had engaged in unlawful campaign activities. Thus, the Indian press reported
that "a state of emergency [has been declared] this morning on account of [sic] threat
to the 'security of the country' due to 'internal disturbances."' The Times of India, June
27, 1975, at 1, col. 1 (Bombay ed.). The activity in India is by no means unique, since a
state of emergency or martial law has been declared in no less than nine other countries
in the past four years. These have included the Philippine Islands, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23,
1972, at 1, col. 7; Turkey, id., Apr. 30, 1971, at 2, col. 7; Korea, id., Oct. 18, 1972, at 1,
col. 5; South Vietnam, id., July 18, 1972, at 4, col. 5; Argentina, id., May 1, 1973, at 3,
col. 1; Chile, id., June 28, 1973, at 18, col. 2; Greece, id., Nov. 18, 1973, at 1, col. 3;
Burma, id., Dec. 17, 1974, at 2, col. 4; and Nicaragua, id., Dec. 29, 1974, at 1, col. 4.
See generally Nesson, Aspects of the Executive's Power Over National Security
Matters: Secrecy Classifications and Foreign Intelligence Wiretaps, 49 IND. L.J. 399
(1974); Comment, Executive Military Power: A Path to American Dictatorship, 54
Nma. L. RE. 111 (1975); Note, Honored in the Breach: Presidential Authority to
Execute the Laws with Military Force, 83 YAT LJ. 130 (1973).
274. For example, the behavior of National Guardsmen in Newark and Plainfield,
New Jersey, and Detroit in 1967 provide excellent examples, Crcv DISORDERS REPORT
30-38, 41-46, 47-61, as does the behavior of the judiciary in Chicago in 1968 and Detroit
in 1967. Criminal Justice h Extremis; Comment, 66 MiCH. L. REv., supra note 2.
275. In Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), Chief Justice Taney observed
that
[ilt is said that this [intervention] power in the President is dangerous to lib-
erty, and may be abused. All power may be abused if placed in unworthy
hands. But it would be difficult, we think, to point out any other hands in
which this power would be more safe, and at the same time equally effectual.
Id. at 44.
Recent events suggest that abuse of power entrusted to the President may occur in the
absence of effective legislative or judicial oversight.
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legislatures and courts.27 6 Our basic suggestions for state legislatures
involve several quite disparate elements: (1) legislative definition of
the circumstances justifying extraordinary powers and delineation of the
powers that may be exercised in such circumstances; (2) executive
responsibility for the declaration of an emergency when conditions
warrant the use of extraordinary powers, appropriate publication of the
declaration, and a division of responsibility between local executives and
the governor with reference to certain powers; (3) legislative reservation
of the power to require approval for the continuation of an emergency
after a stated period as well as the power to determine that emergency
conditions have terminated; (4) judicial power to review whether an
emergency justifying the use of extraordinary powers exists during a
declared emergency; (5) brief maximum limits on preventive detention;
(6) the development of guidelines authorizing and encouraging release
of offenders during an emergency and dismissal of cases after a disorder
has subsided when no useful purpose will be served by detention or
prosecution; and (7) creation of an effective civil remedy for victims of
abuse, including money damages and expungement of arrest records.
At the federal level major problems arise when regular troops are
used or state guardsmen are federalized. As has been suggested earlier,
there is good reason to clarify existing federal statutes to express more
precisely when regular troops may be used,27 8 and when state guards
may be called into federal service.2 79 The President should be denied the
authority to act in any other cases without prior congressional authoriza-
tion.
There is likewise a need to specify the powers of troops when they
276. The elements that we envision in an emergency power scheme were described by
Friedrich and Sutherland as "an experiment [that] has [not] yet been made in any
federal system, nor indeed in any other form of constitutional state." Friedrich &
Sutherland, supra note 26, at 692. They also identified four requirements that were
necessary to ensure that emergency powers will not be used for an improper purpose:
(1) That the assumption of emergency powers be strictly legitimate in charac-
ter-it must have its origin in and its authority must be derived from the legiti-
mate constituti6nal source of power.
(2) The assumption of power must be for a relatively short period of time.
(3) Final authority to determine the need for emergency power must never
rest with the agency which assumes the power.
(4) There must be an independent agency to determine whether or not acts
perpetrated under an assumption of emergency powers were in defense of the
constitution. Id. at 693.
While we have not attempted to build our model upon these requirements, they are
reflected in the theoretical model suggested in the text.
277. See notes 306-08 infra and accompanying text.
278. See Part I 610-32.
279. Id. at 616-18 n.97.
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are used. 280 The President should be required to issue an executive order
whenever troops are utilized, stating the reasons for their deployment
and the authority for his action.28 1 There may also be reasons for
authorizing congressional oversight of the President's decision to commit
troops, by requiring congressional approval if troops are not removed
after a limited period. Additional protection exists in federal court
jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus,28 2 as well as federal relief
against individuals 23 and the government for unconstitutional action.284
The greatest need for procedural protection is at the state and local
level. The most prevalent current pattern combines broad powers of
governors to use guardsmen, no clear statement of their powers, no
legislative oversight, limited judicial capacity or inclination to restrain
executive action, broad authority of local officials to proclaim emergen-
cies and institute curfews, and broad immunity statutes without effective
alternative remedies against the state.288 We think that considerable
protection to the citizenry can be provided by more carefully drafted
statutes defining the circumstances in which certain extraordinary pow-
ers may be exercised by civilian executive and judicial officials. Such
280. See notes 262-72 supra and accompanying text. Limitations on the power of
federal troops might follow several models: (1) Congressional enactment of laws
governing police powers in civil disorders within the District of Columbia with provision
that the powers and limitations would apply to federal military forces used anywhere
within the United States to maintain order; (2) delegation to the President of power to
enact limitations by Executive order not inconsistent with principles reflected in Con-
gressional legislation; (3) adoption of the law of the state in which federal troops are
being used; and (4) legislation specifically setting forth powers.
281. See Part 1 620 n.103.
282. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970).
283. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
284. The bases for civil relief from the government would be the provisions of the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1970), and the constitutional cause of
action provided by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See generally Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The
Constitution as a Sword, 85 HAIv. L. REv. 1532 (1972). Prior to its amendment in 1974,
the Federal Tort Claims Act would not have provided relief for a wide range of
intentional torts. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1971)
(plaintiff injured by National Guardsman denied relief for riot-related gunshot injury).
See also Coffey v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 539 (D. Conn. 1975). In light of the
Supreme Court's language in Bivens, this exception was eliminated from the Federal Tort
Claims Act in 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50 (Mar. 16, 1974). In the report
accompanying the change, its effect is described as follows:
this provision should be viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens case and its
progeny, in that it waives the defense of sovereign immunity so as to make
the Government independently liable in damages for the same type of conduct
that is alleged to have occurred in Bivens (and for which that case imposes
liability upon the individual Government officials involved). S. REP. No. 93-
588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973).
285. See Part 1 636-55.
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statutes might incorporate different thresholds as justification for the use
of specific powers, with the decision as to the existence of the necessary
conditions correspondingly entrusted to officials of different rank.280
Thus, mayors might be authorized to impose curfews upon a finding of
widespread public disorder, while a decision to broaden the powers of
arrest, search, or detention might require a finding that the disorders
have reached a level that available civilian law enforcement authorities
are unable to restore order under normal procedures. The seriousness of
such action might justify a requirement that it be made by the governor
upon request from the appropriate local official, particularly since the
decision as to whether to commit the state guard will presumably
continue to be made by the governor. The statute might require a
specific finding that conditions necessitate the use of the special powers
authorized by the executive action. A demonstration such as the Wash-
ington May Day demonstration might, for example, justify broadened
powers of arrest and detention, but not necessarily require broadened
powers of search.28 7 The decision to use troops might also require a
finding that even with their enlarged powers civilian law enforcement
authorities will be unable to restore order promptly. The statute should
set out specifically the special powers entrusted to police and courts, and
authorize troops to exercise the same powers as police.
In order to empower police or troops to use extraordinary powers,
a governor should be required to declare an emergency and to delineate
its geographical area. The declaration should be published widely
through the media and by sound truck or other device in the affected
areas. 288 The promulgation and publication of the emergency declara-
tion would perform several important functions: (1) provide notice to
286. The problem of defining the local officials who should be empowered to act can
cause difficulty in states with complex patterns of local government. See 35 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 524 (1969). See also Part I 648-50 n.206. Thus, consideration must be given to the
person who is to be authorized to act in the absence of the mayor or other local official.
See, e.g., Riot Control Legislation 158 (noting that in the absence of the mayor of
Denver, the deputy mayor would have such power, and the deputy mayor would be the
manager of public works). We specifically think it unwise to entrust decisions concerning
the existence of an emergency to state police or sheriffs. See Comment, 72 W. VA. L.
R v., supra note 10. It has also been argued that it is important to require local officials
to act to guard against a local mayor who sympathizes with rioters. Ducharme &
Eickholt, State Riot Laws: A Proposal, 45 J. URBAN L. 713, 729-30 (1968). We doubt
the efficacy of any attempt to mandate action through the imposition of criminal
sanctions for neglect or refusal to act. Such approaches have in the past caused more
practical problems than they have solved. See Part 1664-67.
287. See note 251 supra.
288. See notes 48-55 supra and accompanying text (notice requirements for curfew
orders).
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some potential offenders of the seriousness of the situation and deter
some from participating; (2) provide a clear indication to the public of
acceptance by the governor of responsibility for conduct limiting civil
liberties, thereby discouraging its use in doubtful situations where an
executive might be willing to act if his decision had lower visibility;289
and (3) tend to prevent post hoc justification for actions on the ground
that they were justified by an emergency, since deviation from normal
practice would not be permitted in the absence of the declaration.290
Our proposal would involve prior legislative approval of a gover-
nor's power to act if certain conditions exist. In doing so we have
obviously opted in favor of executive discretion to determine whether
the required conditions exist, rather than reserving to a legislature the
power to decide whether an emergency justifies the use of special
powers. We do so for several reasons: (1) many state legislatures are
not permanently in session; (2) some do not always demonstrate the
capacity to take decisive action within short periods when in session; and
(3) the intelligence resources of a governor probably render him more
capable of assessing the seriousness of conditions and the relative levels
of force required to deal with different types of disorders.291
It does not follow that the legislature has no role to play. It seems
to us quite reasonable to require legislative approval for the continuation
of emergency conditions beyond a stated time period, such as a week, as
well as to recognize the power of a legislature to terminate the resort to
special powers by finding that an emergency no longer exists. 292 Such
negative controls may go far in discouraging overreaction by a governor.
289. See Note, Honored in the Breach: Presidential Authority to Execute the Laws
with Military Force, 83 YALE L.J. 130, 141 (1973).
290. National Security Interest and Civil Liberties 1287.
291. See Friedman, Contingency Planning for the Administration of Justice During
Civil Disorder and Mass Arrest, 18 Ad.mU.L. REv. 77, 95 (1968).
292. Cf. English Emergency Powers Act of 1920, which provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
1. Issue of proclamation of emergency
(2) Where a proclamation of emergency has been made the occasion
thereof shall forthwith be communicated to Parliament, and, if Parliament
is then separated by such adjournment or prorogation as will not expire
within five days, a proclamation shall be issued for the meeting of Parlia-
ment within five days, and Parliament shall accordingly meet and sit upon
the day appointed by that proclamation, and shall continue to sit and act
in like manner as if it had stood adjourned or prorogued to the same day.
2. Emergency regulations
(2) Any regulations so made shall be laid before Parliament as soon as
may be after they are made, and shall not continue in force after the expir-
ation of seven days from the time when they are so laid unless a resolu-
tion is passed by both Houses providing for the continuance thereof.
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We think it wise that a legislature confer jurisdiction upon its
courts to determine if the statutory conditions justifying expanded pow-
ers or the use of troops exist, when a challenge to emergency powers is
asserted by a detained citizen.293 We are mindful of the extensive case
law in which courts have declined to examine whether emergencies
in fact existed in the face of executive action.2 94 Such judicial self-
restraint, or abdication of function, may sometimes have been justified
by the constitutional separation of powers, or by adherence to "political
question '295 or "standing" doctrines, 296 but we are not impressed by the
supposed lack of capacity of the courts to determine whether conditions
are as the executive claims them to be. If the legislature has manifested
its intent that the executive should act only if certain conditions exist,
and has authorized the courts to determine if such conditions do in fact
exist, there should be no serious question about the power of the courts
to act. Such litigation should also not jam the dockets during a disorder.
Presumably, a limited number of cases, with expedited appeals if neces-
sary, could serve as the vehicles for determining whether an emergency
existed and, if so, when it terminated.
The standard of review to be applied by a court should be whether
the conditions justifying extraordinary powers existed and whether lim-
itations placed upon police powers were exceeded. It has been sug-
gested that the courts should play a more dynamic role, reviewing the
exercise of emergency powers to determine if the measures taken were
necessary to restore order. 297 Such a standard would require that "there
(4) The regulations so made shall have effect as if enacted in this Act,
but may be added to, altered, or revoked by resolution of both Houses of
Parliament or by regulations made in like manner and subject to the like
provisions as the original regulations. Emergency Powers Act of 1920, 10
& 11 Geo. 5, c. 55, §§ 1(2), 2(2), (4).
See 38 HAILsBuRY's STATuTEs OF ENGLAND 289-90 (1972). See also National Security
Interest and Civil Liberties 1293 (proposal to permit temporary use of measures designed
to deal with early stages of a disorder but requiring legislative action for more drastic
measures).
293. We doubt if judicial review would provide realistic protection in any but the
most extreme cases when an emergency was declared by a governor. It might, however,
provide more protection when emergency measures are continued after the events which
gave rise to the declaration have ceased to exist.
294. See Part I 635; McGonagle, supra note 26 at 211-12. But see Warren, The Bill
of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 181, 193 (1962) ("mI]f judicial review is
to constitute a meaningful restraint upon unwarranted encroachments upon freedom in
the name of military necessity, situations in which the judiciary refrains from examining
the merit of the claim of necessity must be kept to an absolute minimum").
295. See Part 1 632-34.
296. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
297. National Security Interest and Civil Liberties 1296.
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not be available to the government alternative means of coping with
the emergency that were as effective as the measures employed but
less restrictive of individual liberties. '29 8 Under such an approach no
attempt would be made by the legislature to articulate permissible pow-
ers, but executive discretion would be subject to judicial review in a
context where the government would be required to establish the neces-
sity of each exercise of emergency powers.
We think that such a procedure would prove unworkable in prac-
tice. The height of a civil disorder is not an appropriate time, nor is the
court the best vehicle, for determining which measures are absolutely
necessary to accomplish a restoration of order. Each case would inevita-
bly require separate litigation, since a decision in one would rarely be
binding on a second where conditions were different. The relative costs,
effectiveness, and restrictiveness of alternative measures are better deter-
mined by a legislature before a disorder takes place.
There is, furthermore, no compelling reason why a less restrictive
measure should always be used instead of a constitutionally permissible,
but more restrictive, measure. There is certainly no such requirement in
non-emergency conditions, where, for example, an arrest without a
warrant is permitted although a warrant could have been obtained; an
arrest is lawful although a summons or citation would have sufficed to
bring the defendant before the court; a complete search of the person for
a weapon is permitted upon arrest in the absence of any reason to
believe that the arrested person was armed; and a surety bond may be
required for a defendant to obtain pretrial release although release on
recognizance would have provided adequate assurances of the defend-
ant's presence at trial. We see no compelling justification for a greater
standard during an emergency.
We have previously suggested that it may be appropriate to provide
a time limit on the period that a defendant may be detained without
opportunity to obtain pretrial release through normal procedures, 299
such as seventy-two to ninety-six hours. Such a limit seems justified
for several reasons. Most serious disorders will peak at a relatively
early point.30 0 Also, there is an understandable tendency to continue
emergency conditions until authorities are reasonably sure that they are
not experiencing a temporary lull. There may be reason to continue
other powers for longer periods, but detention without opportunity for
pretrial release is a sufficiently serious infringement of individual lib-
298. Id. at 1296-97.
299. See notes 247-48 supra and accompanying text.
300. See note 219 supra.
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erty to justify a return to normalcy as soon as it is reasonably possible.
Such a time limitation, after which bail hearings would commence,
would provide prosecutors with an opportunity to prepare cases where
high bonds may be appropriate and to order the release of detained
persons who after investigation are found to be unlikely future offend-
ers.
We also see no reason why persons arrested for serious offenses
should not be entitled to a prompt preliminary hearing if their detention
is to be justified solely on the ground of the emergency.30 1 Likewise, a
prompt hearing should precede less serious offenses if attempts are made
to justify a continued detention on the grounds that the arrestee is likely
to rejoin the disorder.
Our proposals contemplate that police and prosecutors should
release most persons arrested during a disorder upon the issuance of a
citation °2 and dismiss most charges after a disorder has subsided.303
Decisions by an individual prosecutor to adopt such an approach could
well bring charges that he is "soft on crime," is encouraging future
disorders, or is otherwise derelict in the performance of his duties. An
official who must soon face re-election in a city experiencing a serious
disorder may be loathe to take such action unless explicit support can be
found for his decisions. Accordingly, legislative authority to issue cita-
tions and a legislative statement of policy with delegation of the respon-
sibility for drafting guidelines to the appropriate prosecutorial officials,
would be a helpful step toward governing the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in civil disorders.
Unquestionably, some excesses will occur regardless of good faith
efforts to comply with the law. The victims of misguided zeal should
have a remedy in the courts of their state. They should not be required
to establish an intentional violation of their federal constitutional
rights,304 or be left without redress if official immunity is successfully
asserted 0 5 or if their claim establishes unlawful action not reaching
constitutional dimensions. Thus, civil relief in the form of an action for
damages against a state official acting unlawfully under circumstances
where no immunity exists should be authorized, 80 as should an action
301. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). An expedited and more informal
preliminary hearing of the kind authorized by Gerstein might be appropriate. Such a
hearing would provide adequate protection against the possibility of an unlawful arrest.
302. See notes 232-40 supra and accompanying text.
303. See notes 232-40 supra and accompanying text.
304. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 235 (1974).
305. See Part I 651-55 n.209.
306. There is, of course, a broad immunity available in most jurisdictions. See id. In
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against the state when there has been unlawful action without regard
to whether the actor is protected by immunity.3 1 7 Included in any such
remedy should be the power to expunge official records of any unlawful
arrest.30
8
DX. CONCLUSION
As the length of this two-part essay may suggest, the role of the
criminal process during civil disorders presents a wide range of fun-
damental problems, some of which have been unresolved for several
centuries at the very least. We have not attempted to discuss all of these
problems. Some of those left unexplored are relatively insignificant, such
as the power of the state to close places of business during a civil
emergency. Some are among the more important issues facing our
society, such as the extent to which the state should be permitted to
engage in strategic intelligence-gathering activities. 0 9 We have also not
undertaken to consider the broader underlying issues-for example, the
obligation of our society to remove or alleviate the social, economic, or
political causes of civil disorder.
Our object has been to study the decisional, legislative, constitu-
tional, and historical principles which bear upon the role of the criminal
process in civil disorders, and to suggest that during serious emergencies
the criminal process has different purposes from those in normal cir-
cumstances and that special powers are justified to accomplish the
different objectives. Legislatures should act during periods of relative
tranquility to provide the powers and safeguards that may be needed in
later emergencies. Troops may be used constitutionally to deal with
some jurisdictions, state officials are liable for injuries caused by their acts or omissions,
see, e.g., CALIF. GOV'T CODE § 820 (West 1966), but even in these states there will often
be an exception for actions in enforcing the law, see id. § 820.4, or the broader disorder
immunity. See CALIF. MIL. & VET. CODE § 392 (West 1955).
307. See, e.g., N.Y. JUDICRY--COURT OF CLAIMs Acr § 8-a (McKinney Supp.
1974) (torts of militia members).
308. The extent to which the records of those who are arrested and detained during a
civil disorder may be expunged is a question that has received considerable attention
following recent disorders. See ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 206-5 (Supp. 1975). See
also Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d
938, 966-71 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973); Menard v. Mitchell, 430
F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See generally Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication
Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147,
162-68, 174-78; Comment, Expungement and Sealing of Arrest and Conviction Records:
The New Jersey Response, 5 SEToN IIALL L. REv. 864 (1974).
309. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d
678 (1970).
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serious disorders, but when used their powers should be the same as
those of civilian police. While extraordinary powers are justified, special
safeguards are also required to assure that civil liberties are limited only
to the extent justified by the necessity.
Others will strike a different balance between police power and
individual liberties from that which we have suggested. Our hope is that
in the relative calm of the middle seventies, legislatures will address the
problems which were presented by the civil disorders of the late sixties,
face the hard choices that must be made, and provide a framework that
will provide a basis for both the maintenance of order and the protection
of civil liberties in future crises.

